Models and Algorithms for Private Data Sharing by Mohammed, Noman






Computer Science and Software Engineering
Presented in Partial Fulﬁllment of the Requirements




c© Noman Mohammed, 2012
CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
This is to certify that the thesis prepared
By:                                                                                                                         
Entitled:
and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with
respect to originality and quality.
Signed by the final examining committee:
                                                                                     Chair
 External Examiner





                                                                                    
Chair of Department or Graduate Program Director
                                                                                     
Dean of Faculty
Noman Mohammed
Models and Algorithms for Private Data Sharing




Dr. S. P. Mudur
Dr. K. Schmitt
Drs. M. Debbabi and B. C. M. Fung
July, 2012
ABSTRACT
Models and Algorithms for Private Data Sharing
Noman Mohammed, Ph.D.
Concordia University, 2012
In recent years, there has been a tremendous growth in the collection of digital
information about individuals. Many organizations such as governmental agencies,
hospitals, and ﬁnancial companies collect and disseminate various person-speciﬁc
data. Due to the rapid advance in the storing, processing, and networking capa-
bilities of the computing devices, the collected data can now be easily analyzed to
infer valuable information for research and business purposes. Data from diﬀerent
sources can be integrated and further analyzed to gain better insights. On one hand,
the collected data oﬀer tremendous opportunities for mining useful information. On
the other hand, the mining process poses a threat to individual privacy since these
data often contain sensitive information. In this thesis, we address the problem of
developing anonymization algorithms to thwart potential privacy attacks in diﬀerent
real-life data sharing scenarios. In particular, we study two privacy models: LKC-
privacy and -diﬀerential privacy. For each of these models, we develop algorithms
for anonymizing diﬀerent types of data such as relational data, trajectory data, and
heterogeneous data. We also develop algorithms for distributed data where multiple
data publishers cooperate to integrate their private data without violating the given
privacy requirements. Experimental results on the real-life data demonstrate that
the proposed anonymization algorithms can eﬀectively retain the essential informa-
tion for data analysis and are scalable for large data sets.
iii
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Numerous organizations such as governmental agencies, hospitals, and ﬁnancial com-
panies collect and disseminate various person-speciﬁc data for research and business
purposes. Worldwide governments systematically collect personal information about
their citizens through censuses. These data are released to public for demographic
research. In medical domain, gaining access to high-quality healthcare data is a vital
requirement to informed decision making for medical practitioners and researchers.
Driven by mutual beneﬁts and regulations, there is a demand for healthcare insti-
tutes to share patient data with various parties for research purposes. For example,
licensed hospitals in California are required to periodically submit speciﬁc demo-
graphic data on every discharged patient [20].
Data collection and publishing are also ubiquitous in other domains. With the
emergence of new technologies, data about individuals get collected at various places
in various ways. Grocery stores collect a large amount of customer purchase data
by store courtesy cards. These data are analyzed to model customer behavior and
used by advertisement companies. In online world, websites and service providers
(e.g. Google) collect search requests of users for future analysis. Recent data release
by AOL is a unique example of this kind [10].
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Finally, the use of location-aware devices such as RFID tags, GPS-based de-
vices, and cell phones raises new privacy concerns. These devices are used extensively
in many network systems including mass transportation [90], car navigation [49], and
healthcare management [105]. The collected trajectory data capture the detailed
movement information of the tagged objects, oﬀering tremendous opportunities for
mining useful knowledge. However, these trajectory data contain people’s visited
locations and thus reveal identiﬁable sensitive information such as social customs,
religious preferences, and sexual preferences.
The explosion of digital data collection has given rise to a number of complex
privacy questions regarding the ownership, collection and dissemination of personal
data. The answers to these questions connect many avenues of research: social, legal,
ethical and technical. The objective of this thesis is to answer the following question:
How can a data publisher safeguard data privacy while keeping the released data
useful?
1.1 Motivation
The current practice in data sharing primarily relies on policies and guidelines on
the types of data that can be shared and agreements on the use of shared data. This
approach alone may lead to excessive data distortion or insuﬃcient protection. The
most common practice is to remove the identiﬁable attributes (e.g. name, social
security number) of individuals before releasing the data. However, this simple
technique though apparently looks innocuous, in reality fails to protect the privacy
of record holders. In this section, we present a number of real-world attacks to
emphasize the need of privacy-preserving techniques and to illustrate the challenges
in developing such tools.
The most illustrious privacy attack was demonstrated by Sweeney [96]. In
Massachusetts, Group Insurance Commission (GIC) collected the medical data of
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the state employees. The data set had no identiﬁable attributes such as name, social
security number or phone numbers and thus was believed to be anonymous. GIC
gave a copy of the data to researchers and sold a copy to industry. However, the
data set did contain demographic information such as date of birth, gender, and ZIP
code. Sweeney reported that 87% of the U.S. population can be uniquely identiﬁed
based on 5-digit zip code, gender and date of birth. It is not common to ﬁnd many
people with the same date of birth, less likely for them to live in the same place and
very less likely having same gender. She bought a copy of the Massachusetts voter
registration list by $20 and identiﬁed the record of William Weld, governor of the
state of Massachusetts, by joining both the tables. This kind of attack where an
external data can be used to identify an anonymous data is called linking attack. The
concern of linking attack has escalated in recent years due to the ease of collecting
external information over Internet.
Not all linking attacks require external information. Sometimes the semantic
information of the data itself reveals the identity of a user. The case of AOL data
release is a notable example. On August 6, 2006, AOL released a 2GB ﬁle containing
the search queries of its 650,000 users. There are approximately 20 million search
queries collected over three months period. As a privacy protection mechanism, AOL
removed all user identities except the search queries and assigned a random number
to each of its users. Three days later, two New York Times reporters identiﬁed and
interviewed the user # 4417749 from the release data [10]. Ms. Thelma Arnold was
re-identiﬁed from the semantic information of her search queries. She said, “We all
have a right to privacy. Nobody should have found this all out."
Few months later, Netﬂix, a movie renting service, announced a $1, 000, 000
prize for 10% improvement for their recommendation system. To assist the competi-
tion, they also provided a real data set which contains 100 million ratings for 18,000
movie titles from 480,000 randomly chosen users. According to the Netﬂix web-
site, “To protect customer privacy, all personal information identifying individual
3
Table 1.1: Summary of the thesis contributions
Algorithms Data Publisher Privacy ModelSingle Multiple Diﬀerential Privacy LKC-privacy
Chapters 3 and 4  
Chapter 5  
Chapter 6  
Chapter 7  
customers has been removed and all customer ids have been replaced by randomly-
assigned ids." Narayanan and Shmatikov shortly attacked the Netﬂix data by linking
information from the International Movie Database (IMDb) site, where users post
their reviews (not anonymous) [85]. They showed “With 8 movie ratings (of which 2
may be completely wrong) and dates that may have a 14-day error, 99% of records
can be uniquely identiﬁed in the data set. For 68%, two ratings and dates (with a
3-day error) are suﬃcient."
It is evident from the above examples that mere removal of the personal in-
formation does not ensure privacy to the users. Privacy-preserving data publishing
(PPDP) studies how to transform raw data into a version that is immunized against
privacy attacks but that still preserves useful information for data analysis.
1.2 Contributions
This thesis examines various privacy attacks and develops anonymization algorithms
for diﬀerent application scenarios. The proposed anonymization algorithms adopt
two privacy models: LKC-privacy and diﬀerential privacy. Table 1.1 summaries
diﬀerent characteristics of the proposed algorithms. Following we detail the technical
contributions of this thesis.
1.2.1 Relational Data Anonymization
Sharing healthcare data has become a vital requirement in healthcare system man-
agement; however, inappropriate sharing and usage of healthcare data could threaten
4
patients’ privacy. We study the privacy concerns of the blood transfusion information-
sharing system between the Hong Kong Red Cross Blood Transfusion Service (BTS)
and public hospitals, and identify the major challenges that make existing data
anonymization methods not applicable. Furthermore, we propose a new privacy
model called LKC-privacy, together with an anonymization algorithm, to eﬀec-
tively preserve both privacy and utility in high-dimensional relational data sharing.
Experiments on real-life data demonstrate that our anonymization algorithm can
eﬀectively retain the essential information in anonymous data for data analysis and
is scalable for anonymizing large data sets.
1.2.2 Trajectory Data Anonymization
Location-aware devices are used extensively in many network systems, such as mass
transportation, car navigation, and healthcare management. The collected trajec-
tory data capture the detailed movement information of the tagged objects, oﬀering
tremendous opportunities for mining useful knowledge. Yet, publishing the raw
trajectory data for data mining would reveal speciﬁc locations, times, and other
potentially sensitive information of the tagged objects or individuals. We study the
privacy threats in trajectory data publishing and show that existing anonymization
methods are not applicable for trajectory data due to its challenging properties:
high-dimensional, sparse, and sequential. Our primary contributions are (1) to
adopt LKC-privacy model for trajectory data that overcomes these challenges, and
(2) to develop an anonymization algorithm to achieve LKC-privacy while preserving
the data utility for trajectory pattern mining. We evaluate the privacy model and
anonymization algorithm, in terms of data utility, and scalability, on data sets that
simulate real-life traﬃc.
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1.2.3 Heterogeneous Data Anonymization
Among the existing privacy models, -diﬀerential privacy provides one of the strongest
privacy guarantees and has no assumptions about an adversary’s background knowl-
edge. All existing solutions that ensure -diﬀerential privacy handle the problem of
anonymizing relational and set-valued data separately. Our contribution is the pro-
posal of the ﬁrst anonymization algorithm for heterogenous data that contain both
relational and set-valued data. The proposed approach makes a simple yet funda-
mental switch in anonymization algorithm design: instead of listing all the possible
records (i.e., contingency table) for noise addition, records are generalized before
noise addition. The anonymization algorithm ﬁrst probabilistically generalizes the
raw data and then adds noise to guarantee -diﬀerential privacy. We show that the
anonymized data can be used eﬀectively to build a decision tree induction classi-
ﬁer. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed algorithm is scalable and
performs better than the existing solutions for classiﬁcation analysis.
1.2.4 Distributed Data Anonymization
Data integration and sharing methods enable diﬀerent data providers to ﬂexibly in-
tegrate their expertise and deliver highly customizable services to their customers.
Nonetheless, combining data from diﬀerent sources could potentially reveal person-
speciﬁc sensitive information. Our contribution is the proposal of distributed algo-
rithms to securely integrate private data from multiple parties where the database is
divided either vertically or horizontally among the parties. The vertically-partitioned
data problem problem was discovered in a collaborative project with a ﬁnancial
industry. The horizontally-partitioned data problem was generalized from the in-
formation sharing scenario of the Hong Kong Red Cross Blood Transfusion Service
(BTS). For both the scenarios, we devise algorithms that achieve both LKC-privacy
and diﬀerential privacy models.
6
1.3 Organization
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 provides an overview of various privacy models, anonymization
techniques, and utility metrics of privacy-preserving data publishing. In this
chapter, we also provide an overview of the related literature.
• Chapter 3 formalizes the LKC-privacy model and presents the algorithm for
anonymizing relational data. The results of this chapter appear in [80].
• Chapter 4 studies the privacy threat of releasing trajectory data. We adopt
LKC-privacy model and propose an algorithm for trajectory data anonymiza-
tion. The results of this chapter appear in [78].
• Chapter 5 addresses the problem of distributed anonymization from multiple
data publishers while ensuring LKC-privacy model. The results of this chapter
appear in [79,81,82].
• Chapter 6 provides an overview of -diﬀerential privacy and describes a
diﬀerentially-private data release algorithm for heterogeneous health data.
The results of this chapter appear in [77].
• Chapter 7 presents the two-party diﬀerentially private data release algo-
rithms. The results of this chapter appear in [8].




Data privacy has been an active area of research in statistics, database, and security
community for the last three decades [2, 37]. These works can be broadly classi-
ﬁed into two frameworks: interactive and non-interactive. In interactive framework,
users pose aggregate queries through a private mechanism and the data holder out-
puts macro-data (e.g., SUM, COUNT) in response. This approach is also known as
statistical disclosure control (SDC) [2]. In non-interactive setting, the original data
are ﬁrst sanitized and the entire anonymous data about individuals (micro-data) are
published for data analysis. Once the data are published, the data publisher has
no further control on the published data. This approach is also known as privacy-
preserving data publishing (PPDP) [37]. The existing research works can also be
categorized into two scenarios, which are somehow orthogonal to the above classiﬁca-
tion: centralized vs. distributed. Data may be owned by a single party (centralized)
or by multiple parties (distributed). In the case of distributed scenario, the data
owners want to achieve the same goal like single party on their integrated data
without sharing their data with others.
In this thesis, we address the centralized and the distributed scenarios for the
non-interactive framework. In Section 2.1, we ﬁrst present an overview of various










Figure 2.1: Data ﬂow in privacy-preserving data publishing
data publishing. We then discuss the related research proposals in Section 2.2.
2.1 Preliminaries
Privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP) has two phases: data collection and
data publishing. Figure 2.1 depicts the data ﬂow in PPDP. In data collection phase,
the data publisher collects data from the individuals. There are two models in the
data collection phase: trusted and untrusted. In the trusted model, individuals trust
the data publisher and give all the required data. For example, patients give their
true information to hospitals to receive proper treatment. In this scenario, it is the
responsibility of the data publisher to protect privacy of the individuals’ personal
data. In untrusted model, individuals do not trust their data publisher. They add
some noise to their data to protect sensitive information from the data publisher [31].
A typical example of this model is participants responding to a survey. In this thesis,
we assume that the data publisher is trusted and study how to anonymize data in
the data publishing phase to protect privacy of the individuals.
Data publishing phase includes sharing the data with speciﬁc recipients and
releasing the data for public download; the recipient could be a data user (researcher)
who wants to perform legitimate data analysis, or could potentially be an adversary
who attempts to associate sensitive information in the published data with a target
victim. Therefore, data publisher needs to transform the underlying raw data into
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a version that is immunized against privacy attacks but still supports eﬀective data
mining tasks. To achieve proper balance between privacy and utility, the data
publisher needs to decide three aspects: privacy model, anonymization techniques,
and utility metric.
2.1.1 Privacy Models
The collected micro-data set are stored in a data table where each row represents an
individual and each column is an attribute. We use the terms “data set” and “data
table” interchangeably in the rest of this thesis. Attributes can be divided into three
categories. (1) Attributes that explicitly identify an individual, such as SSN, and
name. These attributes are called explicit identiﬁer and must be removed before
releasing the data. (2) A set of attributes whose combined value may potentially
identify an individual. For example, the combined values of zip code, date of birth,
and gender. These attributes are called quasi-identiﬁer (QID) and the values of
these attributes may be publicly accessible from other sources. Finally, an attribute
is considered sensitive if an adversary is not permitted to link its value with an
identifer. Examples includes disease, salary, etc.
Diﬀerent privacy models have been proposed to prevent an adversary from
linking an individual with a sensitive attribute given the knowledge of the quasi-
identifer. Following we brieﬂy present some of the well-known privacy models.
k-Anonymity. Samarati and Sweeney [94, 96] show that removing explicit iden-
tiﬁers is not enough to protect privacy of the individuals. If a record in the table
is so speciﬁc that not many individuals match it, releasing the data may lead to
linking the individual’s record and, therefore, the value of her sensitive attribute.
Consider the raw patient data in Table 2.1(a), where each record represents a pa-
tient with the patient-speciﬁc information. Job, Sex, and Age are quasi-identifying
attributes. Suppose that the adversary knows that the target patient is a Lawyer
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Table 2.1: Examples for illustrating attacks
(a) Patient table
Job Sex Age Disease
1 Engineer Male 35 Hepatitis
2 Engineer Male 38 Hepatitis
3 Lawyer Male 38 HIV
4 Writer Female 30 Flu
5 Writer Female 33 HIV
6 Dancer Male 30 HIV
7 Dancer Female 30 HIV
(b) 2-anonymous patient table
Job Sex Age Disease
1 Professional Male [35-40) Hepatitis
2 Professional Male [35-40) Hepatitis
3 Professional Male [35-40) HIV
4 Writer Female [30-35) Flu
5 Writer Female [30-35) HIV
6 Dancer * 30 HIV
7 Dancer * 30 HIV
and his age is 38. Hence, record #3, together with his sensitive value (HIV in this
case), can be identiﬁed since he is the only Lawyer who is 38 years old in the data.
k-anonymity requires that no individual should be uniquely identiﬁable from a group
of size smaller than k based on the values of QID attributes. A table satisfying this
requirement is called a k-anonymous table. Table 2.1(b) is a 2-anonymous table of
Table 2.1(a).
-diversity. Machanavajjhala et al. [70] point out that k-anonymity only prevents
identity linkage attacks since an adversary can not identify a record corresponding to
an individual with conﬁdence greater than 1/k. However, k-anonymous data table
is vulnerable against attribute linkage attacks. Suppose the adversary knows that
the patient is a dancer of age 30. In such case, even though there exist two such
records (#6 and #7), the adversary can infer that the patient has HIV with 100%
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conﬁdence since both the records contain HIV. To prevent such attribute linkage
attack, -diversity requires that every QID group should contain at least  “well-
represented” values for the sensitive attribute. Machanavajjhala et al. [12] gave a
number of interpretations of the term “well-represented”. The simplest deﬁnition
requires every equivalent group to have  distinct values of the sensitive attribute.
Conﬁdence Bounding. Wang et al. [103] consider bounding the conﬁdence of in-
ferring a sensitive value from diﬀerent combination of QID values by specifying one or
more privacy templates of the form, 〈QID → s, h〉, where s is a sensitive value, QID
is a quasi-identiﬁer, and h is a threshold. For example, with QID = {Job, Sex,Age},
〈QID → HIV, 50%〉 states that the conﬁdence of inferring HIV from any group
on QID is no more than 50%. For the data in Table 2.1(b), this privacy tem-
plate is violated because the conﬁdence of inferring HIV is 100% in the group for
{Dancer, ∗, 30}. Unlike -diversity, conﬁdence bounding can have diﬀerent privacy
templates with diﬀerent conﬁdence thresholds.
There are other privacy models. (α, k)-anonymity [108] requires every QID
group to satisfy both k-anonymity and conﬁdence bounding. t-closeness requires
the distribution of a sensitive attribute in any group to be close to the distribution
of the attribute in the overall table [65]. Xiao and Tao [110] propose the notion of
personalized privacy to allow each record owner to specify her own privacy level.
This model assumes that a sensitive attribute has a taxonomy tree and each record
owner speciﬁes a guarding node in the taxonomy tree. Thus, all these partition-
based privacy models have diﬀerent assumptions about the adversary’s background
knowledge.
Recently, Wong et al. [106] and Zhang et al. [121] have shown that algorithms
that satisfy partition-based privacy models are vulnerable to minimality attack and
do not provide the claimed privacy guarantee. Although several ﬁxes against a
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minimality attack have been proposed [24, 54, 112], new type of attacks such as
composition attack [39], deFinetti attack [58], and foreground knowledge attack [107]
have emerged against algorithms that adopt partition-based privacy models.
Diﬀerential privacy [28] has received considerable attention as a substitute
for partition-based privacy models in privacy-preserving data publishing. Diﬀeren-
tial privacy provides strong privacy guarantees independent of an adversary’s back-
ground knowledge, computational power or subsequent behavior. Diﬀerential pri-
vacy, in general, requires that the outcome of any analysis should not overly depend
on a single data record. Thus, if a user had opted in the database, there would not be
a signiﬁcant change in any computation based on the database. Therefore, this as-
sures every record owner that any privacy breach will not be a result of participating
in a database. We further discuss about diﬀerential privacy in Chapter 6.
2.1.2 Anonymization Techniques
Given a privacy model, diﬀerent anonymization techniques are used to transform the
original data set into a version that satisﬁes the privacy requirements. Anonymiza-
tion techniques are used to make the data less precise to protect privacy. Following,
we present some common techniques that are often used for anonymization.
Suppression. The simplest technique to achieve anonymity is to suppress the value
of a cell. Suppression is done by replacing an attribute value with a special sym-
bol “*” or “Any”. It has been widely used to satisfy privacy requirement such as
k-anonymity. For example in Table 2.1(b), the values of Sex attribute of records #6
and #7 are suppressed to ensure 2-anonymity. Both Meyerson and Williams [83]
and Aggarwal et al. [4] prove that it is NP-hard to achieve optimal k-anonymization
by suppression. Meyerson and Williams [83] propose an O(k log k) approximation
algorithm. Aggarwal et al. [4] improve the approximation to O(k). Finally, Park














Figure 2.2: Taxonomy trees for Job, Sex, Age
Table 2.2: Bucketized data
(a) QID Attribute
Job Sex Age Bucket
Engineer Male 35 1
Engineer Male 38 2
Lawyer Male 38 1
Writer Female 30 3
Writer Female 33 2
Dancer Male 30 3










Generalization. Generalization provides better data utility compared to suppres-
sion by replacing the speciﬁc value with a more general value. While suppression
works in a binary fashion (keep the original value or suppress), generalization has a
number of intermediate states according to a taxonomy tree for each attribute. Fig-
ure 2.2 depicts the taxonomy trees for the attributes Job, Sex and Age. For example
in Table 2.1(b), the values Engineer and Lawyer are replaced by a more general
value Professional according to the taxonomy tree. Generalization techniques can
be classiﬁed mainly into two categories: global vs. local [61]. In global generaliza-
tion, all instances of a value are mapped to the same general value. While in local
generalization, diﬀerent instances can be generalized to diﬀerent general values. A
range of algorithms have been proposed that use generalization technique to enforce
diﬀerent privacy models. Some of these algorithms are optimal under restricted form
of generalization [11,61,94], while others are based on heuristics [38,62,104].
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Bucketization. Unlike generalization and suppression, bucketization [73,111] does
not modify the QID and the sensitive attribute (SA), but de-associates the relation-
ship between the two. However, it thus also disguises the correlation between SA
and other attributes; therefore, hinders data analysis that depends on such corre-
lation. Bucketization was proposed to achieve -diversity. It divides all the records
into diﬀerent buckets in such a way that each bucket contains  distinct values of
sensitive attribute. Tables 2.2(a) and 2.2(b) are the bucketized data, which satisﬁes
2-diversity for the patient data Table 2.1(a).
Other anonymization techniques include randomization-based approach, and
output perturbation-based approach. Randomization-based approach modiﬁes the
underling data randomly by either adding noise to the numerical values or replacing
the categorical values with other values from the domain [6, 32]. Randomized data
are useful at the aggregated level (such as average or sum), but not at the record
level [6, 36]. Data recipients can no longer interpret the semantic of each individ-
ual record, which is important in some knowledge exploration tasks, such as visual
data mining [122]. Yet, they are still useful techniques if the applications do not
require preserving data truthfulness at the record level. On the other hand, output
perturbation-based approach ﬁrst computes the correct result and outputs a per-
turbed version of the result by adding noise. This technique is often used to achieve
diﬀerential privacy (more discussion in Chapter 6). Though randomization-based
approach can also ensure diﬀerential privacy [92], it requires higher degree of noise
than output perturbation-based approach [29,30].
2.1.3 Utility Metrics
While protecting privacy is a critical element in data publishing, it is equally im-
portant to preserve the utility of the published data because this is the primary
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reason for publication. A number of utility metrics have been proposed to quantify
the information that is present in the anonymized data. Data publishers use these
metrics to evaluate and optimize the data utility of the anonymized data. In gen-
eral, utility metrics can be classiﬁed into two categories: general purpose metric and
special purpose metric.
General Purpose Metric. In many cases, data publisher does not know how the
released data will be used by the data recipient. In such cases, data publisher uses
general purpose metric that measures the similarity between the original data and
the anonymized data. The objective is to minimize the distortion in the anonymized
data. The simplest and most intuitive measure is to count the number of anonymiza-
tion operations performed on the data set. For example, in case of suppression, the
data utility is measured by counting the number of suppressed values [83]. Less
suppression means more utility. Similarly, for generalization, the information loss is
measured by the number of generalization steps performed. Samarati proposes one
metric that measures the utility in terms of generalization height [94]. Other met-
rics include Loss Metric (LM) [51] and Normalized Certainty Penalty (NCP) [98]
that also takes into consideration the domain size of the attribute. Bayardo and
Agrawal [11] propose another metric called Discernibility Metric (DM) to measure
the data distortion in the anonymized data. The metric charges a penalty to each
record for being indistinguishable from other records. This metric has been used to
measure the data utility in [62,70].
Special Purpose Metric. The type of information that should be preserved de-
pends on the data mining task to be conducted on the published data. If the purpose
of the data publishing is known before the data release, then customized anonymiza-
tion techniques can be adapted to preserve certain information that is useful for that
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particular task. Iyengar [51] shows that optimizing data utility with respect to gen-
eral purpose metrics (LM, DM, etc.) does not preserve enough information for a
particular data mining task such as classiﬁcation analysis. In such scenario, the
target data mining model is ﬁrst built on the anonymized data to compare the accu-
racy of the model with respect to the model built from the original data. Diﬀerent
techniques have been proposed to optimize the accuracy of the data mining tasks
such as classiﬁcation, clustering, and regression [38,63].
2.2 Related Work
In this section, we ﬁrst present an overview of various PPDP research proposals for
sharing diﬀerent types of data. We then brieﬂy discuss the related research areas in
the subsequent sections.
2.2.1 Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing
Relational Data. Partition-based privacy models divide a given data set into
disjoint groups and release some general information about the groups. There is
a large body of work on anonymizing relational data based on partitioned-based
privacy models. As discussed earlier, k-anonymity [94] [96], -diversity [70], and
conﬁdence bounding [103] are based on a predeﬁned set of QID attributes. These
single QID-based approaches suﬀer from the curse of high dimensionality [3] and
render the high-dimensional data useless for data mining. In Chapter 3, we address
the problem of high dimensionality by assuming that the adversary knows at most
L values of QID attributes of any target patient.
Many algorithms have been proposed to preserve privacy, but only a few have
considered the goal for classiﬁcation [37]. Iyengar [51] has presented the anonymity
problem for classiﬁcation and proposed a genetic algorithmic solution. Bayardo and
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Agrawal [11] have also addressed the classiﬁcation problem using the same classiﬁca-
tion metric of [51]. Fung et al. [38] have proposed a top-down specialization (TDS)
approach to generalize a data table. Recently, LeFevre et al. [63] have proposed
another anonymization technique for classiﬁcation using multidimensional recod-
ing [62]. More discussion about the partition-based approach can be found in a
survey paper [37].
Diﬀerential privacy has received considerable attention recently as a substi-
tute for partition-based privacy models for PPDP. However, most of the research
on diﬀerential privacy so far concentrates on the interactive setting with the goal
of reducing the magnitude of added noise [26, 30, 93], releasing certain data mining
results [13,35], or determining the feasibility and infeasibility results of diﬀerentially-
private mechanisms [15,57]. A general overview of various research works on diﬀer-
ential privacy can be found in the recent survey [29]. Below, we brieﬂy review some
current techniques that adopt the non-interactive approach.
Barak et al. [9] address the problem of releasing a set of consistent marginals
of a contingency table. Their method ensures that each count of the marginals is
non-negative and their sum is consistent for a set of marginals. Xiao et al. [113]
propose Privelet, a wavelet-transformation-based approach that lowers the magni-
tude of noise needed to ensure diﬀerential privacy to publish a multidimensional
frequency matrix. Hay et al. [46] propose a method to publish diﬀerentially pri-
vate histograms for a one-dimensional data set. Although Privelet and Hay et al.’s
approach can achieve diﬀerential privacy by adding polylogarithmic noise variance,
the latter is only limited to a one-dimensional data set. Xiao et al. [115] propose
a two-step algorithm for releasing relational data. It ﬁrst issues queries for every
possible combination of attribute values to the Privacy Integrated Queries (PINQ)
interface [74], and then produces a generalized output using the perturbed data set
returned by PINQ.
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Some recent proposals [45, 64] address how to compute the results of a num-
ber of given queries while minimizing the added noise. However, these methods
require the set of queries to be given ﬁrst altogether to compute the results. In
contrast, our proposed algorithm described in Chapter 6 complements the above
methods by determining how to partition the data adaptively so that the released
data can be useful for a given data mining task. In addition, a number of recent
works propose diﬀerentially-private mechanisms for diﬀerent applications such as
record linkage [50], and recommender systems [75]. Though closely related, these
methods do not address the problem of privacy-preserving data publishing, the pri-
mary theme of this thesis.
Set-Valued Data. The increasing prevalence of set-valued data has resulted in new
types of privacy attacks. For example, Loukides et al. [67] show that diagnosis codes,
a kind of set-valued data, could be used by an adversary as a linkage to patients’
identities. A large number of research works on privacy-preserving set-valued data
publishing [19, 40, 47, 98, 99, 116, 117] have appeared in the literature. These works
can be broadly divided into two categories according to whether they distinguish
the items between sensitive and non-sensitive.
Ghinita et al. [40] and Xu et al. [116,117] divide all items into either sensitive
or non-sensitive, and assume that an adversary’s background knowledge is strictly
conﬁned to non-sensitive items. Ghinita et al. [40] propose a bucketization-based
approach that limits the probability of inferring a sensitive item to a speciﬁed thresh-
old, while preserving correlations among items for frequent pattern mining. Xu et
al. [117] bound the background knowledge of an adversary to at most p non-sensitive
items, and employ global suppression to preserve as many item instances as possi-
ble. Xu et al. [116] improve the technique in [117] by preserving frequent itemsets
and presenting a border representation. All these works have two main drawbacks.
First, when an adversary is aware of some, even few, sensitive items, other sensitive
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items could be learned. Second, in many cases there does not exist a consensus
of “sensitive”. Items sensitive to someone may not be sensitive to others. Cao et
al. [19] address the ﬁrst concern by assuming that an adversary may possess back-
ground knowledge on sensitive items and propose a privacy notion ρ-uncertainty,
which bounds the conﬁdence of inferring a sensitive item from any subset of items
(sensitive or non-sensitive) to ρ. Terrovitis et al. [98,99], and He and Naughton [47]
eliminate the distinction between sensitive and non-sensitive. Any item could be
both sensitive and non-sensitive at the same time.
Consequently, He and Naughton [47] and Terrovitis et al. [98,99] consider only
identity attacks. Similar to the idea of [116] and [117], Terrovitis et al. [98] propose
to bound the background knowledge of an adversary by the maximum number m of
items and propose a new privacy model km-anonymity, a relaxation of k-anonymity.
They achieve km-anonymity by a bottom-up global generalization solution. To im-
prove the utility, recently Terrovitis et al. [99] provide a local recoding method for
achieving km-anonymity. He and Naughton [47] point out that km-anonymity pro-
vides a weaker privacy protection than k-anonymity and propose a top-down local
generalization solution under k-anonymity. However, recent research [39,58,106,107]
has indicated that even k-anonymity provides insuﬃcient privacy protection for set-
valued data. Lately, Chen et al. [21], for the ﬁrst time, apply diﬀerential privacy to
set-valued data sanitization. They propose a probabilistic top-down partitioning al-
gorithm, which scales linearly with the input data size. The published data provides
guaranteed utility for count queries and other data analysis tasks based on counts,
such as frequent itemset mining.
Trajectory Data. Some recent works [1, 49, 88, 97, 120] address the anonymity of
moving objects. Abul et al. [1] propose a new privacy model called (k, δ)-anonymity
that exploits the inherent uncertainty of moving objects’ locations. Their method
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relies on a basic assumption that every trajectory is continuous. Though this as-
sumption is valid for GPS-like devices where the object can be traced all the time,
it does not hold for RFID-based moving objects. Moreover, Abul et al. [1] achieve
anonymity by space translation that changes the actual location of an object. In
contrast, our proposed algorithm described in Chapter 4 employs suppression for
anonymity and thus preserves the data truthfulness and maximal frequent sequences
with true support counts. Hoh et al. [49] present an uncertainly-aware privacy al-
gorithm for GPS traces. They selectively remove trajectory pairs to increase un-
certainly between trajectories to hinder identiﬁcation. Both the works target GPS
traces and can not be employed for anonymizing RFID data.
The privacy model proposed in [97] assumes that diﬀerent adversaries have
diﬀerent background knowledge about the trajectories, and thus their objective is
to prevent adversaries from gaining any further information from the published data.
They consider the locations in a trajectory as sensitive information and assume that
the data publisher has the background knowledge of all the adversaries. In reality,
such information is diﬃcult to obtain. Pensa et al. [88] propose a k-anonymity
notion for sequence datasets. The proposed algorithm also aims to preserve frequent
sequential patterns. However to achieve anonymity, they transform a sequence into
the other by insertion, deletion or substitution of a single item. Thus, their approach
also spoils data truthfulness. Yarovoy et al. [120] consider time as a QID attribute.
However, there is no ﬁxed set of time for all moving objects. Each trajectory has
its own set of times as its QID. It is unclear how the data holder can determine the
QID attributes for each trajectory.
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2.2.2 Privacy-Preserving Distributed Data Sharing
This approach allows anonymizing data from diﬀerent sources for data release with-
out exposing the sensitive information. We categorise this approach as the dis-
tributed non-interactive scenario. Jurczyk and Xiong [56] have proposed an algo-
rithm to securely integrate horizontally-partitioned data from multiple data owners
without disclosing data from one party to another. Jiang and Clifton [52] have pro-
posed a method to integrate vertically-partitioned data by maintaining k-anonymity
among the participating parties. However, this approach does not fulﬁll the security
requirements of a semi-honest adversary model. To satisfy this requirement, Jiang
and Clifton [53] have proposed Distributed k-Anonymity (DkA) framework to se-
curely integrate two distributed data tables satisfying k-anonymity requirement. To
the best of our knowledge, Jiang and Clifton’s works are the only ones that generate
a k-anonymous table in a distributed setting for vertically-partitioned data. Our
proposed algorithm presented in Chapter 5 outperforms DkA framework in terms
of algorithmic complexity and scalability for handling large data sets.
All the previous research proposals adopt k-anonymity [94, 96] or its exten-
sions [70, 103] as the underlying privacy principle and, therefore, are vulnerable to
the recently discovered privacy attacks [39, 58, 106, 107]. To thwart these privacy
attacks, we propose diﬀerentially-private distributed algorithms in Chapter 7.
2.2.3 Statistical Disclosure Control
Information sharing while protecting individuals’ privacy has also been well studied
in statistical databases [2]. We can categorize these works as centralized-interactive
approach. Unlike PPDP, here the users (researchers) are only interested in the
aggregate properties of the data such as SUM, MAX, MIN, COUNT, MEDIAN, etc.
These aggregate values are computed over a set of values and should not disclose
any sensitive value of an individual. However, it is possible for an adversary to
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construct a set of queries that unveils the detailed underlying data. The challenge
is to answer the queries in such a way that no inference can be made based on the
aggregate statistics.
The proposed approaches can be roughly divided into two categories: restriction-
based techniques and perturbation-based techniques. Restriction-based techniques
ensure privacy by putting restriction on the query [16, 25, 33, 48, 72, 100]. In the
response to a query, the system determines whether the answer can or cannot be
safely delivered without inference and thus controls the amount of information to
be released. In perturbation-based approach, the system ﬁrst computes the cor-
rect result and outputs a perturbed version of the result by adding noise [14,26,30].
The fundamental diﬀerence between the two approaches is that while the restriction-
based approaches either answer the query result correctly or reject to avoid inference,
the perturbation-based approaches add noise to the query output. All these works
prohibit data publishing, which is the basic requirement of PPDP.
2.2.4 Privacy-Preserving Distributed Data Mining
This category of works can be classiﬁed as distributed-interactive approach. In
privacy-preserving distributed data mining (PPDDM), multiple data holders want
to compute a function based on their inputs without sharing their data with others.
This function can be as simple as a count query or as complex as a data mining task
such as classiﬁcation, clustering, etc. For example, multiple hospitals may want to
build a data mining model (e.g. classiﬁer for predicting disease based on patients’
history) without sharing their data with one another. The usual assumption is
that the data holders are semi-honest where they follow the protocol but may try to
deduce additional information from the received messages. In recent years, extensive
research has been conducted to design secure protocols that can construct diﬀerent
data mining models. These protocols are based on cryptographic techniques known
as Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC). For example, Yang et al. [118] proposed a
23
method to acquire classiﬁcation rules from a large number of data holders while their
sensitive values are protected. Diﬀerent methods have been proposed for diﬀerent
data mining tasks including association rules mining [101], clustering [102], ID3
decision tree [66]. Refer to [22, 89] for surveys on privacy-preserving distributed
data mining.
However, compared to data mining result sharing, data sharing gives greater
ﬂexibility because data recipients (researchers) can perform their required analysis
and data exploration, such as mining patterns in a speciﬁc group of records, visu-









Gaining access to high-quality health data is a vital requirement to informed de-
cision making for medical practitioners and pharmaceutical researchers. Driven by
mutual beneﬁts and regulations, there is a demand for healthcare institutes to share
patient data with various parties for research purposes. However, health data in its
raw form often contains sensitive information about individuals, and publishing such
data will violate their privacy. In this chapter, we study the challenges in a real-
life information-sharing scenario in the Hong Kong Red Cross Blood Transfusion
Service (BTS) and propose a new privacy model, together with a data anonymiza-
tion algorithm, to eﬀectively preserve individuals’ privacy and meet the information
requirements speciﬁed by the BTS.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the data ﬂow in the BTS. After collecting and examining
the blood collected from donors, the BTS distributes the blood to diﬀerent public
hospitals. The hospitals collect and maintain the health records of their patients and
transfuse the blood to the patients if necessary. The blood transfusion information,
such as the patient data, type of surgery, names of medical practitioners in charge,



























Figure 3.1: Data ﬂow in Hong Kong Red Cross Blood Transfusion Service (BTS)
owned by each individual hospital. Periodically, the public hospitals are required to
submit the blood usage data, together with the patient-speciﬁc surgery data, to the
BTS for the purpose of data analysis. Hospitals transfer their data to BTS in two
ways. Sometimes, hospitals begin by transferring their data to the to the central
government health agency. The department then integrates the data from diﬀerent
hospitals and gives it to the BTS for data analysis. At other times, hospitals directly
submit their data to BTS. These information sharing scenarios in BTS illustrate a
typical dilemma in information sharing and privacy protection faced by many health
institutes. For example, licensed hospitals in California are also required to submit
demographic data on every discharged patient [20] which can provide a multitude
of privacy concerns outside of the realm of health care. Our proposed solution,
designed for the BTS case, will also beneﬁt other health institutes that face similar
challenges in information sharing.
The problems with this BTS case can be generalized into two scenarios. In
the ﬁrst scenario, there exists a trustworthy entity such as the central government
health agency to collect the raw patient data from multiple hospitals and submit
the data to BTS after performing the centralized anonymization. In this chapter,
we address the problem of centralized anonymization. In the second scenario, the
hospitals have to directly submit the integration of their data to the BTS while
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QID1 = {Job, Sex}
QID2 = {Job, Age}




















Figure 3.2: Taxonomy trees and QIDs
protecting the patients’ privacy. In Chapter 5, we address the distributed scenario.
Below, we summarize the privacy concerns and challenges of the BTS case.
Privacy Model. Giving the BTS access to blood transfusion data for data analy-
sis is clearly legitimate. However, it raises some concerns on patients’ privacy. The
patients are willing to submit their data to a hospital because they consider the
hospital to be a trustworthy entity. Yet, the trust in the hospital may not neces-
sarily be transitive to a third party. Many agencies and institutes consider that the
released data is privacy-preserved if explicit identifying information, such as name,
social security number, address, and telephone number, is removed. However, sub-
stantial research has shown that simply removing explicit identifying information
is insuﬃcient for privacy protection. Sweeney [96] showed that an individual can
be re-identiﬁed by simply matching other attributes, called quasi-identiﬁers (QID),
such as gender, date of birth, and postal code. Below, we illustrate the privacy
threats by a simpliﬁed BTS example.
Example 3.1.1. Consider the raw patient data in Table 3.1, where each record
represents a surgery case with the patient-speciﬁc information. Job, Sex, and Age
are quasi-identifying attributes. The hospital wants to release Table 3.1 to the BTS
for the purpose of classiﬁcation analysis on the class attribute, Transfuse, which
has two values, Y and N , indicating whether or not the patient has received blood
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Table 3.1: Raw patient data
Quasi-identiﬁer (QID) Class Sensitive
ID Job Sex Age Transfuse Surgery
1 Janitor M 34 Y Transgender
2 Doctor M 58 N Plastic
3 Mover M 34 Y Transgender
4 Lawyer M 24 N Vascular
5 Mover M 58 N Urology
6 Janitor M 44 Y Plastic
7 Doctor M 24 N Urology
8 Lawyer F 58 N Plastic
9 Doctor F 44 N Vascular
10 Carpenter F 63 Y Vascular
11 Technician F 63 Y Plastic
Table 3.2: Anonymous data (L = 2, K = 2, C = 50%)
Quasi-identiﬁer (QID) Class Sensitive
ID Job Sex Age Transfuse Surgery
1 Non-Technical M [30− 60) Y Transgender
2 Professional M [30− 60) N Plastic
3 Non-Technical M [30− 60) Y Transgender
4 Professional M [1− 30) N Vascular
5 Non-Technical M [30− 60) N Urology
6 Non-Technical M [30− 60) Y Plastic
7 Professional M [1− 30) N Urology
8 Professional F [30− 60) N Plastic
9 Professional F [30− 60) N Vascular
10 Technical F [60− 99) Y Vascular
11 Technical F [60− 99) Y Plastic
transfusion. Without a loss of generality, we assume that the only sensitive value in
Surgery is Transgender. The hospital expresses concern on two types of privacy
threats:
Identity linkage: If a record in the table is so speciﬁc that not many patients
match it, releasing the data may lead to linking the patient’s record and, therefore,
her received surgery. Suppose that the adversary knows that the target patient is
a Mover and his age is 34. Hence, record #3, together with his sensitive value
(Transgender in this case), can be uniquely identiﬁed since he is the only Mover
who is 34 years old in the raw data.
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Attribute linkage: If a sensitive value occurs frequently together with some
QID attributes, then the sensitive information can be inferred from such attributes
even though the exact record of the patient cannot be identiﬁed. Suppose the
adversary knows that the patient is a male of age 34. In such case, even though
there exist two such records (#1 and #3), the adversary can infer that the patient
has received a Transgender surgery with 100% conﬁdence since both the records
contain Transgender.
High Dimensionality. Many privacy models, such as k-anonymity [94] [96] and its
extensions [70] [103], have been proposed to thwart privacy threats caused by identity
and attribute linkages in the context of relational databases. The usual approach is
to generalize the records into equivalence groups so that each group contains at least
k records with respect to some QID attributes, and the sensitive values in each QID
group are diversiﬁed enough to disorient conﬁdent inferences. However, Aggarwal [3]
has shown that when the number of QID attributes is large, that is, when the
dimensionality of data is high, most of the data have to be suppressed in order to
achieve k-anonymity. Our experiments conﬁrm this curse of high dimensionality
on k-anonymity [3]. Applying k-anonymity on the high-dimensional patient data
would signiﬁcantly degrade the data quality. In order to overcome this bottleneck,
we exploit one of the limitations of the adversary: in real-life privacy attacks, it
is very diﬃcult for an adversary to acquire all the information of a target patient
because it requires non-trivial eﬀort to gather each piece of prior knowledge from so
many possible values. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the adversary’s prior
knowledge is bounded by at most L values of the QID attributes of the patient.
Based on this assumption, we deﬁne a new privacy model called LKC-privacy for
anonymizing high-dimensional data.
The general intuition of LKC-privacy is to ensure that every combination of
values in QIDj ⊆ QID with maximum length L in the data table T is shared by
at least K records, and the conﬁdence of inferring any sensitive values in S is not
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greater than C, where L, K, C are thresholds and S is a set of sensitive values
speciﬁed by the data publisher (the hospital). LKC-privacy bounds the probabil-
ity of a successful identity linkage to be ≤ 1/K and the probability of a successful
attribute linkage to be ≤ C, provided that the adversary’s prior knowledge does
not exceed L. Table 3.2 shows an example of an anonymous table that satisﬁes
(2, 2, 50%)-privacy by generalizing all the values from Table 3.1 according to the
taxonomies in Figure 3.2 (Ignore the dashed curve for now). Every possible value
of QIDj with maximum length 2 in Table 3.2 (namely, QID1, QID2, and QID3
in Figure 3.2) is shared by at least 2 records, and the conﬁdence of inferring the
sensitive value Transgender is not greater than 50%. In contrast, enforcing tra-
ditional 2-anonymity will require further generalization. For example, in order to
make 〈Professional,M, [30 − 60)〉 to satisfy traditional 2-anonymity, we may fur-
ther generalize [1− 30) and [30− 60) to [1− 60), resulting in higher utility loss.
Data Utility. The BTS wants to perform two types of data analysis on the blood
transfusion data collected from the hospitals. First, it wants to obtain some general
count statistics. Second, it wants to employ the surgery information as training
data for building a classiﬁcation model on blood transfusion. One frequently raised
question is: To avoid the privacy concern, why doesn’t the hospital simply release
the statistical data or a classiﬁer to the BTS? The BTS wants to have access to
the blood transfusion data, not statistics, from the hospitals for several reasons.
First, the practitioners in hospitals have no expertise and interest in doing the data
mining. They simply want to share the patient data with the BTS, who needs the
health data for legitimate reasons. Second, having access to the data, the BTS has
much better ﬂexibility to perform the required data analysis. It is impractical to
continuously request practitioners in a hospital to produce diﬀerent types of statis-
tical information and ﬁne-tune the data mining results for research purposes.
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Contributions. The contributions of this chapter are summarized as follows:
1. We use the BTS as a real-life example to present the challenges of privacy-
aware information sharing for data analysis.
2. To thwart the privacy threats caused by identity and attribute linkage, we
propose a new privacy model called LKC-privacy that overcomes the chal-
lenge of anonymizing high-dimensional relational data without signiﬁcantly
compromising the data quality (Section 3.2).
3. We present an eﬃcient anonymization algorithm for achieving LKC-privacy
with two diﬀerent adaptations. The ﬁrst adaptation maximizes the informa-
tion preserved for classiﬁcation analysis; the second one minimizes the distor-
tion on the anonymous data for general data analysis. Minimizing distortion
is useful when the particular information requirement is unknown during in-
formation sharing or the shared data is used for various kinds of data mining
tasks (Section 3.3).
4. Experiments suggest that our developed algorithm is ﬂexible and scalable
enough to handle large volumes of blood transfusion data that include both cat-
egorical and numerical attributes. In 2008, the BTS received 150,000 records
from the public hospitals (Section 3.4).
3.2 Problem Deﬁnition
Based on the privacy threats, we ﬁrst present our LKC-privacy model. Then, we
address the data utility requirements, followed by the problem statement.
3.2.1 Privacy Model
Suppose a data publisher (e.g., the government health agency) wants to publish a
health data table T (ID,A1, . . . , Am, Class, Sens) (e.g., Table 3.1) to some recipient
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(e.g., the Red Cross BTS) for data analysis. ID is an explicit identiﬁer, such as SSN ,
and it should be removed before publication. We keep the ID in our examples for
discussion purpose only. Each Ai is either a categorical or a numerical attribute.
Sens is a sensitive attribute. A record has the form 〈v1, . . . , vm, cls, s〉, where vi is a
domain value of Ai, cls is a class value of Class, and s is a sensitive value of Sens.
The data publisher wants to protect against linking an individual to a record or
some sensitive value in T through some subset of attributes called a quasi-identiﬁer
or QID, where QID ⊆ {A1, . . . , Am}.
One recipient, who is an adversary, seeks to identify the record or sensitive
values of some target victim patient V in T . As explained in Section 3.1, we assume
that the adversary knows at most L values of QID attributes of the victim patient.
We use qid to denote such prior known values, where |qid| ≤ L. Based on the prior
knowledge qid, the adversary could identify a group of records, denoted by T [qid],
that contains qid. |T [qid]| denotes the number of records in T [qid]. For example,
T [〈Janitor,M〉] = {ID#1, 6} and |T [qid]| = 2. Then, the adversary could launch
two types of privacy attacks:
1. Identity linkage: Given prior knowledge qid, T [qid] is a set of candidate records
that contains the victim patient V ’s record. If the group size of T [qid], denoted
by |T [qid]|, is small, then the adversary may identify V ’s record from T [qid]
and, therefore, V ’s sensitive value. For example, if qid = 〈Mover, 34〉 in
Table 3.1, T [qid] = {ID#3}. Thus, the adversary can easily infer that V has
received a Transgender surgery.
2. Attribute linkage: Given prior knowledge qid, the adversary can identify T [qid]
and infer that V has sensitive value s with conﬁdence P (s|qid) = |T [qid∧s]||T [qid]| ,
where T [qid∧s] denotes the set of records containing both qid and s. P (s|qid)
is the percentage of the records in T [qid] containing s. The privacy of V
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is at risk if P (s|qid) is high. For example, given qid = 〈M, 34〉 in Ta-
ble 3.1, T [qid ∧ Transgender] = {ID#1, 3} and T [qid] = {ID#1, 3}, hence
P (Transgender|qid) = 2/2 = 100%.
To thwart the identity and attribute linkages on any patient in the table T ,
we require every qid with a maximum length L in the anonymous table to be shared
by at least a certain number of records, and the ratio of sensitive value(s) in every
group cannot be too high. Our privacy model, LKC-privacy, reﬂects this intuition.
Deﬁnition 3.1 (LKC-privacy). Let L be the maximum number of values of the
prior knowledge. Let S ⊆ Domain(Sens) be a set of sensitive values. A data table
T satisﬁes LKC-privacy if and only if for any qid with |qid| ≤ L,
1. |T [qid]| ≥ K, where K > 0 is an integer anonymity threshold, and
2. P (s|qid) ≤ C for any s ∈ S, where 0 < C ≤ 1 is a real number conﬁdence
threshold. Sometimes, we write C in percentage.
The data publisher speciﬁes the thresholds L, K, and C. The maximum length
L reﬂects the assumption of the adversary’s power. LKC-privacy guarantees that
the probability of a successful identity linkage to be ≤ 1/K and the probability of
a successful attribute linkage to be ≤ C. LKC-privacy has several nice properties
that make it suitable for anonymizing high-dimensional data. First, it only requires
a subset of QID attributes to be shared by at least K records. This is a major
relaxation from traditional k-anonymity, based on a very reasonable assumption
that the adversary has limited power. Second, LKC-privacy generalizes several
traditional privacy models. k-anonymity [94, 96] is a special case of LKC-privacy
with L = |QID| and C = 100%, where |QID| is the number of QID attributes in
the data table. Conﬁdence bounding [103] is also a special case of LKC-privacy with
L = |QID| and K = 1. (α, k)-anonymity [108] is also a special case of LKC-privacy
with L = |QID|, K = k, and C = α. Thus, the data publisher can still achieve the
traditional models, if needed.
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3.2.2 Utility Metric
The measure of data utility varies depending on the data analysis task to be per-
formed on the published data. Based on the information requirements speciﬁed by
the BTS, we deﬁne two utility measures. First, we aim at preserving the maximal
information for classiﬁcation analysis. Second, we aim at minimizing the overall
data distortion when the data analysis task is unknown.
We propose a top-down specialization algorithm to achieve LKC-privacy. The
general idea is to anonymize a table by a sequence of specializations starting from the
topmost general state in which each attribute has the topmost value of its taxonomy
tree. We assume that a taxonomy tree is speciﬁed for each categorical attribute in
QID. A leaf node represents a domain value and a parent node represents a less
speciﬁc value. For a numerical attribute in QID, a taxonomy tree can be grown
at runtime, where each node represents an interval, and each non-leaf node has two
child nodes representing some optimal binary split of the parent interval. Figure 3.2
shows a dynamically grown taxonomy tree for Age.
A specialization, written v → child(v), where child(v) denotes the set of child
values of v, replaces the parent value v with the child value that generalizes the
domain value in a record. A specialization is valid if the specialization results in a
table satisfying the anonymity requirement after the specialization. A specialization
is performed only if it is valid. The specialization process can be viewed as pushing
the “cut” of each taxonomy tree downwards. A cut of the taxonomy tree for an
attribute Ai, denoted by Cuti, contains exactly one value on each root-to-leaf path.
Figure 3.2 shows a solution cut indicated by the dashed curve representing the
anonymous Table 3.2. Our specialization starts from the topmost cut and pushes
down the cut iteratively by specializing some value in the current cut until violating
the anonymity requirement. In other words, the specialization process pushes the
cut downwards until no valid specialization is possible. Each specialization tends to
increase data utility and decrease privacy because records are more distinguishable
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by speciﬁc values. We deﬁne two utility measures depending on the information
requirement to evaluate the “goodness” of a specialization. We assume that BTS
only receives one version of the sanitized data for a given data set anonymized by
one of the following Score functions.
Case 1: Score for Classiﬁcation Analysis For the requirement of classiﬁcation
analysis, we use information gain, denoted by InfoGain(v), to measure the goodness
of a specialization. Our selection criterion, Score(v), is to favor the specialization
v → child(v) that has the maximum InfoGain(v):
Score(v) = InfoGain(v). (3.1)
InfoGain(v): Let T [x] denote the set of records in T generalized to the value x.
Let freq(T [x], cls) denote the number of records in T [x] having the class cls. Note
that |T [v]| =∑c |T [c]|, where c ∈ child(v). We have




|T [v]|E(T [c]), (3.2)
where E(T [x]) is the entropy of T [x] [91]:




|T [x]| × log2
freq(T [x], cls)
|T [x]| , (3.3)
Intuitively, I(T [x]) measures the mix of classes for the records in T [x], and
InfoGain(v) is the reduction of the mix by specializing v into c ∈ child(v).
For a numerical attribute, the specialization of an interval refers to the optimal
binary split that maximizes information gain on the Class attribute. See [91] for
details.
Case 2: Score for General Data Analysis Sometimes, the data is shared
without a speciﬁc task. In this case of general data analysis, we use discernibility
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cost [11] to measure the data distortion in the anonymous data table. The discerni-
bility cost charges a penalty to each record for being indistinguishable from other
records. For each record in an equivalence group qid, the penalty is |T [qid]|. Thus,
the penalty on a group is |T [qid]|2. To minimize the discernibility cost, we choose





over all qidv containing v.
3.2.3 Problem Statement
Our goal is to transform a given data set T into an anonymous version T ′ that
satisﬁes a given LKC-privacy requirement and preserves as much information as
possible for the intended data analysis task. Based on the information requirements
speciﬁed by the BTS, we deﬁne the problems as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.2 (Anonymization for data analysis). Given a data table T , a LKC-
privacy requirement, and a taxonomy tree for each categorical attribute contained
in QID, the anonymization problem for classiﬁcation analysis is to generalize T
on the attributes QID to satisfy the LKC-privacy requirement while preserving
as much information as possible for the classiﬁcation analysis. The anonymization
problem for general analysis is to generalize T on the attributes QID to satisfy the
LKC-privacy requirement while minimizing the overall discernibility cost.





combinations of decomposed QIDj with maximum size L. For any value
of K and C, each combination of QIDj in LKC-privacy is an instance of the (α, k)-
anonymity problem with α = C and k = K. Wong et al. [108] have proven that
computing the optimal (α, k)-anonymous solution is NP-hard; therefore, computing
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optimal LKC-privacy is also NP-hard. Below, we provide a greedy approach to
eﬃciently identify a sub-optimal solution.
3.3 Anonymization Algorithm
In this section, we ﬁrst present an overview of our anonymization algorithm. We then
elaborate the implementation details and analyze the complexity of the algorithm.
3.3.1 Overview
Algorithm 3.1 provides an overview of our anonymization algorithm for achieving
LKC-privacy. Initially, all values in QID are generalized to the topmost value
in their taxonomy trees, and Cuti contains the topmost value for each attribute
Ai. At each iteration, the algorithm ﬁnds the Best specialization, which has the
highest Score among the candidates that are valid specializations in ∪Cuti (Line
4). Then, apply Best to T and update ∪Cuti (Line 5). Finally, update the Score
of the aﬀected candidates due to the specialization (Line 6). The algorithm is
terminated when there are no more valid candidates in ∪Cuti. In other words, the
algorithm is terminated if any further specialization would lead to a violation of
the LKC-privacy requirement. An important property of Algorithm 1 is that if a
generalized table violates LKC-privacy before a specialization, it remains violated
after the specialization because a specialization never increases the |T [qid]| and never
decreases the maximum P (s|qid). This property guarantees that the ﬁnal solution
cut is a sub-optimal solution.
Example 3.3.1. Consider the integrated raw patient data in Table 3.1 with L = 2,
K = 2, C = 50%, and QID = {Job, Sex,Age}. Initially, all data records are
generalized to 〈ANY_Job, ANY _Sex, [1-99)〉, and ∪Cuti = {ANY_Job, ANY
_Sex, [1-99)}. To ﬁnd the Best specialization among the candidates in ∪Cuti, we
compute Score(ANY_Job), Score(ANY_Sex), and Score([1-99)).
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Algorithm 3.1: Anonymization Algorithm
1: Initialize every value in T to the topmost value;
2: Initialize Cuti to include the topmost value;
3: while some x ∈ ∪Cuti is valid do
4: Find the Best specialization from ∪Cuti;
5: Perform Best on T and update ∪Cuti;
6: Update Score(x) and validity for x ∈ ∪Cuti;
7: end while;
8: Output T and ∪Cuti.;
3.3.2 Implementation
A simple yet ineﬃcient implementation of Lines 4-6 is to scan all data records and
recompute Score(x) for all candidates in ∪Cuti. The key to the eﬃciency of our
algorithm is having direct access to the data records to be specialized, and updating
Score(x) and validity for x ∈ ∪Cuti based on some statistics maintained for candi-
dates in ∪Cuti, instead of scanning all data records. In the rest of this section, we
explain our scalable implementation and data structures in detail.
Line 4. Initially, we compute Score for all candidates x in ∪Cuti. For each subse-
quent iteration, information needed to calculate Score comes from the update of the
previous iteration (Line 6). Finding the best specialization Best involves at most
| ∪ Cuti| computations of Score without accessing data records. The procedure for
updating Score will be discussed in Line 6.
Example 3.3.2. Continue from Example 3.3.1. We show the computation of
Score(ANY_Job) for the specialization ANY_Job → {Blue-collar,White-collar}.
For classiﬁcation analysis,
E(T [ANY_Job]) = − 6
11
× log2 611 − 511 × log2 511 = 0.994
E(T [Blue-collar]) = −1
6
× log2 16 − 56 × log2 56 = 0.6499
E(T [White-collar]) = −5
5
× log2 55 − 05 × log2 05 = 0.0
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Blue-collar ANY_Sex [60-99) 2
ANY_Job       { White-collar , Blue-collar }
Figure 3.3: Tree for partitioning records
E(T [Blue-collar]) + 5
11
× E(T [White-collar])) = 0.6396
Score(ANY_Job) = InfoGain(ANY_Job) = 0.6396.
Line 5. Consider a specialization Best → child(Best), where Best ∈ Ai and
Ai ∈ QID. First, we replace Best with child(Best) in ∪Cuti. Then, we need to
retrieve T [Best], the set of data records generalized to Best, to tell the child value
in child(Best) for individual data records. We employ a tree like data structure to
facilitate this operation. This data structure is also crucial for updating Score(x) for
candidates x. The general idea is to group data records according to their generalized
records on QID.
Each leaf node stores the set of data records having the same generalized value
for all the QID attributes of the node. Each node is called a leaf partition. For
each x in ∪Cuti, Px denotes a leaf partition whose generalized record contains x,
and Linkx denotes the link of all Px, with the head of Linkx stored with x. At any
time, the generalized data is represented by the leaf partitions of the tree, but the
original data records remain unchanged. Linkx provides a direct access to T [x], the
set of data records generalized to the value x. The tree has several useful properties.
First, all data records in the same leaf partition have the same generalized record
although they may have diﬀerent raw values. Second, every data record appears in
exactly one leaf partition. Third, each leaf partition Px has exactly one generalized
qid on QID and contributes the count |Px| towards |T [qid]|.
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Initially, the tree has only one leaf partition containing all data records, gen-
eralized to the topmost value on every attribute in QID. In each iteration, we
perform the best specialization Best by reﬁning the leaf partitions on LinkBest. We
reﬁne each leaf partition PBest found on LinkBest as follows. For each value c in
child(Best), a new partition Pc is created from PBest, and records in PBest are split
among the new partitions: Pc contains a record in PBest if c generalizes the corre-
sponding domain value in the record. An empty Pc is removed. Linkc is created to
link up all Pc’s for the same c. Also, link Pc to every Linkx to which PBest was previ-
ously linked, except for LinkBest. We emphasize that this is the only operation in the
algorithm that requires accessing data records. The overhead of maintaining Linkx
is small. For each attribute in ∪QIDj and each leaf partition on LinkBest, there are
at most |child(Best)| “relinkings”, or at most | ∪QIDj| × |LinkBest| × |child(Best)|
“relinkings” in total for applying Best.
Example 3.3.3. Initially, the tree has only one leaf partition containing all data
records and representing the generalized record 〈ANY_Job, ANY_Sex, [1-99)〉. Let
the best specialization be ANY_Job → {White-collar, Blue-collar} on Job. We
create two new partitions under the root partition as in Figure 3.3, and split data
records between them. Both the leaf partitions are on LinkANY_Sex and Link[1-99).
∪Cuti is updated into {White-collar, Blue-collar, ANY_Sex, [1-99)}. Suppose that
the next best specialization is [1-99) → {[1-60),[60-99)}, which specializes the two
leaf partitions on Link[1-99), resulting in the tree in Figure 3.3.
A scalable feature of our algorithm is maintaining some statistical informa-
tion for each candidate x in ∪Cuti for updating Score(x) without accessing data
records. For each new value c in child(Best) added to ∪Cuti in the current iter-
ation, we collect the following count statistics of c while scanning data records in
PBest for updating the tree: |T [c]|, |T [d]|, freq(T [c], cls), and freq(T [d], cls), where
d ∈ child(c) and cls is a class label. These information will be used in Line 6.
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Line 6. This step updates Score(x) and validity for candidates x in ∪Cuti to reﬂect
the impact of the Best specialization. The key to the scalability of our algorithm is
updating Score(x) using the count statistics maintained in Line 5 without accessing
raw records again. The procedure for updating Score is diﬀerent depending on the
information requirement.
1. Case 1 classiﬁcation analysis: An observation is that InfoGain(x) is not
aﬀected by Best→ child(Best), except that we need to compute InfoGain(c)
for each newly added value c in child(Best). InfoGain(c) can be computed
from the count statistics for c collected in Line 5.
2. Case 2 general data analysis: Each leaf partition Pc keeps the count |T [qidc]|.
By following Linkc in the tree, we can compute
∑
qidc
|T [qidc]|2 for all the qidc
on Linkc.
A specialization Best → child(Best) may change the validity status of other
candidates x ∈ ∪Cuti if Best and x are contained in the same qid with size not
greater than L. Thus, in order to check the validity, we need to keep track of the
count of every qid with |qid| = L. Note, we can ignore qid with size less than L
because if a table satisﬁes LKC-privacy, then it must satisfy L′KC-privacy where
L′ < L. We present an eﬃcient method for checking the validity of a candidate.
First, given a QID in T , we identify all QIDj ⊆ QID with size L. Then, for
each QIDj, we use another tree like data structure to index all qidj on QIDj.
Each root-to-leaf path represents an existing qidj on QIDj in the generalized data,
with |T [qidj]| and |T [qidj ∧ s]| for every s ∈ S stored at the leaf node. A candidate
x ∈ ∪Cuti is valid if, for every c ∈ child(x), every qidj containing c has |T [qidj]| ≥ K
and P (s|qidj) ≤ C for any s ∈ S. If x is invalid, remove it from ∪Cuti.
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3.3.3 Analysis
Each iteration involves: (1) Accessing the records in T [Best] for updating the tree
and count statistics (Line 5), and (2) Updating Score(x) and validity status for the
aﬀected candidates x in ∪Cuti (Line 6). Only the work in (1) involves accessing
data records, which is in the order of O(|T |); the work in (2) makes use of the
count statistics without accessing data records and can be performed in constant
time. This feature makes our approach scalable. We will empirically evaluate the
scalability of the algorithm on a real-life data set in Section 3.4. For one iteration,
the computation cost is O(|T |) and the total number of iterations is bounded by
O(log|T |); therefore, the total computation cost is O(|T |log|T |).
3.4 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, our objectives are to study the impact of enforcing various LKC-
privacy requirements on the data quality in terms of classiﬁcation error and discerni-
bility cost, and to evaluate the eﬃciency and scalability of our proposed anonymiza-
tion method by varying the thresholds of maximum adversary’s knowledge L, min-
imum anonymity K, and maximum conﬁdence C.
We employ two real-life data sets, Blood and Adult. Blood is a real-life blood
transfusion data set owned by an anonymous health institute. Blood has 62 at-
tributes after removing explicit identiﬁers; 41 of them are QID attributes. The
Class attribute represents the Blood Group with 8 possible values. Diagnosis Codes,
which has 15 possible values representing 15 categories of diagnosis, is considered to
be the sensitive attribute. The remaining attributes are neither quasi-identiﬁers nor
sensitive. Blood contains 10,000 blood transfusion records. Each record represents
one incident of blood transfusion. The publicly available Adult data set [34] is a
de facto benchmark for testing anonymization algorithms [11, 38, 51, 70, 103]. Adult
has 45,222 census records on 6 numerical attributes, 8 categorical attributes, and a
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binary Class column representing two income levels, ≤50K or >50K. We consider
Divorced and Separated in the attribute Marital-status as sensitive, and the remain-
ing 13 attributes as QID. All experiments were conducted on an Intel Core2 2.4GHz
PC with 2GB RAM.
Data Utility. To evaluate the impact on classiﬁcation quality (Case 1 in Sec-
tion 3.2.2), we use all records for generalization, build a classiﬁer on 2/3 of the
generalized records as the training set, and measure the classiﬁcation error (CE)
on 1/3 of the generalized records as the testing set. For classiﬁcation models, we
use the well-known C4.5 classiﬁer [91]. To better visualize the cost and beneﬁt
of our approach, we measure additional errors: Baseline Error (BE) is the error
measured on the raw data without generalization. BE − CE represents the cost in
terms of classiﬁcation quality for achieving a given LKC-privacy requirement. A
naïve method to avoid identity and attributes linkages is to simply remove all QID
attributes. Thus, we also measure upper bound error (UE), which is the error on
the raw data with all QID attributes removed. UE − CE represents the beneﬁt of
our method over the naïve approach.
To evaluate the impact on general analysis quality (Case 2 in Section 3.2.2),
we use all records for generalization and measure the discernibility ratio (DR) on
the ﬁnal anonymous data. DR =
∑
qid |T [qid]|2
|T |2 . DR is the normalized discernibility
cost, with 0 ≤ DR ≤ 1. Lower DR means higher data quality. Following we present
the experimental results for centralized and distributed anonymization respectively.
Figure 3.4a depicts the classiﬁcation error CE with adversary’s knowledge
L = 2, 4, 6, anonymity threshold 20 ≤ K ≤ 100, and conﬁdence threshold C = 20%
on the Blood data set. This setting allows us to measure the performance of the
centralized algorithm against identity linkages for a ﬁxed C. CE generally increases
as K or L increases. However, the increase is not monotonic. For example, the
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Figure 3.4: Data utility for Blood data set
the fact that generalization has removed some noise from the data, resulting in a
better classiﬁcation structure in a more general state. For the same reason, some
test cases on L = 2 and L = 4 have CE < BE, implying that generalization not
only achieves the given LKC-privacy requirement but sometimes may also improve
the classiﬁcation quality. BE = 22.1% and UE = 44.1%. For L = 2 and L = 4,
CE − BE spans from -2.9% to 5.2% and UE − CE spans from 16.8% to 24.9%,
suggesting that the cost for achieving LKC-privacy is small, but the beneﬁt is large
when L is not large. However, as L increases to 6, CE quickly increases to about
40%, the cost increases to about 17%, and the beneﬁt decreases to 5%. For a greater
value of L, the diﬀerence between LKC-privacy and k-anonymity is very small in
terms of classiﬁcation error since more generalized data does not necessarily worse
classiﬁcation error. This result conﬁrms that the assumption of an adversary’s prior
knowledge has a signiﬁcant impact on the classiﬁcation quality. It also indirectly
conﬁrms the curse of high dimensionality [3].
Figure 3.4b depicts the discernibility ratio DR with adversary’s knowledge
L = 2, 4, 6, anonymity threshold 20 ≤ K ≤ 100, and a ﬁxed conﬁdence thresh-
old C = 20%. DR generally increases as K increases, so it exhibits some trade-
oﬀ between data privacy and data utility. As L increases, DR increases rapidly
because more generalization is required to ensure each equivalence group has at

























































BE = 14.7% UE = 24.6%
(a) C = 20% (b) K = 100
Figure 3.5: Classiﬁcation error for Adult data set
over the traditional k-anonymity model, we measure the discernibility ratio, de-
noted DRTradK , on traditional k-anonymous solutions produced by the TDS method
in [38]. DRTradK − DR, representing the beneﬁt of our model, spans from 0.1 to
0.45. This indicates a signiﬁcant improvement on data quality by making a rea-
sonable assumption on limiting the adversary’s knowledge within L known values.
Note, the solutions produced by TDS do not prevent attribute linkages although
they have higher discernibility ratio.
Figure 3.5a depicts the classiﬁcation error CE with adversary’s knowledge
L = 2, 4, 6, anonymity threshold 20 ≤ K ≤ 100, and conﬁdence threshold C = 20%
on the Adult data set. BE = 14.7% and UE = 24.5%. For L = 2, CE −BE is less
than 1% and UE −CE spans from 8.9% to 9.5%. For L = 4 and L = 6, CE −BE
spans from 1.1% to 4.1%, and UE − CE spans from 5.8% to 8.8%. These results
suggest that the cost for achieving LKC-privacy is small, while the beneﬁt of our
method over the naïve method is large.
Figure 3.5b depicts the CE with adversary’s knowledge L = 2, 4, 6, conﬁ-
dence threshold 5% ≤ C ≤ 30%, and anonymity threshold K = 100. This setting
allows us to measure the performance of the algorithm against attribute linkages for
a ﬁxed K. The result suggests that CE is insensitive to the change of conﬁdence
threshold C. CE slightly increases as the adversary’s knowledge L increases.






















































(a) C = 20% (b) K = 100
Figure 3.6: Discernibility ratio for Adult data set
L = 2, 4, 6, anonymity threshold 20 ≤ K ≤ 100, and conﬁdence threshold C = 20%.
DR sometimes has a drop when K increases. This is a result of the greedy algorithm
only identifying the sub-optimal solution. DR is insensitive to the increase of K
and stays close to 0 for L = 2. As L increases to 4, DR increases signiﬁcantly
and ﬁnally equals traditional k-anonymity when L = 6 because the number of
attributes in Adult is relatively smaller than in Blood. Yet, k-anonymity does not
prevent attribute linkages, while our LKC-privacy provides this additional privacy
guarantee.
Figure 3.6b depicts the DR with adversary’s knowledge L = 2, 4, 6, conﬁ-
dence threshold 5% ≤ C ≤ 30%, and anonymity threshold K = 100. In general,
DR increases as L increases due to a more restrictive privacy requirement. Similar
to Figure 3.5b, the DR is insensitive to the change of conﬁdence threshold C. It
implies that the primary driving forces for generalization are L and K, not C.
Scalability. One major contribution of our work is the development of an eﬃcient
and scalable algorithm for achieving LKC-privacy on high-dimensional healthcare
data. Every previous test case can ﬁnish the entire anonymization process within
30 seconds. We further evaluate the scalability of our algorithm with respect to
data volume by blowing up the size of the Adult data set. First, we combined the
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Figure 3.7: Scalability (L = 4, K = 20, C = 100%)
combined set, we created α − 1 “variations” of r, where α > 1 is the blowup scale.
Together with all original records, the enlarged data set has α× 45, 222 records.
Figure 3.7 depicts the runtime of the centralized anonymization algorithm
from 200,000 to 1 million records for L = 4, K = 20, C = 100%. The total runtime
for anonymizing 1 million records is 107s, where 50s are spent on reading raw data,
33s are spent on anonymizing, and 24s are spent on writing the anonymous data.
Our algorithm is scalable due to the fact that we use the count statistics to update
the Score, and thus it only takes one scan of data per iteration to anonymize the
data. As the number of records increases, the total runtime increases linearly.
Summary. The experimental results on the two real-life data sets can be sum-
marized as follows: (1) Our anonymization method can eﬀectively preserve both
privacy and data utility in the anonymous data for a wide range of LKC-privacy re-
quirements. There is a trade-oﬀ between data privacy and data utility with respect
to K and L, but the trend is less obvious on C. (2) Our proposed LKC-privacy
model retains more information than the traditional k-anonymity model and pro-
vides the ﬂexibility to adjust privacy requirements according to the assumption of
adversary’s background knowledge. (3) The proposed method is highly scalable for
large data sets. These characteristics make our algorithm a promising component
for anonymizing healthcare data.
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3.5 Discussion
What is the eﬀect of specialization ordering on the information content of the
anonymized data set? Can the algorithm be easily modiﬁed to use local general-
ization or multi-dimensional generalization? Following we provide answers to these
questions.
Eﬀect of Specialization Ordering. Our proposed algorithm does not yield an
optimal solution cut rather it is suboptimal. We take a greedy approach and choose
an attribute with highest Score in every iteration. Thus, it is possible that a diﬀer-
ent solution cut may provide better utility. However, it is important to note that
maximizing the overall sum of the Score for specializations in the training data does
not guarantee having the lowest classiﬁcation error in the testing data.
Other Anonymization Techniques. Our algorithm performs the anonymization
process by determining a good solution cut. The solution cut is obtained through
specializing an attribute in every iteration based on its Score value. In order to
adopt local/multi-dimensional generalization, we need to modify the deﬁnition of
cut and redesign the Score function. Thus, these anonymization techniques cannot
be implemented directly by our present algorithm.
Though local and multi-dimensional generalization cause less data distortion,
these techniques have a number of limitations. Local and multi-dimensional general-
ization allow a value v to be independently generalized into diﬀerent values. Mining
classiﬁcation rules from local/multi-dimensional recoded data may result in ambigu-
ous classiﬁcation rules, e.g., White-collar → Class A and Lawyer → Class B [37].
Furthermore, local and multi-dimensional recoded data cannot be directly analyzed
by the oﬀ-the-shelf data analysis softwares (e.g., SPSS, Stata) due to the complex





In recent years, there has been an explosive growth of location-aware devices such
as RFID tags, GPS-based devices, cell phones, and PDAs. The use of these devices
facilitates new and exciting location-based applications that consequently generate
a huge collection of trajectory data. Recent research reveals that these trajectory
data can be used for various data analysis purposes to improve current systems,
such as city traﬃc control, mobility management, urban planning, and location-
based service advertisements. Clearly, publication of these trajectory data threatens
individuals’ privacy since these raw trajectory data provide location information that
identiﬁes individuals and, potentially, their sensitive information. Below, we present
some real-life applications of publishing trajectory data.
Transit company: Transit companies have started to use smart cards for pas-
sengers, such as the Octopus card in Hong Kong, the OPUS card in Montreal, and
the Oyster Travel card in London. Passengers register personal information when
they ﬁrst purchase their smart cards, so that appropriate fare is charged based on
their status. The transit companies want to share the personal journey data with
internal and external parties to further improve their services.
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LBS provider: Many companies provide location-based services (LBS) for mo-
bile devices. With the help of triangulation and GPS devices, the location infor-
mation of users can be precisely determined. Various data mining tasks can be
performed on these trajectory data for diﬀerent applications, such as traﬃc analysis
and location-based advertisements. However, these trajectory data contain people’s
visited locations and thus reveal identiﬁable sensitive information such as social
customs, religious preferences, and sexual preferences.
Hospital: Radio Frequency IDentiﬁcation (RFID) is a technology for the auto-
matic identiﬁcation of objects. Some hospitals have adopted RFID sensory system
to track the positions of patients, doctors, and medical equipment inside the hospital
with the goals of minimizing life-threatening medical errors and improving the man-
agement of patients and resources [55] [105]. Analyzing trajectory data, however, is
a non-trivial task. Hospitals often do not have the expertise to perform the analysis
themselves but outsource this process and, therefore, require granting a third party
access to the patient-speciﬁc location and health data.
In this chapter, we study privacy threats in the data publishing phase and
adopt a practical privacy model to accommodate the special challenges of anonymiz-
ing trajectory data. We also propose an algorithm to transform the underlying raw
data into a version that is immunized against privacy attacks but still useful for
eﬀective data mining tasks.
Privacy Model. Many privacy models, such as k-anonymity [94] [96] and its
extensions [62] [70] [111], have been proposed to thwart privacy threats caused by
identity and attribute linkages in the context of relational databases. These privacy
models are eﬀective for anonymizing relational data, but they are not applicable to
trajectory data due to the following challenges.
(1) High dimensionality: Consider a transit system having 50 stations that
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operate 24 hours per day. There are 50 × 24 = 1200 possible combinations (di-
mensions) of locations and timestamps. Each dimension could be a potential QID
attribute used for identity and attribute linkages. Traditional k-anonymity would
require every trajectory to be shared by at least k records. Due to the curse of high
dimensionality [3], most of the data have to be suppressed in order to achieve k-
anonymity. For example, to achieve 2-anonymity on the trajectory data in Table 4.1,
all instances of {b2, d3, c4, c5} have to be suppressed even though k is small.
(2) Data sparseness: Consider passengers in a public transit system or patients
in a hospital. They usually visit only a few locations compared to all available
locations, so each trajectory is relatively short. Anonymizing these short, little-
overlapping trajectories in a high-dimensional space poses a signiﬁcant challenge for
traditional anonymization techniques because it is diﬃcult to identify and group the
trajectories together. Enforcing traditional k-anonymity on high-dimensional and
sparse data would render the data useless.
(3) Sequential: Time is an essential factor of trajectory data, which may incur
unique privacy threats. Consider two trajectories b3 → e6 and e3 → b6. Both
the trajectories have same timestamps but diﬀerent locations; and thus, they are
diﬀerent from each other. Furthermore, the same location when associated with
diﬀerent timestamps should be considered diﬀerent in the context of trajectory data.
For example, b2 → e8 and b3 → e6 are diﬀerent due to diﬀerent timestamps. These
diﬀerences may provide an adversary more opportunities to succeed in a privacy
attack; therefore, require more eﬀorts in the anonymization algorithm.
We adopt a new privacy model called LKC-privacy for anonymizing trajectory
data. The general idea of LKC-privacy has been previously applied on relational
data (Chapter 3). In this chapter, we modify the model to address the problem of
anonymizing trajectory data. The general intuition is to ensure that every sequence
q with maximum length L of any trajectory in a data table T is shared by at least
K records in T , and the conﬁdence of inferring any sensitive value in S from q is not
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Table 4.1: Raw trajectory and health data
ID Path Diagnosis ...
1 〈b2→ d3→ c4→ f6→ c7〉 AIDS ...
2 〈f6→ c7→ e8〉 Flu ...
3 〈d3→ c4→ f6→ e8〉 Fever ...
4 〈b2→ c5→ c7→ e8〉 Flu ...
5 〈d3→ c7→ e8〉 Fever ...
6 〈c5→ f6→ e8〉 Diabetes ...
7 〈b2→ f6→ c7→ e8〉 Diabetes ...
8 〈b2→ c5→ f6→ c7〉 AIDS ...
Table 4.2: Anonymous trajectory data (L = 2, K = 2, C = 50%)
ID Path Diagnosis ...
1 〈d3→ f6→ c7〉 AIDS ...
2 〈f6→ c7→ e8〉 Flu ...
3 〈d3→ f6→ e8〉 Fever ...
4 〈c5→ c7→ e8〉 Flu ...
5 〈d3→ c7→ e8〉 Fever ...
6 〈c5→ f6→ e8〉 Diabetes ...
7 〈f6→ c7→ e8〉 Diabetes ...
8 〈c5→ f6→ c7〉 AIDS ...
greater than C, where L and K are positive integer thresholds, C is a positive real
number threshold, and S is a set of sensitive values speciﬁed by the data publisher.
LKC-privacy bounds the probability of a successful identity linkage to be ≤ 1/K
and the probability of a successful attribute linkage to be ≤ C. Table 4.2 shows
an example of an anonymous table that satisﬁes (2, 2, 50%)-privacy by suppressing
b2 and c4 from Table 4.1. Every possible sequence q with maximum length 2 in
Table 4.2 is shared by at least 2 records and the conﬁdence of inferring the sensitive
value AIDS from q is not greater than 50%.
Data Utility. While protecting privacy is a critical element in data publishing, it
is equally important to preserve the utility of the published data because this is the
primary reason for publication. In this chapter, we aim at preserving the maximal
frequent sequences (MFS ) because MFS often serves as the information basis for
diﬀerent primitive data mining tasks on trajectory data. MFS represents the set
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of longest sequences of visited locations by some minimum number of moving ob-
jects within a particular time interval. In the context of trajectory data, frequent
sequences can capture the major trajectories of moving objects [12]. MFS is also
useful for trajectory pattern mining [41] and workﬂow mining [44].
Contributions. The contributions of this chapter are summarized as follows:
1. We adopt LKC-privacy model to address the special challenges of anonymizing
high-dimensional, sparse, and sequential trajectory data.
2. We present an eﬃcient anonymization algorithm to achieve LKC-privacy while
preserving maximal frequent sequences in the anonymous trajectory data (Sec-
tion 4.3).
3. Experimental results suggest that the proposed anonymization algorithm is
scalable and can retain data utility for data mining (Section 4.4). To the best
of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst work addressing the anonymization problem
for trajectory data and preserving maximal frequent sequences for data mining.
4.2 Problem Deﬁnition
We ﬁrst describe the trajectory database and then formally deﬁne the privacy and
utility requirements.
4.2.1 Trajectory Database
Trajectory from RFID Tags. RFID is a technology for objects’ automatic iden-
tiﬁcation. A tag is a small device attached to a moving object or a person, such as
patients in hospitals or passengers in public transit systems. A reader broadcasts a
radio signal to the tag, which then transmits its unique identiﬁer called Electronic
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Product Code (EPC ) back to the reader. Streams of RFID data entries, in the for-
mat of (EPC, loc, t), are then stored in a RFID database, where loc is the location
of the reader and t is the time of detection. A reader reads a tag either continuously
or on a ﬁxed interval basis. Thus, the database may have duplicate entries showing
the same location if the object has not moved. Gonzalez et al. [44] suggest some
preprocessing methods to compress RFID data.
A pair (lociti) represents the visited location loci of an object at time ti. The
path of an object, denoted by 〈(loc1t1) → . . .→ (locntn)〉, is a sequence of pairs that
can be obtained by ﬁrst grouping the RFID entries by EPC, then sorting the entries
in each group by their timestamps. A timestamp is the entry time to a location,
so the object is assumed to stay in the same location until it has been detected
again. An object may revisit the same location at diﬀerent times. At any time, an
object can appear at only one location, so 〈a1 → b1〉 is not a valid sequence and
timestamps in a path increase monotonically.
Trajectory from Mobile Devices. The trajectory from a mobile device can
be considered as a sequence of spatio-temporal points in the form 〈(x1, y1, t1), (x2, y2,
t2), . . . , (xn, yn, tn)〉, where t1 < t2 < . . . tn and the coordinate (xi, yi) represents the
location of the device at time ti, obtained with the help of GPS devices and/or
by localization techniques. Though these techniques can provide fairly accurate
positions, yet they are not the exact locations. Each point is associated with an
uncertainty threshold δ such that the location of the moving object can be (xi ±
δ, yi ± δ) [1]. We assume that the space is divided into  ×  grids, where each
coordinate is represented by a grid. In the preprocessing step, we transform the
continuous spatio-temporal points into discrete (lociti) pairs, where each grid is
represented by loci.
Thus, a trajectory database T is a collection of records in the form 〈(loc1t1) →
. . . → (locntn)〉 : s1, . . . , sp : d1, . . . , dm, where 〈(loc1t1) → . . . → (locntn)〉 is the
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path, si ∈ Si are the sensitive values, and di ∈ Di are the quasi-identifying (QID)
values of an object. The sensitive and QID values are the object-speciﬁc data in
the form of relational data. Identity and attribute linkages via the QID attributes
can be avoided by applying existing anonymization methods for relational data [38]
[61] [63] [70] [103]. In this chapter, we focus on eliminating identity and attribute
linkages via trajectory data.
4.2.2 Privacy Model
Suppose a data publisher wants to publish a trajectory data table T (e.g., Table 4.1)
to some recipient(s) for data mining. Explicit identiﬁers, e.g., name, SSN, and ID,
are removed. Note, we keep the ID in our examples for discussion purpose only.
The trajectory, the object-speciﬁc QID, and sensitive attributes are assumed to be
important for the data mining task; otherwise, they should be removed.
One recipient, who is an adversary, seeks to identify the record or sensitive
values of some target victim V in T . As explained earlier, we assume that the
adversary knows at most L pairs of location and timestamp that V has previously
visited. We use q to denote such prior known sequence of pairs, where |q| ≤ L.
Based on the prior knowledge q, the adversary could identify a group of records,
denoted by T (q), that “contains” q. A record in T contains q if q is a subsequence
of the trajectory in the record. For example in Table 4.1, records with ID#1, 2, 7, 8
contain q = 〈f6 → c7〉, written as T (q) = {ID#1, 2, 7, 8}. The prior knowledge
q, may consist of any L pairs, not necessarily consecutive, such as q = 〈b2 → c7〉.
Based on T (q), the adversary could launch two types of privacy attacks:
1. Identity linkage: Given prior knowledge q, T (q) is a set of candidate records
that contains the victim V ’s record. If the group size of T (q), denoted by
|T (q)|, is small, then the adversary may identify V ’s record from T (q) and,
therefore, V ’s sensitive value. For example, if q = 〈b2 → d3〉 in Table 4.1,
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T (q) = {ID#1}. Thus, the adversary can easily infer that V ’s sensitive value
is AIDS.
2. Attribute linkage: Given prior knowledge q, the adversary can identify T (q)
and infer that V has sensitive value s with conﬁdence P (s|q) = |T (q∧s)||T (q)| , where
T (q ∧ s) denotes the set of records containing both q and s. P (s|q) is the
percentage of the records in T (q) containing s. The privacy of V is at risk if
P (s|q) is high. For example, given q = 〈b2 → f6〉 in Table 4.1, T (q∧AIDS) =
{ID#1, 8} and T (q) = {ID#1, 7, 8}; therefore, P (AIDS|q) = 2/3 = 67%.
To thwart the identity and attribute linkages, we require that every sequence
with a maximum length L in the trajectory data has to be shared by at least a certain
number of records, and the ratio of sensitive value(s) in every group cannot be too
high. Here, we adopt LKC-privacy model as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 3.1. Following
we restate the deﬁnition in the context of trajectory database T .
Deﬁnition 4.1 (LKC-privacy). Let L be the maximum length of the prior knowl-
edge. Let S be a set of sensitive values. A trajectory data table T satisﬁes LKC-
privacy if and only if for any sequence q with |q| ≤ L of any trajectory in T ,
1. |T (q)| ≥ K, where K > 0 is an integer anonymity threshold, and
2. P (s|q) ≤ C for any s ∈ S, where 0 < C ≤ 1 is a real number conﬁdence
threshold.
LKC-privacy is a general privacy model that thwarts both identity linkage
and attribute linkage, i.e., the privacy model is applicable to anonymize trajectory
data with or without sensitive attributes.
4.2.3 Utility Metric
The measure of data utility varies depending on the data mining task to be per-
formed on the published data. In this chapter, we aim at preserving the maximal
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frequent sequences. A sequence q = 〈(loc1t1) → . . . → (locntn)〉 is an ordered set
of locations. A sequence q is frequent in a trajectory data table T if |T (q)| ≥ K ′,
where T (q) is the set of records containing q and K ′ is a minimum support threshold.
Frequent sequences (FS) capture the major trajectories of the moving objects [12],
and often form the information basis for diﬀerent primitive data mining tasks on
sequential data, e.g., association rules mining [7]. In the context of trajectory data,
association rules can be used to determine the subsequent locations of the mov-
ing object given the previously visited locations. This knowledge is important for
workﬂow mining [44].
There is no doubt that FS are useful. Yet, mining all FS is a computationally
expensive operation. When the data volume is large and FS are long, it is infea-
sible to identify all FS because all subsequences of an FS are also frequent. Since
trajectory data is high-dimensional and in large volume, a more feasible solution is
to preserve only the maximal frequent sequences (MFS ).
Deﬁnition 4.2 (Maximal frequent sequence). For a given minimum support thresh-
old K ′ > 0, a sequence x is maximal frequent in a trajectory data table T if x is
frequent and no super sequence of x is frequent.
The set of MFS in T , denoted by U(T ), is much smaller than the set of FS
in T given the same K ′. MFS still contains the essential information for diﬀerent
kinds of data analysis [68]. For example, MFS captures the longest frequently visited
trajectories. Any subsequence of an MFS is also a FS. Once all the MFS have been
determined, the support counts of any particular FS can be computed by scanning
the database once. Our data utility goal is to preserve as many MFS as possible,
i.e., maximize |U(T )|, in the anonymous trajectory database.
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Figure 4.1: Taxonomy tree on location
4.2.4 Problem Statement
LKC-privacy can be achieved by performing a sequence of generalization and/or
suppression operations on the trajectory data table. Generalization replaces a spe-
ciﬁc value with a more general value for a given attribute according to a taxonomy
tree. For example, location a can be generalized into a broader location ab accord-
ing to the taxonomy tree in Figure 4.1. Similarly, ab can be further generalized into
abcd. The same generalization can be performed on the time dimension. Suppres-
sion removes a pair from one or more trajectories in the trajectory data table T . For
example, Table 4.2 is the result of suppressing b2 and c4 from Table 4.1. In both the
above schemes, if all the instances of a value are generalized or suppressed, then it
is called global recoding. In contrast, if some instances of a value remain unchanged
while other instances are generalized or suppressed, then it is called local recoding.
Refer to [61] for detailed descriptions on diﬀerent global and local recoding schemes.
In this chapter, we employ global suppression, meaning that if a pair p is chosen
to be suppressed, all instances of p in T are suppressed. Global suppression oﬀers
several advantages over generalization and local suppression. First, suppression does
not require a predeﬁned taxonomy tree for generalization, which often is unavailable
in real-life databases. Second, trajectory data could be extremely sparse. Enforcing
global generalization on trajectory data will result in generalizing many sibling lo-
cation or time values even if there is only a small number of outlier pairs, such as
c4 in Table 4.1. Suppression oﬀers the ﬂexibility of removing those outliers without
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aﬀecting the rest of the data. Note, we do not intend to claim that global suppres-
sion is always better than other schemes. For example, LeFevre et al. [61] present
some local generalization schemes that may result in less data loss depending on the
utility measure. Third, global suppression retains exactly the same support counts
of the preserved MFS in the anonymous trajectory data table as there were in the
raw data. In contrast, a local suppression scheme may delete some instances of the
chosen pair and, therefore, change the support counts of the preserved MFS. For
example, if the support count of a sequence 〈(loc1t1)〉 is 20 and the support count
of its super sequence 〈(loc1t1) → (loc2t2)〉 is 10, then the conﬁdence of inferring the
occurrence of (loc2t2) from (loc1t1) is 10/20 = 50%. Now, suppose we suppress only
10 instances of (loc1t1) from T . The support of 〈(loc1t1) → (loc2t2)〉 will vary from
0 to 10 and the conﬁdence of inferring the occurrence of (loc2t2) from (loc1t1) will
vary from 0% to 100% depending on which instances have been suppressed. Hence,
employing local suppression cannot preserve the truthful support counts of the pre-
served frequent sequences, implying that the derived knowledge, such as association
rules, is not truthful, too.
Deﬁnition 4.3 (Trajectory Anonymity for MFS). Given a trajectory data table T , a
LKC-privacy requirement, a minimum support threshold K ′, a set of sensitive values
S, the problem of trajecoty anonymity for MFS is to identify a transformed version
of T that satisﬁes the LKC-privacy requirement while preserving the maximum
number of MFS.
4.3 Anonymization Algorithm
Given a trajectory data table T , our ﬁrst step is to identify all sequences that
violate the given LKC-privacy requirement. Section 4.3.1 describes a method to
identify violating sequences eﬃciently. Section 4.3.2 presents a greedy algorithm
to eliminate the violating sequences with the goal of preserving as many maximal
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frequent sequences as possible.
4.3.1 Identifying Violating Sequences
An adversary may use any sequence with length not greater than L as background
knowledge to launch a linkage attack. Thus, any non-empty sequence q with |q| ≤ L
in T is a violating sequence if its group T (q) does not satisfy condition 1, condition
2, or both in LKC-privacy in Deﬁnition 4.1.
Deﬁnition 4.4 (Violating sequence). Let q be a sequence of a trajectory in T with
|q| ≤ L. q is a violating sequence with respect to a LKC-privacy requirement if (1)
q is non-empty, and (2) |T (q)| < K or P (s|q) > C for any sensitive value s ∈ S.
Example 4.3.1. Let L = 2, K = 2, C = 50%, and S = {AIDS}. In Table 4.1,
a sequence q1 = 〈b2 → c4〉 is a violating sequence because |T (q1)| = 1 < K. A
sequence q2 = 〈b2 → f6〉 is a violating sequence because P (AIDS|q2) = 67% > C.
However, a sequence q3 = 〈b2 → c5 → f6 → c7〉 is not a violating sequence even if
|T (q3)| = 1 < K and P (AIDS|q3) = 100% > C because |q3| > L.
A trajectory data table satisﬁes a given LKC-privacy requirement, if all vio-
lating sequences with respect to the privacy requirement are removed, because all
possible channels for identity and attribute linkages are eliminated. A naïve ap-
proach is to ﬁrst enumerate all possible violating sequences and then remove them.
This approach is infeasible because of the huge number of violating sequences. Con-
sider a violating sequence q with |T (q)| < K. Any super sequence of q with length
less than or equal to L, denoted by q′′, in the database T is also a violating sequence
because |T (q′′)| ≤ |T (q)| < K.
One incorrect approach to achieve LKC-privacy is to ignore the sequences
with size less than L and assume that if a table T satisﬁes LKC-privacy, then T
satisﬁes L′KC-privacy where L′ < L. Unfortunately, this monotonic property with
respect to L does not hold in LKC-privacy.
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Table 4.3: Counter example for monotonic property
ID Trajectory Status ...
1 〈a1→ d2〉 Flu ...
2 〈a1→ b2〉 AIDS ...
3 〈a1→ b2→ c3〉 AIDS ...
4 〈a1→ b2→ c3〉 Fever ...
Theorem 4.1. LKC-privacy is not monotonic with respect to adversary’s knowl-
edge L.
Proof. To prove that LKC-privacy is not monotonic with respect to L, it is suﬃ-
cient to prove that one of the conditions of LKC-privacy in Deﬁnition 4.1 is not
monotonic. Following we provide a counter example for both the conditions.
Condition 1: Anonymity threshold k is not monotonic with respect to L. If all
the size-L sequences are non-violating, it does not guarantee that a sequence with
size L′ ≤ L is also non-violating. In Table 4.3, though the size-3 sequences satisfy
privacy requirement for K = 2, the size-2 sequence, q = 〈a1 → d2〉 does not satisfy
the requirement.
Condition 2: Conﬁdence threshold C is not monotonic with respect to L. If q
is a non-violating sequence with P (s|q) ≤ C and |T (q)| ≥ K, its subsequence q′ may
not be a non-violating sequence. We use a counter example to show that P (s|q′) ≤
P (s|q) ≤ C does not always hold. In Table 4.3, the sequence q = 〈a1 → b2 → c3〉
satisﬁes P (AIDS|q) = 50% ≤ C. However, its subsequence q′ = 〈a1 → b2〉 does not
satisfy P (AIDS|q′) = 100% > C.
To satisfy LKC-privacy, it is insuﬃcient to ensure that every sequence q with
only length L in T satisﬁes both the conditions of Deﬁnition 4.1. Instead, we need
to ensure that every sequence q with length not greater than L in T satisﬁes both
the conditions. To overcome this bottleneck of violating sequence enumeration, our
insight is that there exists some “minimal” violating sequences among the violating
sequences, and it is suﬃcient to achieve LKC-privacy by removing only the minimal
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violating sequences.
Deﬁnition 4.5 (Minimal violating sequence). A violating sequence q is a mini-
mal violating sequence (MVS ) if every proper subsequence of q is not a violating
sequence.
Example 4.3.2. In Table 4.1, given L = 3, K = 2, C = 50%, S = {AIDS}, the
sequence q = 〈b2 → d3〉 is a MVS because 〈b2〉 and 〈d3〉 are not violating sequences.
The sequence q = 〈b2 → d3 → c4〉 is a violating sequence but not a MVS because
its subsequence 〈b2 → d3〉 is a violating sequence.
Every violating sequence is either a MVS or it contains a MVS. Thus, if T
contains no MVS, then T contains no violating sequences.
Lemma 4.1. A trajectory data table T satisﬁes LKC-privacy if and only if T
contains no MVS.
Proof. Suppose a data table T does not satisfy LKC-privacy even if T contains
no MVS. Then, by Deﬁnition 4.4, the table T contains violating sequence. But, a
violating sequence must be a MVS or its subset is MVS, which is the contradiction of
the initial assumption. Therefore, the data table T must satisfy LKC-privacy.
Next, we propose an algorithm to eﬃciently identify all MVS in T with respect
to a LKC-privacy requirement. Based on Deﬁnition 4.5, we generate all MVS of
size i + 1, denoted by Vi+1, by incrementally extending a non-violating sequence of
size i, denoted by Wi, with an additional pair.
Algorithm 4.1 presents a method to eﬃciently generate all MVS. Line 1 puts
all the size-1 sequences, i.e., all distinct pairs, as candidates X1 of MVS. Line 4 scans
T once to compute |T (q)| and P (s|q) for each sequence q ∈ Xi and for each sensitive
value s ∈ S. If the sequence q violates the LKC-privacy requirement in Line 6, then
we add q to the MVS set Vi (Line 7); otherwise, add q to the non-violating sequence
set Wi (Line 9) for generating the next candidate set Xi+1, which is a self-join of
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Algorithm 4.1: MVS Generator
Input: Raw trajectory data table T
Input: Thresholds L, K, and C
Input: Sensitive values S
Output: Minimal violating sequence V (T )
1: X1 ← set of all distinct pairs in T ;
2: i = 1;
3: while i ≤ L and Xi = ∅ do
4: Scan T to compute |T (q)| and P (s|q), for ∀q ∈ Xi, ∀s ∈ S;
5: for ∀q ∈ Xi where |T (q)| > 0 do
6: if |T (q)| < K or P (s|q) > C then
7: Add q to Vi;
8: else
9: Add q to Wi;
10: end if
11: end for
12: Xi+1 ←Wi  Wi;
13: for ∀q ∈ Xi+1 do
14: if q is a super sequence of any v ∈ Vi then





20: return V (T ) = V1 ∪ . . . ∪ Vi−1;
Wi (Line 12). Two sequences qx = 〈(locx1tx1) → . . .→ (locxi txi )〉 and qy = 〈(locy1ty1) →
. . . → (locyi tyi )〉 in Wi can be joined only if the ﬁrst i − 1 pairs of qx and qy are
identical and txi < t
y
i . The joined sequence is 〈(locx1tx1) → . . .→ (locxi txi ) → (locyi tyi )〉.
Lines 13-17 remove a candidate q from Xi+1 if q is a super sequence of any sequence
in Vi because any proper subsequence of a MVS cannot be a violating sequence. The
set of MVS, denoted by V (T ), is the union of all Vi.
Example 4.3.3. Consider Table 4.1 with L = 2, K = 2, C = 50%, and S =
{AIDS}. X1 = {b2, d3, c4, c5, f6, c7, e8}. After scanning T , we divide X1 into V1 = ∅
and W1 = {b2, d3, c4, c5, f6, c7, e8}. Next, from W1 we generate the candidate set
X2 = {b2d3, b2c4, b2c5, b2f6, b2c7, b2e8, d3c4, d3c5, d3f6, d3c7, d3e8, c4c5, c4f6,
c4c7, c4e8, c5f6, c5c7, c5e8, f6c7, f6e8, c7e8}. We scan T again to determine
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V2 = {b2d3, b2c4, b2f6, c4c7, c4e8}. We do not further generate X3 because L = 2.
Lemma 4.2. Algorithm 4.1 generates all the minimal violating sequences (MVS)
of size ≤ L.
Proof. We use a loop invariant to proof the correctness of Algorithm 4.1.
Loop Invariant: At the start of each iteration i of the while loop (Line 3), the MVS
set V (T ) contains all the MVS of size ≤ (i− 1).
Initialization: Prior to the ﬁrst iteration of the loop, i = 1, the MVS set V (T ) is
empty. Invariant is true because by Deﬁnition 4.4 violating sequence can not be of
size-0.
Maintenance: During the iteration, every candidate sequence q ∈ Xi that does
not satisfy |T (q)| ≥ K or P (s|q) ≤ C is added to the MVS set V (T ). Since, the
candidate set contains all size-i sequences and the algorithm veriﬁes all candidates,
we conclude that loop invariant indeed remains true before the next iteration i+ 1.
Termination: At termination, i = L + 1, by loop invariant, the MVS set V (T )
contains all the MVS of size ≤ L.
Deﬁnition 4.6 (Violating pair). A pair p is a violating pair if it is part of a violating
sequence.
Example 4.3.4. Given the set of minimal violating sequence, V (T ) = {b2d3, b2c4,
b2f6, c4c7, c4e8}, the violating pairs are {b2, d3, c4, f6, c7, e8}.
From Lemma 4.1, we have to remove all the MVS to satisfy LKC-privacy
requirement. We can remove all the MVS by suppressing a subset of violating pairs.
Given, V (T ) = {b2d3, b2c4, b2f6, c4c7, c4e8}, we can either suppress {b2, c4} or
{b2, c7, e8} and so on. Next, we prove that it is NP-hard to ﬁnd an optimal subset
of violating pairs.
Theorem 4.2. Given a trajectory data table T and a LKC-privacy requirement,
it is NP-hard to ﬁnd the optimal anonymous solution.
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Proof. The problem of ﬁnding the optimal anonymous solution can be converted into
the vertex cover problem [23]. The vertex cover problem is a well-known problem
in which, given an undirected graph G = (V,E), it is NP-hard to ﬁnd the smallest
set of vertices S such that each edge has at least one endpoint in S. To reduce our
problem into the vertex cover problem, we only consider the set of MVS of length 2.
Then, the set of violating pairs represents the set of vertices V , and the set of MVS,
denoted by V (T ), is analogous to the set of edges E. Hence, the optimal vertex
cover, S, means ﬁnding the smallest set of violating pairs that must be suppressed
to obtain the optimal anonymous data set T ′. Given that it is NP-hard to determine
the smallest set of vertices S, it is also NP-hard to ﬁnd the optimal set of violating
pairs for suppression.
Finding an optimal solution for LKC-privacy is NP-hard. Thus, we propose
a greedy algorithm to eﬃciently identify a reasonably “good” sub-optimal solution.
4.3.2 Eliminating Violating Sequences
We propose a greedy algorithm to transform the raw trajectory data table T to
an anonymous table T ′ with respect to a given LKC-privacy requirement by a
sequence of suppressions. In each iteration, the algorithm selects a violating pair
p for suppression based on a greedy selection function. In general, a suppression
on a violating pair p in T increases privacy because it removes minimal violating
sequences (MVS), and decreases data utility because it eliminates maximal frequent
sequences (MFS) in T . Therefore, we deﬁne the greedy function, Score(p), to select
a suppression on a violating pair p that maximizes the number of MVS removed but






Algorithm 4.2: Data Anonymizer
Input: Raw trajectory data table T
Input: Thresholds L, k, C, and K ′
Input: Sensitive values S
Output: Anonymous T ′ that satisﬁes LKC-privacy
1: Generate V (T ) by Algorithm 4.1 and build MVS-tree;
2: Generate U(T ) by MFS algorithm and build MFS-tree;
3: while PG table is not empty do
4: Select a pair w that has the highest Score to suppress;
5: Delete all MVS and MFS containing w from MVS-tree and MFS-tree;
6: Update the Score(p) if both w and p are contained in the same MVS or MFS;
7: Remove w from PG Table;
8: Add w to Sup;
9: end while
10: For ∀w ∈ Sup, suppress all instances of w from T ;
11: return the suppressed T as T ′;
where PrivGain(p) and UtilityLoss(p) are the number of MVS and the number of
MFS containing the violating pair p, respectively. A violating pair p may not belong
to any MFS, resulting in UtilityLoss(p) = 0. To avoid dividing by zero, we add
1 to the denominator. The violating pair p with the highest Score(p) is called the
winner pair, denoted by w.
Algorithm 4.2 summarizes the anonymization algorithm that removes all MVS.
Line 1 calls Algorithm 4.1 to identify all MVS, denoted by V (T ), and then builds
a MVS-tree with a PG table that keeps track of the PrivGain(p) of all violating
pairs for suppressions. Line 2 calls a maximal frequent sequence mining algorithm
to identify all MFS, denoted by U(T ), and then builds a MFS-tree with a UL
table that keeps track of the UtilityLoss(p) of all candidate pairs. We modiﬁed
MAFIA [18], which was originally designed for mining maximal frequent itemsets, to
mine MFS. Any alternative MFS algorithm can be used as a plug-in to our method.
At each iteration in Lines 3-9, the algorithm selects the winner pair w that has the
highest Score(w) from the PG table, removes all the MVS and MFS that contain w,
incrementally updates the Score of the aﬀected violating pairs, and adds w to the
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set of suppressed values, denoted by Sup. Values in Sup are collectively suppressed
in Line 10 in one scan of T . Finally, Algorithm 4.2 returns the anonymized T as
T ′. The most expensive operations are identifying the MVS and MFS containing
w and updating the Score of the aﬀected candidates. Below, we propose two tree
structures to eﬃciently perform these operations.
Deﬁnition 4.7 (MVS-tree). MVS-tree is a tree structure that represents each MVS
as a tree path from root-to-leaf. Each node keeps track of a count of MVS sharing
the same preﬁx. The count at the root is the total number of MVS. MVS-tree has
a PG table that maintains every violating pair p for suppression, together with its
PrivGain(p). Each violating pair p in the PG table has a link, denoted by Linkp,
that links up all the nodes in an MVS-tree containing p. PrivGain(p) is the sum of
the counts of MVS on Linkp.
Deﬁnition 4.8 (MFS-tree). MFS-tree is a tree structure that represents each MFS
as a tree path from root-to-leaf. Each node keeps track of a count of MFS sharing
the same preﬁx. The count at the root is the total number of MFS. MFS-tree has
a UL table that keeps the UtilityLoss(p) for every violating pair p. Each violating
pair p in the UL table has a link, denoted by Linkp, that links up all the nodes in
MFS-tree containing p. UtilityLoss(p) is the sum of the counts of MFS on Linkp.
Example 4.3.5. Figure 4.2 depicts both MVS-tree and MFS-tree generated from
Table 4.1, where V (T ) = {b2d3, b2c4, b2f6, c4c7, c4e8} and U(T ) = {b2c5c7, b2f6c7,
b2c7e8, d3c4f6, f6c7e8, c5f6, c5e8, d3c7, d3e8} with L = 2, K = 2, C = 50%, and
K ′ = 2. Each root-to-leaf path represents one sequence of MVS or MFS. To ﬁnd
all the MVS (or MFS) containing c4, follow Linkc4 starting from the PG (or UL)
table. For illustration purposes, we show PG and UL as a single table.
Table 4.4 shows the initial Score(p) of every violating pair. Identify the winner
pair c4 from violating pairs. Then traverse Linkc4 to identify all MVS and MFS















































Figure 4.3: MVS-tree and MFS-tree after suppressing c4
links are the key to eﬃcient Score updates and suppressions. When a winner pair
w is suppressed from the trees, the entire branch of w is trimmed. The trees provide
an eﬃcient structure for updating the counts of MVS and MFS. For example, when
c4 is suppressed, all its descendants are removed as well. The counts of c4’s ancestor
nodes are decremented by the counts of the deleted c4 node. If a violating pair p and
the winner pair w are contained in some common MVS or MFS, then UtilityLoss(p),
PrivGain(p), and Score(p), have to be updated by adding up the counts on Linkp.
A violating pair p is removed from the PG table if PrivGain(p) = 0 because there
is no more any MVS containing this pair. The resultant MVS-tree and MFS-tree
are shown in Figures 4.3 after suppressing c4. Table 4.5 shows the updated Score
of the remaining violating pairs. In the next iteration, b2 is suppressed and thus all
the remaining MVS are removed. Table 4.2 shows the resulting anonymous table T ′
for (2, 2, 50%)-privacy.
Lemma 4.3. Algorithm 4.2 eliminates all MVS without generating new MVS.
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Table 4.4: Initial Score
b2 d3 c4 f6 c7 e8
PrivGain 3 1 3 1 1 1
UtilityLoss (+1) 4 4 2 5 6 5
Score 0.75 0.25 1.5 0.2 0.16 0.2
Table 4.5: Score after suppressing c4
b2 d3 f6
PrivGain 2 1 1
UtilityLoss (+1) 4 3 4
Score 0.5 0.33 0.25
Proof. By Deﬁnition 4.7, MVS-tree represents all the MVS in a tree structure. Thus
by suppressing the violating sequences iteratively, the algorithm eliminates all the
MVS. However, global suppression does not generate any new MVS. Consider a new
sequence q, which resulted from the suppression of its super sequence. The sequence
q can not be a MVS since by Deﬁnition 4.5, all the subsequence of a MVS is a
non-violating sequence.
We now prove that the anonymous data table T ′ is the LKC-private version
of the raw data table T .
Theorem 4.3. Given a trajectory data table T , the anonymous data table T ′ pro-
duced by the anonymization algorithm satisﬁes LKC-privacy.
Proof. The proof follows directly from Lemmas 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. Since, the anonymiza-
tion algorithm can enumerate all the MVS (Lemma 4.2) and subsequently remove
them without generating new MVS (Lemma 4.3), the anonymous table contains
no MVS. Finally, according to Lemma 4.1, the anonymous data table T ′ satisﬁes
LKC-privacy because it has no MVS.
4.3.3 Analysis
Our anonymization algorithm has two steps. In the ﬁrst step, we determine the
set of MVS and the set of MFS. In the second step, we build the MVS-tree and
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MFS-tree, and suppress the violating pairs iteratively according to their Score. The
most expensive operation of our algorithm is scanning the raw trajectory data table
T once to compute |T (q)| and P (s|q) for all sequence q in the candidate set Xi.
This operation takes place during MVS generation. The cost of this operation is
approximated as Cost =
∑L
i=1 mii, where mi = |Xi|. Note that the searching cost
depends on the value of L and size of the candidate set. When i = 1, the candidate
set Xi is the set of all distinct pairs in T . Hence, the upper limit of mi = |d|, where
|d| is the number of dimensions. It is unlikely to have any single pair violating the
LKC-privacy; therefore, m2 = |d|(|d| − 1)/2. However, when i ≥ 3, the sizes of the
candidate sets do not increase signiﬁcantly. It is because all candidates are generated
by self-joining, which requires that only if two sequences share the same preﬁx, their
resulting sequence can be considered a future candidate. When i is relatively large,
the chance of ﬁnding two such sequences decreases signiﬁcantly. Therefore, a good
approximation of the size of the candidate set,
∑L
i=1 mi ≈ d2. However, in the
worst case, the size of the candidate set is bounded by O(dL). Finally, including the
dependence on the data size, the time complexity of our algorithm is O(|d|Ln).
In the second step, we insert the MVS and MFS into the respective trees and
delete them iteratively afterward. This operation is proportional to the number of
MVS and thus in the order of O(|V (T )|). Due to MVS-tree and MFS-tree data
structures, our approach can eﬃciently calculate and update the the score of the
violating pairs.
4.4 Experimental Evaluation
The main objective of our empirical study is to evaluate the performance of our
proposed algorithm in terms of utility loss caused by anonymization, and scalability
for handling large data sets. The utility loss is deﬁned as |U(T )|−|U(T )
′|
|U(T )| , where |U(T )|
and |U(T )′| are the numbers of maximal frequent sequences before and after the
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Table 4.6: Data sets statistics
data set Records Avg. trajectory Dimensions Data size
|T | length |d| (K bytes)
City80K 80,000 8 624 2,297
Metro100K 100,000 8 3,900 6,184
anonymization of the data set T . It measures the percentage of MFS loss due to
suppressions, so lower utility loss implies better data quality. We could not directly
compare our methods with others because no method exists that can anonymize
trajectory data while preserving maximal frequent sequences. We evaluate our al-
gorithm with three diﬀerent Score functions:
• Score1(p) = PrivGain(p)
UtilityLoss(p)+1
(from Equation 4.1)
• Score2(p) = PrivGain(p)
• Score3(p) = 1
UtilityLoss(p)+1
We used two data sets for the experiments: City80K andMetro100K. City80K
is a data set simulating the routes of 80,000 citizens in a metropolitan area with
26 city blocks in 24 hours, thus forming 624 dimensions (diﬀerent possible pairs).
Metro100K is a data set simulating the travel routes of 100,000 passengers in the
Montreal subway transit system with 65 stations in 60 minutes, forming 3,900 di-
mensions. Each record in the data set corresponds to the route of one passenger.
The passengers’ traﬃc patterns are simulated based on information obtained from
the Montreal metro information website1. Based on the published annual report, all
the passengers have an average trajectory length of 8 stations. The data generator
also simulates the trajectories according to the current metro map and passengers’
ﬂow in each station. In both data sets, each record contains an attribute with ﬁve
possible values, where one of them is considered to be sensitive.
Following the convention for extracting MFS, we specify the minimum support
threshold K ′ as the percentage of the total number of records in the database. For
1http://www.metrodemontreal.com
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both data sets, we set K ′ = 0.5%, 1%, and 1.5% and vary the thresholds of minimum
anonymity K, maximum conﬁdence C, and maximum adversary’s knowledge L to
evaluate the performance of the algorithm. All experiments are conducted on a PC
with Intel Core2 Duo 1.6GHz CPU with 2GB of RAM.
Figure 4.4. We vary the threshold K from 10 to 50 while ﬁxing L = 3
and C = 100% on City80K. This setting allows us to measure the performance of
the algorithm against identity linkages without considering attribute linkages. The
utility loss of Score1 and Score3 generally increases as K increases, so it exhibits
some trade-oﬀ between data privacy and data utility. The utility loss, sometimes,
has a slight drop when K increases. This is due to the fact that the greedy algorithm
ﬁnds only the sub-optimal solution. Score2 has higher utility loss than Score1 and
Score3 because Score2 does not take into account the number of MFS lost during
the elimination of MVS. As K ′ increases, the utility loss decreases because the
number of MFS decreases and there is less overlapping between V (T ) and U(T ), so
suppressions have less eﬀect on MFS.
As mentioned, our method can also achieve k-anonymity by setting L = |d|,
where |d| is the number of dimensions. The result strongly suggests that apply-
ing LKC-privacy would result in signiﬁcantly lowering the utility loss than would
applying traditional k-anonymity.
Figure 4.5. We vary the threshold C from 20% to 100% while ﬁxing L = 3
and K = 30 on City80K. This allows us to examine the eﬀect of attribute linkages.
Approximately 1/5 of the records contain a sensitive value, so the utility loss is high
at C = 0.2. As C increases, the eﬀect of attribute linkages becomes insigniﬁcant.
As K ′ increases, the utility loss drops quickly due to less overlapping between V (T )
and U(T ). Again, the traditional conﬁdence bounding model results in signiﬁcantly
higher utility loss.
Figure 4.6. We vary the threshold L from 1 to 5 while ﬁxing K = 30 and












































(c) K ′ = 1.5%
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(c) K ′ = 1.5%
Figure 4.8: Utility loss vs. C on Metro100K (L = 3, K = 30)
of an adversary’s background knowledge. The result suggests that up to L = 2,
there is no utility loss. As L increases, the loss increases quickly due to the increase
in the number of violating sequences.
Figure 4.7. Metro100K is a relatively higher dimensional data set (3,900
dimensions) compared to City80K (624 dimensions). Unlike in City80K, passengers
follow predeﬁned tracks based on the metro map. In Figure 4.7, following the same
setting of City80K, we vary the value of K from 10 to 50, while ﬁxing L = 3 and
C = 100% on Metro100K. Metro100K has a large number of violating sequences
and thus many pairs are suppressed during anonymization. The general trend in
Metro100K is more obvious than in City80K. For example, in Figure 4.7(a), as K
increases from 10 to 50, the utility loss of Score1 increases from 29% to 66%. As K ′
increases from 0.5% to 1.5%, the utility loss of Score1 at K = 30 drops from 66% to
21%. In all test cases, Score1 and Score3 consistently outperform Score2, suggesting
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(c) Runtime vs. dimensionality
Figure 4.9: Scalability (K = 30, C = 60%, K ′ = 1%)
utility loss is the same for L = 3 and L = |d| because most of the MVS are of size-3
or less. In other words, there is no diﬀerence between L = 3 and L = 4 or above in
terms of the generated MVS. Hence, the utility loss for L ≥ 3 remains unchanged;
therefore, we omit the ﬁgure on utility loss vs. L.
Figure 4.8. We vary the value of C from 20% to 100% while ﬁxing L = 3 and
K = 30 on Metro100K. The results have characteristics similar to those in Figure
4.5. The utility loss increases when C < 40%. Moreover, as K ′ increases, the utility
loss decreases signiﬁcantly.
One major contribution of our work is the development of an eﬃcient and scal-
able algorithm for achieving LKC-privacy, traditional k-anonymity, and conﬁdence
bounding on high-dimensional trajectory data. Every previous test case can ﬁnish
the entire anonymization process within 15 seconds. We further evaluate scalability
with respect to data volume and dimensionality. We conduct all the experiments
on the data set Metro100K since it is larger in size and dimensionality. Unless
otherwise speciﬁed, we ﬁx L = 3, K = 30, C = 60%, and K ′ = 1%.
Figure 4.9.a depicts the runtime in seconds from 200,000 to 1 million records.
The total runtime for anonymizing 1 million records is 125 seconds, of which 46
seconds are spent identifying MVS and 79 seconds are spent reading the raw data
set and writing the anonymous data set. It takes less than 1 second to suppress all
the MVS due to our eﬃcient MVS-tree and MFS-tree. As the number of records
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increases from 200,000 towards 1 million, the runtime for read/write and identifying
MVS also increases linearly, suggesting that our algorithm is scalable to anonymize
large data sets. Figure 4.9.b compares the total runtime for L = 2, L = 3, and
L = |d|. L = |d| represents the runtime for achieving traditional k-anonymity and
conﬁdence bounding. The runtime for achieving those models is much longer than
ours because L = |d| requires verifying many sequences up to L = |d|. In Fig-
ure 4.9.c, we increase the dimension on the data set with 1 million records. As the
number of dimensions increases, the number of MVS also increases due to sparse-
ness; therefore, the runtime for identifying MVS also increases.
Summary. (1) As anonymity threshold K or an adversary’s knowledge L increases,
the data utility decreases. The trend is less obvious on C. (2) As minimum support
threshold K ′ increases, the set of MVS and the set of MFS have less overlapping, so
suppressing pairs in MVS has less eﬀect on MFS. (3) Score1 and Score3 outperforms
Score2, suggesting it is important to consider the loss of MFS in the greedy function.
(4) High-dimensional data generally has more violating sequences and, therefore,
higher utility loss. (5) Our proposed method is scalable with respect to the data
size.
4.5 Discussion
In this section, we provide answers to the following frequently raised questions: Why
does the data publisher want to publish the sensitive attributes when the goal is to
preserve maximal frequent sequences? What if the adversary only uses time or lo-
cation to identify an individual?
Sensitive Attribute. The data publisher may publish the sensitive attributes
because some data mining tasks on trajectory data require both trajectory and
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object-speciﬁc data. Analyzing the workﬂow (traﬃc ﬂow) without understanding
what the objects are often meaningless. For example, transit companies like to un-
derstand the characteristics of the passengers’ traﬃc. However, if there is no such
data mining purpose, the sensitive attributes should be removed. Our proposed
anonymization algorithm (Section 4.3) is ﬂexible enough to handle trajectory data
with or without sensitive attributes. Note that, none of the previous works consider
the privacy threats caused by attribute linkages between the trajectory and the sen-
sitive attributes.
Time and Location. It is possible that the adversary’s background knowledge q′
contains only the location loci or only the timestamp ti. This type of attack is obvi-
ously weaker than the attack based on background knowledge q containing (lociti)
because the identiﬁed group |T (q′)| ≥ |T (q)|. Thus, an LKC-privacy preserved





In the contemporary business environment, data sharing is an essential requirement
for making better decisions and providing high-quality services. Often, multiple ser-
vice providers need to collaborate and integrate their data and expertise to deliver
highly customizable services to their customers. While data sharing can help their
clients obtain the required information or explore new knowledge, it can also be
misused by adversaries to reveal sensitive information that was not available before
the data integration. In this chapter, we study the privacy threats caused by data
sharing and present two algorithms to securely integrate person-speciﬁc sensitive
data from multiple data publishers, whereby the integrated data still retains the es-
sential information for supporting general data exploration or a speciﬁc data mining
task, such as classiﬁcation analysis. In particular, we study two real-life scenarios,
where the data is divided either horizontally or vertically among the data publishers.
Vertically-Partitioned Data. This research problem was discovered in a col-
laborative project with a ﬁnancial industry. We generalize their problem as fol-















Figure 5.1: Distributed anonymization model for multiple data publishers
the same set of individuals identiﬁed by the common identiﬁer attribute (ID), e.g.,
TA(ID, Job, Balance) and TB(ID, Sex, Salary). These companies want to integrate
their data to support better decision making such as loan or credit limit approval,
which is basically a data mining task on classiﬁcation analysis. In additional to
companies A and B, their partnered credit card company C also has access to the
integrated data, so all three companies A, B, and C are data recipients of the ﬁnal
integrated data. Figure 5.1 illustrates the data ﬂow model of secure data integration
generalized from the project. Companies A and B have two privacy concerns. First,
simply joining TA and TB would reveal the sensitive information to the other party.
Second, even if TA and TB individually do not contain person-speciﬁc or sensitive
information, the integrated data can increase the possibility of identifying the record
of an individual. The next example illustrates this point.
Example 5.1.1. Consider the data in Table 5.1. Party A (the loan company) and
Party B (the bank) own TA(ID, Job, . . . , Class) and TB(ID, Sex, Salary, . . . , Class),
respectively. Each row in the table represents the information of an individual. The
attribute Class contains the class label Y or N, representing whether or not the loan
has been approved. Both parties want to integrate their data and use the integrated
data to build a classiﬁer on the Class attribute. After integrating the two tables (by
matching the ID ﬁeld), the female lawyer becomes unique and, therefore, vulnerable
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Table 5.1: Raw tables for vertically-partitioned data
Shared Party A Party B
ID Class Job ... Sex Salary ...
1 N Writer Male 30K
2 N Dancer Male 25K
3 Y Writer Male 35K
4 N Dancer Female 37K
5 Y Engineer Female 65K
6 Y Engineer Female 35K
7 Y Engineer Male 30K
8 N Dancer Female 44K
9 Y Lawyer Male 44K
10 Y Lawyer Female 44K
to be linked to sensitive information such as Salary. In other words, linking attack
is possible on the ﬁelds Sex and Job.
In this chapter, we ﬁrst consider the problem of distributed anonymization for
vertically-partitioned Data. Given multiple private tables for the same set of records
on diﬀerent sets of attributes (i.e., vertically-partitioned tables), we want to eﬃ-
ciently produce an integrated table on all attributes for release to diﬀerent parties.
There are two obvious, yet incorrect approaches. The ﬁrst one is “integrate-then-
generalize”: ﬁrst integrate the local tables and then generalize the integrated table
using some single table anonymization methods [11, 38, 51, 63, 80]. Unfortunately,
this approach does not preserve privacy in the studied scenario because any party
holding the integrated table will immediately know all private information of all par-
ties. The second approach is “generalize-then-integrate”: ﬁrst generalize each table
locally and then integrate the generalized tables. This approach does not work for a
quasi-identiﬁer that spans multiple tables. In Example 5.1.1, achieving k-anonymity
on Sex and Job separately does not imply achieving k-anonymity on (Sex,Job) as
a single QID.
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Table 5.2: Raw tables for horizontally-partitioned data
Quasi-identiﬁer (QID) Class Sensitive
ID Job Sex Age Transfuse Surgery
Party A
1 Janitor M 34 Y Transgender
2 Lawyer F 58 N Plastic
3 Mover M 58 N Urology
Party B
4 Lawyer M 24 N Vascular
5 Mover M 34 Y Transgender
6 Janitor M 44 Y Plastic
7 Doctor F 44 N Vascular
Party C
8 Doctor M 58 N Plastic
9 Doctor M 24 N Urology
10 Carpenter F 63 Y Vascular
11 Technician F 63 Y Plastic
Horizontally-Partitioned Data. The problems with this BTS case can be gen-
eralized into two scenarios (See Chapter 3). In the ﬁrst scenario, there exists a
trustworthy entity such as the central government health agency to collect the raw
patient data from multiple hospitals and submit the data to BTS after performing
the centralized anonymization. In the second scenario, the hospitals have to directly
submit the integration of their data to the BTS while protecting the patients’ pri-
vacy. In Chapter 3, we addressed the ﬁrst scenario and presented the centralized
anonymization algorithm. The centralized anonymization method can be viewed as
“integrate-then-generalize” approach, where the central government health agency
ﬁrst integrates the data from diﬀerent hospitals then performs generalization. In
real-life information sharing, a trustworthy central authority may not always exist.
Sometimes, it is more ﬂexible for the data recipient to make requests to the data
publishers, and the data publishers directly send the requested data to the recipient.
For example, in some special occasions, BTS has to directly collect data from the
hospitals without going through the government health agency.
In this distributed scenario, each hospital owns a set of raw patient data
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Table 5.3: Naïve approach (L = 2, K = 2, C = 50%)
Quasi-identiﬁer (QID) Class Sensitive
ID Job Sex Age Transfuse Surgery
1 ANY ANY [30− 60) Y Transgender
2 ANY ANY [30− 60) N Plastic
3 ANY ANY [30− 60) N Urology
4 Professional ANY [1− 60) N Vascular
5 Non-Technical M [30− 60) Y Transgender
6 Non-Technical M [30− 60) Y Plastic
7 Professional ANY [1− 60) N Vascular
8 Professional M [1− 60) N Plastic
9 Professional M [1− 60) N Urology
10 Technical F [60− 99) Y Vascular
11 Technical F [60− 99) Y Plastic
records. The data can be viewed as horizontally partitioned among the data pub-
lishers over the same set of attributes. Consider the raw patient data in Table 5.2,
where records 1− 3 are from Party A, records 4− 7 are from Party B, and records
8 − 11 are from Party C. To achieve distributed anonymization, a naïve approach
is to anonymize the patient data independently by the hospitals and then inte-
grate as shown in Table 5.3. However, such a distributed “generalize-then-integrate”
approach suﬀers signiﬁcant utility loss compared to the centralized “integrate-then-
generalize” approach as shown in Table 5.4.
Both the distributed anonymization problems face two major challenges. First,
the data utility of the anonymous integrated data should be as good as the data
quality produced by the centralized anonymization algorithm. Second, in the pro-
cess of anonymization, the algorithm should not reveal more speciﬁc information
than the ﬁnal anonymous integrated table. For example in Table 5.1, Engineer and
Lawyer are more detailed than Professional. If the ﬁnal anonymous table contains
Professaional, then Party B should not able to determine whether the one is an
Engineer or a Lawyer.
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Table 5.4: Anonymous distributed data (L = 2, K = 2, C = 50%)
Quasi-identiﬁer (QID) Class Sensitive
ID Job Sex Age Transfuse Surgery
1 Non-Technical M [30− 60) Y Transgender
2 Professional F [30− 60) N Plastic
3 Non-Technical M [30− 60) N Urology
4 Professional M [1− 30) N Vascular
5 Non-Technical M [30− 60) Y Transgender
6 Non-Technical M [30− 60) Y Plastic
7 Professional F [30− 60) N Vascular
8 Professional M [30− 60) N Plastic
9 Professional M [1− 30) N Urology
10 Technical F [60− 99) Y Vascular
11 Technical F [60− 99) Y Plastic
Contributions. The contributions of this chapter are summarized as follows:
1. We use real-life examples to present the challenges of distributed anonymiza-
tion for privacy-aware information sharing and deﬁne the problems of dis-
tributed anonymization for vertically and horizontally partitioned data.
2. We present two algorithms to securely integrate private data from multiple
parties for two diﬀerent application scenarios (Sections 5.3 and 5.4). Both the
algorithms achieve LKC-privacy model for the semi-honest adversary model.
In the semi-honest adversarial model, it is assumed that parties follow protocol
but may try to deduce additional information.
3. We implement the proposed algorithms and evaluate the performance (Sec-
tion 5.5). Experimental results on real-life data suggest that the distributed




The privacy and the utility requirements are similar to the centralized anonymization
algorithm as presented in Chapter 3. In particular, we adopt the LKC -privacy
model and preserve information for classiﬁcation analysis. Following, we present
the problem of distributed anonymization for vertically and horizontally partitioned
data.
5.2.1 Anonymization for Vertically-Partitioned Data
We assume that there are n data publishers such that each Party y, where 1 ≤
y ≤ n owns a private table Ty(ID,Attribsy, Class) over the same set of records.
We also assume that parties hold mutually exclusive set of attributes. That is,
Attribsy ∩ Attribsz = ∅ for any 1 ≤ y, z ≤ n (See Section 5.6 for further discussion
on same set of records and mutually exclusive set of attributes). ID and Class are
shared attributes among all parties.
Deﬁnition 5.1 (Distributed Anonymization for Vertically-Partitioned Data). Given
multiple private tables T1, . . . , Tn, a LKC-privacy requirement, and a taxonomy tree
for each categorical attribute in ∪QIDj, the problem of distributed anonymization
for vertically-partitioned data is to eﬃciently produce a generalized integrated table
T such that (1) T satisﬁes the joint anonymity requirement, (2) T contains as much
information as possible for classiﬁcation, and (3) each party learns nothing about
the other party that is more speciﬁc than the information in the ﬁnal anonymous
integrated table T .
5.2.2 Anonymization for Horizontally-Partitioned Data
We assume that there are n data publishers (i.e., hospitals for the BTS case), where
each Party i owns a private table Ti(ID,D1, . . . , Dm, Class) over the same set of
attributes. Each data publisher owns a disjoint set of records, where recordi ∩
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recordj = ∅ for any 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. These parties are required to form an integrated
table T for conducting a joint data analysis.
Deﬁnition 5.2 (Distributed Anonymization for Horizontally-Partitioned Data).
When given multiple private tables T1, . . . , Tn, where each Ti is owned by dif-
ferent Party i, a LKC-privacy requirement, and a taxonomy tree for each cate-
gorical attribute contained in QID, the problem of distributed anonymization for
horizontally-partitioned data is to eﬃciently produce a generalized integrated table
T such that (1) T satisﬁes the LKC-privacy requirement, (2) T contains as much
information as possible for data analysis, and (3) each party learns nothing about
the other party more speciﬁc than what is in the ﬁnal anonymous integrated table
T .
The requirement (3) in Deﬁnitions 5.1 and 5.2 requires that each party should
not reveal any additional information to other parties than what is in the ﬁnal
anonymous integrated table. This requirement is similar to the secure multiparty
computation (SMC) protocols, where no participant learns more information than
the outcome of a function. In the problem of distributed anonymization, we assume
that the parties are semi-honest. In the semi-honest adversary model, each party
obeys the protocol. However, they may be curious to derive more information from
the received messages in the course of the protocol execution. This is the com-
mon security deﬁnition adopted in the SMC literature [53] and it is realistic in our
problem scenario since diﬀerent organizations are collaborating to share their data
securely for mutual beneﬁts. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that parties will not
deviate from the deﬁned protocol. However, they may be curious to learn additional
information from the messages they received during the protocol execution.
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5.3 Algorithm for Vertically-Partitioned Data
Without loss of generality, we ﬁrst present our solution in a scenario of two parties
(n = 2). Section 5.3.3 describes the extension to multiple parties (n > 2). Consider
a table T that is given by two tables TA and TB with a common key ID, where Party
A holds TA and Party B holds TB. At ﬁrst glance, it seems that the change from
one party to two parties is trivial because the change of Score due to specializing on
a single attribute depends only on that attribute and the Class attribute, and each
party knows about Class and the attributes they have. This observation is wrong
because parties will not be able to determine the validity of the candidate attributes
in case the QID spans multiple tables.
To overcome this problem, each party keeps a copy of the current ∪Cuti and
generalized T , denoted by Tg, in addition to the private TA or TB. The nature
of the top-down approach implies that Tg is more general than the ﬁnal answer
and, therefore, does not violate the requirement (3) in Deﬁnition 5.1. At each
iteration, the two parties cooperate to perform the same specialization as identiﬁed
in the centralized anonymization algorithm by communicating certain information
that satisﬁes the requirement (3) in Deﬁnition 5.1. Algorithm 5.1 describes the
algorithm at Party A (same for Party B).
5.3.1 Overview
First, Party A ﬁnds the local best candidate using the specialization criterion (See
Section 3.2.2) and communicates with Party B to identify the overall global best
candidate, denoted by w (Lines 4-9). To avoid disclosing the Score to each other,
the secure multiparty maximum protocol [119] can be employed. Suppose the best
w is local to Party A. Party A performs w → child(w) on its copy of ∪Cuti and
Tg. This means specializing each record t ∈ Tg containing w into more specialized
records, t′1, . . . , t′z containing the child values of child(w) (Lines 11-12). Since Party
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Algorithm 5.1: Algorithm for Vertically-Partitioned Data
1: initialize Tg to include one record containing top most values;
2: initialize ∪Cuti to include only top most values;
3: while there exists some valid candidate in ∪Cuti do
4: ﬁnd the local candidate x of highest Score(x);
5: if the party has valid candidate then




10: if the best candidate w is local then
11: specialize w on Tg and update ∪Cuti;
12: instruct Party B to specialize w;
13: else
14: wait for the instruction from Party B;
15: specialize w on Tg and update ∪Cuti using the instruction;
16: end if
17: update Score(x) and validity for candidates x in ∪Cuti;
18: end while
19: return Tg and ∪Cuti;
B does not have the attribute for w, Party A needs to instruct Party B how to
partition these records in terms of IDs. Similarly, Party B updates its ∪Cuti and
Tg, and partitions TB[t] into TB[t′1], . . . , TB[t′z] (Lines 14-15). If the best w is local
to Party B, then the role of the two parties is exchanged in this discussion. The
algorithm terminates when there are no more valid candidate in ∪Cuti.
Example 5.3.1. Consider Table 5.1. Initially, Tg = {〈ANY_Job,ANY_Sex, [1-99)〉}
and ∪Cuti = {ANY_Job,ANY_Sex, [1-99)}, and all specializations in ∪Cuti are
candidates. To ﬁnd the candidate, Party A computes Score(ANY_Job), and Party
B computes Score(ANY_Sex) and Score([1-99)).
5.3.2 Implementation
Below, we describe the key steps: ﬁnd the best candidate (Lines 4-9), perform the
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Figure 5.2: Distributed anonymization for vertically-partitioned data
(Line 17). For Party A, a local attribute refers to an attribute from TA, and a local
specialization refers to that of a local attribute.
Lines 4-9. Party A ﬁrst ﬁnds the local candidate x with highest Score(x), then
communicates with Party B to ﬁnd the best candidate. If Party A has no valid
candidate, then it sends Not-participate. This message indicates that the party has
no attribute to specialize. Score(x) come from the update done in the previous iter-
ation or the initialization prior to the ﬁrst iteration. This is similar to single-party
algorithm and this step does not access data records.
Lines 10-16. Suppose that the best candidate w is local at Party A (otherwise,
replace PartyA with PartyB). For each record t in Tg containing w, PartyA accesses
the raw records in TA[t] to tell how to specialize t. To facilitate this operation, we
represent Tg by the tree data structure as discussed in Section 3.3. The idea is to
group the raw records in TA according to their generalized records t in Tg. Given the
tree, we can ﬁnd all raw records generalized to x by following Linkx for a candidate
x in ∪Cuti. To ensure that each party has access only to its own raw records, a
leaf partition at Party A contains only raw records from TA and a leaf partition at
Party B contains only raw records from TB. Initially, the tree has only the root node
representing the most generalized record and all raw records. In each iteration, the
two parties cooperate to perform the specialization w by reﬁning the leaf partitions
Pw on Linkw in their own trees.
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Example 5.3.2. Continue with Example 5.3.1. Initially, the tree has the root node
representing the most generalized record 〈ANY_Job, ANY_Sex, [1-99)〉, TA[root] =
TA and TB[root] = TB. The root node is on LinkANY_Sex, LinkANY_Job, and
Link[1−99). See the root node in Figure 5.2. The shaded ﬁeld contains the num-
ber of raw records generalized by a node. Suppose that the best candidate w is
[1-99)→ {[1-37), [37-99)} (on Salary). Party B ﬁrst creates two child nodes under
the root node and partitions TB[root] between them. The root node is deleted from
LinkANY_Sex, LinkANY_Job, and Link[1−99); the child nodes are added to Link[1−37)
and Link[37−99), respectively, and both are added to LinkANY_Job and LinkANY_Sex.
Party B then sends the following instruction to Party A:
IDs 1-3, 6, and 7 go to the node for [1-37).
IDs 4, 5, and 8-10 go to the node for [37-99).
On receiving this instruction, Party A creates the two child nodes under the
root node in its copy of the tree and partitions TA[root] similarly. Suppose, the
next best candidate is ANY_Job → {Blue-collar,White-collar}. Similarly, the two
parties cooperate to specialize each leaf node on LinkANY_Job, resulting in the tree
in Figure 5.2.
Next, we summarize the operations at the two parties. We assume that the
best w is local at Party A.
Party A. Reﬁne each leaf partition Pw on Linkw into child partitions Pc.
Linkc is created to link up the new Pcs for the same c. Add Pc to every Linkx other
than Linkw to which Pw was previously linked. While scanning the records in Pw,
Party A also collects the following information.
• Instruction for Party B. If a record in Pw is specialized to a child value c,
collect the pair (id, c), where id is the ID of the record. This information will
be sent to B to reﬁne the corresponding leaf partitions there.
• Count statistics. The following information is collected for updating Score. (1)
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For each c in child(w): |TA[c]|, |TA[d]|, freq(TA[c], cls), and freq(TA[d], cls),
where d ∈ child(c) and cls is a class label. |TA[c]| (similarly |TA[d]|) is com-
puted by
∑ |Pc| for Pc on Linkc. (2) For each Pc on Linkc: |Pd|, where Pd is
a child partition under Pc as if c was specialized.
Party B. On receiving the instruction from Party A, Party B creates child
partitions Pc in its own tree. At Party B, Pcs contain raw records from TB. Pcs are
obtained by splitting Pw among Pcs according to the (id, c) pairs received.
Line 18. This step is similar to the single-party algorithm. Essentially, it makes
use of the count statistics in to do the update. We omit the details here.
5.3.3 Analysis
Generalization to Multi-party Case. Algorithm 5.1 is extendable for multiple
parties with minor changes: In Line 6, each party should communicate with all other
parties for determining the best. Similarly, in Line 12, the party holding the best
candidate should instruct the other parties, and in Line 14, a party should wait for
instruction from the best party.
Algorithmic Correctness. For the information requirement, our approach pro-
duces the same integrated table as the single party (See Algorithm 3.1 in Chapter 3)
on a joint table, and ensures that no party learns more detailed information about
the other party other than what they agree to share. This claim follows from the
fact that Algorithm 5.1 performs exactly the same sequence of specializations as in
single party in a distributed manner where TA and TB are kept locally at the sources.
For the privacy requirement, the only information revealed to each other are
the Score (Line 6) and the instruction (Line 12) for specializing the best candidate.
The disclosure of the Score does not breach privacy because Score is calculated by
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the frequency of the class attribute. This value only indicates how good an attribute
is for classiﬁcation analysis, and does not provide any information for a particular
record. Although the Score does not reveal any information for a particular record,
the data providers can further enhance the protection and employ the secure max
protocol [119] to securely determine the best with the highest Score without dis-
closing the Score to other data providers. The instruction for specializing the best
candidate includes (id, c) pairs, where id is the ID of the record and c is the child
value of the best candidate. This information is more general than the ﬁnal inte-
grated table that the two parties agree to share and hence does not violate privacy
requirement.
Complexity Analysis. The cost of our proposed algorithm can be summarized as
follows. Each iteration involves the following work: (1) Scan the records in TA[w] and
TB[w] for updating the tree and maintaining count statistics. (2) Update Score(x)
for aﬀected candidates x. (3) Send “instruction” to the remote party. Only the work
in (1) involves accessing data records, which is in the order of O(|T |); the work
in (2) makes use of the count statistics without accessing data records and can be
performed in constant time. This feature makes our approach scalable. Thus, for one
iteration the computation cost is O(|T |). The total number of iterations is bounded
by O(log|T |), resulting in the total computation cost to be O(|T |log|T |). For the
communication cost (3), the instruction contains only IDs of the records in TA[w]
or TB[w] and child values c in child(w) and, therefore, is compact. The number
of bits to be transmitted is proportional to the number of records in the database
and thus in the order of O(|T |). However, the instruction is sent only by a party.
Assuming the availability of a broadcast channel, the maximum communication
cost of a single party is bounded by O(|T |log|T |). If secure sum protocol is used,
then there is an additional cost in every iteration. The running time of secure max
protocol is bounded by O(p(n)), where p(n) is the polynomial of n parties [119].
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5.4 Algorithm for Horizontally-Partitioned Data
In the section, we similarly extend the single-party (centralized) algorithm to ad-
dress the problem of distributed anonymization for horizontally-partitioned data as
described in Deﬁnition 5.2. Each Party i (hospital) owns a private database Ti.
The union of the local databases constructs the complete view of the data table,
T =
⋃
Ti, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Note that the quasi-identiﬁers are uniform across all
the local databases.
As discussed earlier, if the data publishers perform anonymization indepen-
dently before data integration (Table 5.3), then it results in higher utility loss than
the centralized approach. To prevent utility loss, parties need to know whether a
locally identiﬁable record will or will not satisfy the privacy requirement after inte-
gration. Moreover, to satisfy the utility requirement, all the parties should perform
the same sequence of anonymization operations. In other words, parties need to
calculate the Score of the candidates over the integrated data table. To overcome
these problems, each party keeps a copy of the current ∪Cuti and generalized T ,
denoted by Tg, in addition to the private Ti. The nature of the top-down approach
implies that Tg is more general than the ﬁnal answer, therefore, does not violate
the requirement (3) in Deﬁnition 5.2. At each iteration, all the parties cooperate to
determine the Best specialization that has the highest Score and perform the same
specialization.
The proposed distributed anonymization algorithm requires one party to act
as a leader. It is important to note that any party can act as a leader and the
leader is not necessarily to be more trustworthy than others. Unlike the centralized
approach, parties do not share their data with the leader and after the anonymization
the data resides with the respective data publishers. The only purpose of the leader
is to synchronize the anonymization process. Algorithms 5.2 and 5.3 describe the
algorithms for leader and non-leader parties.
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Algorithm 5.2: Algorithm for horizontally-partitioned data (Leader)
1: Initialize Tg to include one record containing the top most values;
2: Initialize Cuti to include all the valid top most values;
3: Send Information to Party 2;
4: Read Information from Party n;
5: while some x ∈ ∪Cuti is valid do
6: Find the Best specialization from ∪Cuti;
7: Send Instruction to Party 2 to specialize Best on Tg;
8: Perform Best on Tg and update ∪Cuti;
9: Send Information to Party 2;
10: Read Information from Party n;
11: Update the Score(x) and validity for ∀x ∈ ∪Cuti;
12: end while
13: Send End to Party 2 and terminate;
5.4.1 Overview
Without loss of generality, we assume that Party 1 is the leader in the explana-
tion. The sequence of specialization operations performed by the parties in this
distributed anonymization algorithm is the same as the centralized anonymization
algorithm. Initially, each party initializes Tg to include one record containing the
top most values and ∪Cuti to include the top most value for each attribute Di
(Lines 1-2 of Algorithms 5.2 and 5.3). First, the leader collects all the count statis-
tics from all the parties to determine the Best candidate. The count statistics are
collected through the propagation of the Information message by using secure sum
protocol [95] (Lines 3-4 of Algorithms 5.2 and 5.3). Secure sum protocol ensures
that the leader only knows the global count statistics without the knowledge of the
speciﬁc individuals’ contribution. Once the leader determines the Best candidate
(Line 6 of Algorithm 5.2), it informs the other parties through the propagation of
the Instruction message to specialize the Best on Tg (Line 7 of Algorithm 5.2 and
Lines 6-7 of Algorithm 5.3). Then the leader performs Best → child(Best) on its
copy of ∪Cuti and Tg (Line 8 of Algorithm 5.2). This means specializing each record
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Algorithm 5.3: Algorithm for horizontally-partitioned data (Non-leader)
1: Initialize Tg to include one record containing the top most values;
2: Initialize Cuti to include all the valid top most values;
3: Read Information from Party (i− 1);
4: Send Information to Party (i + 1) % n after adding its own information;
5: while received message = End do
6: Read Instruction from Party (i− 1);
7: Send Instruction to Party (i + 1) % n;
8: Perform specialization on Tg according to the received Instruction;
9: Read Information from Party (i− 1);
10: Send Information to Party (i + 1) % n after adding its own counts;
11: end while
12: Send message End to Party (i + 1) % n and terminate;
t ∈ Tg containing the value of Best into more specialized records, t′1, . . . , t′z contain-
ing the child values of child(Best). Similarly, other parties updates its ∪Cuti and
Tg, and partitions Tg[t] into Tg[t′1], . . . , Tg[t′z] (Line 8 of Algorithm 5.3). Finally, the
leader again collects global count statistics from the other parties (Lines 9-10 of
Algorithms 5.2 and 5.3) to update the Score and validity of the candidates (Line
11 of Algorithm 5.2). The algorithm terminates when there are no valid candidates
in ∪Cuti. Finally, all the parties integrate their local anonymous databases after
anonymization.
Example 5.4.1. Consider Table 5.2. Initially, all data records are generalized to
〈ANY_Job, ANY_Sex, [1-99)〉 in Tg, and ∪Cuti = {ANY_Job, ANY_Sex, [1-99)}.
To ﬁnd the Best specialization among the candidates in ∪Cuti, the leader collects
the global count statistics to compute Score(ANY _Job), Score(ANY_Sex), and
Score([1-99)).
5.4.2 Implementation
Similar to the centralized algorithm, following we describe the key steps for the
leader. Note that, only the leader determines the Best candidate and updates the
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Score and validity of the candidates. All the other parties perform the Best spe-
cialization according to the instruction of the leader.
Lines 3-6 of Algorithm 5.2. Initially, the leader computes the Score for all
candidates x in ∪Cuti to determine the Best candidate. For each subsequent it-
eration, Score(x) come from the update done in the previous iteration (Line 11
of Algorithm 5.2). To calculate the Score of a candidate x, the leader needs the
value of |T [x]|, |T [c]|, freq(T [x], cls), and freq(T [c], cls), where c ∈ child(x) and
cls is a class label. Refer to Equation 3.2 for Score function. These values can
be obtained by summing up the individual count statistics from all the parties:
|T [x]| = ∑i |Ti[x]|, |T [c]| =
∑
i |Ti[c]|, freq(T [x], cls) =
∑
i freq(Ti[x], cls), and
freq(T [c], cls) =
∑
i freq(Ti[c], cls). However, disclosing these values for summation
violates the privacy requirement, since a party should not know the count statistics
of other parties. To overcome this problem, we use secure sum protocol [22].
Secure sum protocol calculates the sum of the values from diﬀerent parties
without disclosing the value of any individual. Suppose there are n (> 2) diﬀerent
parties each holding a secret number, where Party 1 is the leader. The leader ﬁrst
generates a random number R, adds it to its local value v1 and sends the sum R+v1
to Party 2. Thus, Party 2 does not know the value of v1. For the remaining parties,
2 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, each party receives V = R +∑i−1j=1 vj, adds its own value to the
sum and passes it to Party i + 1. Finally, Party n receives the sum, adds its value,
and passes it to Party 1. Since Party 1 (leader) knows the random number, it can
obtain the summation by subtracting R from V . Hence, the leader can determine
the summation without knowing the secret value of the individual parties. However,
secure sum protocol does not work when n = 2 because Party 1 can always know
the value of Party 2 by subtracting its own value from the summation. We further
discuss about this issue in Section 5.4.3.
To obtain the global count statistics, the leader ﬁrst creates an Information
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message by adding random numbers to its own local count statistics and passes
the message to Party 2 (Line 3 of Algorithm 5.2). Similarly, all of the non-leader
parties add their count statistics to the Information and pass it to the next party
(Lines 3-4 of Algorithm 5.3). Finally, the leader gets the message from Party n and
subtracts the random numbers to get the global count statistics for computing the
Score of the candidates.
Example 5.4.2. Continue with Example 5.4.1. First, the leader (Party 1) computes
the Information message by its local count statistics. The Information message
has two parts: validity and score. The validity portion contains count statistics
needed to determine the validity of the candidates. Speciﬁcally, it contains the
number of records generalized to a particular equivalence group and the size of the
new sub-groups if any of the attribute is specialized. Following is the validity part
of an Information message.
Validity= {(ANY_Job, ANY_Sex, [1-99), 3(1)), (ANY_Job, 2(1), 1(0)),
(ANY_Sex, 2(1), 1(0)), ([1-99), 3(1), 0(0))}
This means that Party 1 has three records in an equivalence group with qid =
{ANY_Job, ANY_Sex, [1-99)}, where one of the records contains sensitive value.
If ANY_Job is specialized, then it generates two equivalence groups, where the ﬁrst
group contains two records including one sensitive value and the other group contains
one record with no sensitive value. Similarly, it also contains the count statistics if
ANY_Sex and [1-99) are specialized. Note that, validity part also provides enough
count statistics to compute the Score for general data analysis.
Score part contains count statistics needed to compute the Score for classiﬁ-
cation analysis. It contains the number of records for all the class labels for each
candidate in the ∪Cuti. Following is the score part of an Information message.
Score = {(ANY_Job, 1, 2) (Blue-collar, 1, 1) (White-collar, 0, 1),
(ANY_Sex, 1, 2) (M, 1, 1) (F, 0, 1), ([1-99), 1, 2) ([1-60), 1, 2) ([60-99), 0, 0)}
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Figure 5.3: Distributed anonymization for horizontally-partitioned data
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The number of records are one and two for the class labels “Yes” and “No”
respectively for the ANY_Job. It also provides the detailed counts when ANY_-
Job is specialized into Blue-collar and White-collar. Blue-collar has one record
containing “Yes” and one record containing “No” class label. White-collar has only
one record with “No” class label. Similarly, it provides necessary counts for the other
candidates. After computing the Information message, Party 1 adds a random
number to each of the values and sends the message to Party 2. As mentioned earlier,
all of the parties add their part into the Information and thus the message comes
back to the leader with the global count statistics. Then, the leader subtracts the
random numbers to get the real global counts for computing the Score and validity
of the candidates. Figure 5.3 shows the information ﬂow among the parties.
Lines 7-10 of Algorithm 5.2. Once the Best candidate is determined, the leader
instructs all the other parties to specialize Best → child(Best) on their local Tg
(Line 7 of Algorithm 5.2). The Instruction message contains the Best attribute
and the number of global generalized records in each new subgroups. Similar to
the centralized anonymization algorithm, each party uses the tree data structure to
facilitate the operations on Tg. The diﬀerence is that in the centralized approach,
one party (central government health agency) specializes the records, but in the
distributed setting, every data publisher concurrently specialize its own records. If
⋃
Cuti has no valid attributes, then the leader sends the End message to terminate
the anonymization algorithm. Thus, both centralized and distributed anonymization
algorithms produce the same anonymous integrated table by performing the same
sequence of operations.
Example 5.4.3. Continue with Example 5.4.2. Initially, the tree has one partition
(root) representing the most generalized record 〈ANY_Job, ANY_Sex, [1-99)〉.
Suppose that the Best candidate is ANY_Job → {Blue-collar,White-collar}. The
leader creates two child nodes under the root and partitions Tg[root] between them
resulting in the tree in Figure 5.3 and further instructs Party 2 to perform the same
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specialization. On receiving this instruction, Party 2 sends the message to the next
party and similarly creates two child nodes under the root in its copy of the tree.
Thus, all the parties perform the same operation on their tree. This specialization
process continues as long as there is a valid candidate in
⋃
Cuti.
Line 11 of Algorithm 5.2. This step is performed only by the leader and is
similar to the centralized approach. All of the count statistics that are needed to
update Score(x) and validity for candidates x in ∪Cuti are collected through the
Information message from all the other parties.
Data Integration. After executing Algorithms 5.2 and 5.3, each party generates
a local anonymous database which by itself may not satisfy LKC -privacy, but the
union of the local anonymous databases is guaranteed to satisfy the privacy require-
ments. The ﬁnal task is to integrate these local anonymous databases before giving
it to the BTS. Therefore, each data publisher sends its local anonymous data to the
leader for data integration.
5.4.3 Analysis
Two-party Case. Due to the limitation of the employed secure sum protocol in
our proposed distributed anonymization algorithm, the present solution is applicable
only if there are more than two parties. A distributed anonymization algorithm for
two parties requires a diﬀerent cryptographic technique, which is not as simple as
the secure sum protocol [27]. A possible solution for the two party case is presented
in Chapter 7.
Algorithmic Correctness. The distributed anonymization algorithm produces
the same anonymous integrated table as the centralized anonymization algorithm.
This claim follows from the fact that Algorithms 5.2 and 5.3 perform exactly the
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same sequence of specializations as the centralized anonymization algorithm in a
distributed manner where Ti is kept locally at each party.
For the privacy requirement, the only information revealed to the leader is
content found in the global count statistics of Information message. The count
statistics are needed for the calculation of Score and validity of the candidates. The
validity part of the Information message determines whether a candidate can be
further specialized or not. However, such information can also be determined from
the ﬁnal integrated table because a specialization should take place as long as it is
valid. The disclosure of the score part does not breach privacy because it contains
only the frequency of the class labels for the candidates. These values only indi-
cate how good a candidate is for classiﬁcation analysis, and does not provide any
information for a particular record. Moreover, the Score is computed by the leader
over the global count statistics without the knowledge of the individual local counts.
Complexity Analysis. The computation cost of the distributed algorithm is simi-
lar to the centralized approach. Each party only scans its own data in every iteration.
As a result, the computational cost for each party is bounded by O(|Ti|log|Ti|). How-
ever, distributed algorithm has some additional communication overhead. In every
iteration, each party sends one Instruction and one Information message. The
Instruction message contains the Best candidate that needs to be specialized. The
Information message contains diﬀerent count statistics for every candidate in the
∪Cuti. Thus, these messages are compact. Moreover, there is a synchronization
delay in every iteration, which is proportional to the number of parties n since the
parties form a ring topology.
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Table 5.5: Attributes for the Adult data set
Attribute Type Numerical Range
# Leaves # Levels
Age (Ag) continuous 17 - 90
Education-num (En) continuous 1 - 16
Final-weight (Fw) continuous 13492 - 1490400
Relationship (Re) categorical 6 3
Race (Ra) categorical 5 3
Sex (Sx) categorical 2 2
Martial-status (Ms) categorical 7 4
Native-country (Nc) categorical 40 5
Education (Ed) categorical 16 5
Hours-per-week (Hw) continuous 1 - 99
Capital-gain (Cg) continuous 0 - 99999
Capital-loss (Cl) continuous 0 - 4356
Work-class (Wc) categorical 8 5
Occupation (Oc) categorical 14 3
5.5 Experimental Evaluation
We implemented the proposed algorithms by simulating the distributed environment
on a single PC. The distributed anonymization algorithms achieve the same data
utility as the centralized anonymization algorithm and thus all the previous results
(Section 3.4) also hold for distributed anonymization algorithms. The main objective
of this section is to evaluate the beneﬁt of the distributed algorithms over the naïve
approach for data utility. We measure the utility of the anonymous data by doing
classiﬁcation analysis.
Vertically-Partitioned Data. We use the publicly available Adult data set [34].
We model two private tables TA and TB as follows: TA contains the ﬁrst 9 attributes
of Table 5.5, interesting to the Immigration Department, and TB contains the re-
maining 5 attributes, interesting to the Taxation Department. A common key ID for
joining the two tables is added to both tables. We would like to emphasize that the
























SE(A) = 17.7% SE(B) = 17.9%
Figure 5.4: Classiﬁcation error for vertically-partitioned data ( L = 4, C = 20%)
the sequence of specializations performed does not depend on the decision of the
participating parties.
In addition to classiﬁcation error (CE), Baseline Error (BE) and upper bound
error (UE) (Section 3.4 for details), we also measure Source error ( SE). SE is
the error without data integration at all, i.e., the error of classiﬁers built from an
individual raw private table. Each party has a SE. Thus, SE − CE measures the
beneﬁt of data integration over an individual private table. UE − CE measures
the beneﬁt of generalization compared to the brute removal of the attributes in the
QID. CE−BE measures the quality loss due to the generalization for achieving the
privacy requirement.
Figure 5.4 evaluates the beneﬁt of data integration over individual private
table, measured by SE −CE. SE for TA, denoted by SE(A), is 17.7% and SE for
TB, denoted by SE(B), is 17.9%. The ﬁgure also shows diﬀerent classiﬁcation error
CE for diﬀerent values of K. For example, CE = 16.8% for K = 100, suggesting
that the beneﬁt of integration, SE − CE, for each party is approximately 1.5%. In
practice, the beneﬁt is more than the accuracy consideration because our method
allows the participating parties to share information for joint data analysis.
Horizontally-Partitioned Data. We show the beneﬁt of our distributed anonymiza-























Distributed Algorithm Naïve Approach
BE=14.7% UE=24.6%
Figure 5.5: Classiﬁcation error for horizontally-partitioned data ( L = 4, C = 20%)
45, 222 records of Adult data set equally among three parties. In the naïve approach,
parties ﬁrst generalizes their data to satisfy LKC-privacy. Classiﬁcation error is then
calculated on the integrated anonymous data collected from the parties.
Figure 5.5 depicts the classiﬁcation error CE with adversary’s knowledge
L = 4, anonymity threshold 20 ≤ K ≤ 100, and conﬁdence threshold C = 20% on
the Adult data set. For the naïve approach, CE−BE spans from 3.8% to 8.2%, and
UE − CE spans from 1.7% to 6.1%. This result conﬁrms that the naïve approach
losses signiﬁcant amount of data due to prior generalization before integration.
5.6 Discussion
How reasonable is it to assume that the parties can identify the same set of records,
and hold a mutually exclusive set of attributes for the vertically-partitioned data?
Following we provide answers to these questions.
Same Set of Records. Parties can identify the same set of records by execut-
ing a secure set intersection protocol (based on [5]) on the global unique identiﬁers
(ID). The secure set intersection protocol of [5] uses commutation encryption. Com-
mutative encryption has the property that when multiple parties encrypt a value
successively by their keys, the result of the encryption is identical irrespective of
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the order of encryptions. Following, we brieﬂy present the protocol for two parties
which can be extended for n parties similarly.
Initially, both the parties encrypt the values of their global identiﬁer and send
EK(V ) to the other party, where K is the secret key and V is the set of global
identiﬁer values. Each party then encrypts the received values by its own key and
sends back the double encrypted values along with the received values to the other
party in the same order. For example, Party 1 receives EK2(V2) from Party 2 and
sends back the pair 〈EK2(V2), EK1(EK2(V2))〉 to Party 2. Similarly, Party 1 receives
the pair 〈EK1(V1), EK2(EK1(V1))〉 from Party 2. Now, both the parities can deter-
mine the common value set V1 ∩ V2 by comparing the values in EK2(EK1(V1)) and
EK1(EK2(V2)) and thus can identiﬁes the same set of records without disclosing the
identiﬁers of the records that are not common between the parties. Note, parties
also obtain an encrypted value EK1(EK2(v)) for each v ∈ V1 ∩ V2 that uniquely
identify the records. These encrypted ID values are exchanged (Section 5.3) to facil-
itate the anonymization process but removed (along with the real ID values) before
publishing the data to third parties.
Mutually Exclusive Set of Attributes. Our secure data integration algorithms
require that parties hold mutually exclusive set of attributes. We assume that each
party knows what attributes the other parties hold. Therefore, if there is a com-
mon attribute among the parties, there are two possible alternative solutions that
parties can adopt before executing the secure data integration algorithms. First, if
the attribute is common among all the parties then they can exclude the common
attributes from integration since parties already know the values of the attribute.
Second, parties can make an agreement that outlines who will contribute the com-
mon attribute so that multiple parties do not contribute the same attribute. Hence,
common attribute is not a problem since parties will communication and agree on








Anonymizing health data is a challenging task due to its inherent heterogeneity.
Modern health data are typically composed of diﬀerent types, for example relational
data (e.g., demographics) and set-valued data (e.g., diagnostic codes). For many
medical problems, diﬀerent types of data need to be published simultaneously so
that the correlation between diﬀerent data types can be preserved. In spite of the
extensive research on privacy-preserving relational and set-valued data publishing
(see Chapter 2.2 for more discussion), the emerging publishing scenario in which
relational data and set-valued data need to be published simultaneously, a very
common scenario in secondary use of health data, is seldom addressed in the existing
literature related to privacy technology. Current techniques primarily focus on a
single type of data [37], and, therefore unable to thwart privacy attacks caused by
inferences involving diﬀerent data types. In this chapter, we propose an algorithm
to publish heterogeneous health data that can retain the essential information for
supporting data mining tasks. The following real-life scenario further illustrates the
privacy threats due to heterogeneous health data sharing.
Example 6.1.1. Consider the raw patient data in Table 6.1 (the attribute ID is
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Table 6.1: Heterogeneous health data
ID Job Age Diagnostic Code Class
1 Engineer 34 11, 12, 21, 22 Y
2 Lawyer 50 12, 22 N
3 Engineer 38 12 N
4 Lawyer 33 11, 12 Y
5 Dancer 20 12 Y
6 Writer 37 11 N
7 Writer 32 11, 12, 21, 22 Y
8 Dancer 25 12, 21, 22 N
Table 6.2: Anonymous heterogeneous health data
Job Age Diagnostic Code Class Count
Professional [18-65) 1* Y 3
Professional [18-65) 1* N 2
Artist [18-65) 1* Y 1
Artist [18-65) 1* N 3
Professional [18-65) 1*, 2* Y 2
Professional [18-65) 1*, 2* N 0
Artist [18-65) 1*, 2* Y 2
Artist [18-65) 1*, 2* N 4
just for the purpose of illustration). Each row in the table represents the information
of a patient. Job, Age, and Diagnostic Code are the categorical, numerical, and set-
valued attribute, respectively. Suppose, the data publisher needs to release Table 6.1
for the purpose of classiﬁcation analysis on the class attribute, which has two values,
Y and N , indicating whether or not the patient is deceased. However, if a record
in the table is so speciﬁc such that not many patients can match it, releasing the
data may lead to the re-identiﬁcation of a patient. For example, Loukides et al. [67]
show that for the International Classiﬁcation of Disease (ICD) version 9 codes (or
“diagnostic codes” for brevity), one source of set-valued data, could be used by an
adversary as a linkage to patients’ identities. Needless to say, the knowledge of both
relational and set-valued data about a victim makes the privacy attack easier for an
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Figure 6.1: Taxonomy tree of attributes
and his diagnostic codes contain {11}. Hence, record #4 can be uniquely identiﬁed
since he is the only Lawyer with diagnostic codes {11, 12} in the raw data. Thus,
identifying his record results in disclosing he also has {12}.
To prevent such linking attacks, a number of partition-based privacy models
have been proposed [65, 70, 96, 108]. However, recent research has indicated that
these models are vulnerable to various privacy attacks [39,58,106,107] and provide
insuﬃcient privacy protection. In this chapter, we adopt diﬀerential privacy [28,30],
a privacy model that provides provable privacy guarantees and that is, by deﬁ-
nition, immune against all aforementioned attacks. Diﬀerential privacy makes no
assumption about an adversary’s background knowledge. A diﬀerentially-private
mechanism ensures that the probability of any output (released data) is equally
likely from all nearly identical input data sets and thus guarantees that all outputs
are insensitive to any individual’s data. In other words, an individual’s privacy is
not at risk because of inclusion in the disclosed data set.
Motivation. Existing algorithms that provide diﬀerential privacy guarantee are
based on two approaches: interactive and non-interactive. In an interactive frame-
work, a data miner can pose aggregate queries through a private mechanism, and a
database owner answers these queries in response. Most of the proposed methods for
ensuring diﬀerential privacy are based on an interactive framework [26,30,35,93]. In
a non-interactive framework the database owner ﬁrst anonymizes the raw data and
then releases the anonymized version for public use. In this chapter, we adopt the
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Table 6.3: A raw data table and its anonymized versions


























non-interactive framework and argue that this approach has a number of advantages
for data mining.
In an interactive framework privacy is ensured by adding noise to each query
response. To ensure privacy a database owner can answer only a limited number of
queries before she has to increase the noise level to a point that the answer is no
longer useful. Thus, the database can only support a ﬁxed number of queries for a
given privacy budget. This is a big problem when there are a large number of data
miners because each user (data miner) can only ask a small number of queries. Even
for a small number of users, it is not possible to explore the data for testing various
hypotheses. On the other hand, by releasing the data, all data miners get full access
to the anonymized data. This gives researchers greater ﬂexibility in performing
the required data analysis, and they can ﬁne-tune the data mining results for their
research purposes.
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Current techniques that adopt the non-interactive approach publish contin-
gency table or marginals of the raw data [9, 30, 46, 113, 115]. The general structure
of these approaches is to ﬁrst derive a frequency matrix1 of the raw data over the
database domain. For example, Table 6.3.b shows the contingency table of Ta-
ble 6.3.a. After that, noise is added to each count to satisfy the privacy require-
ment. Finally, the noisy frequency matrix is published. However, this approach is
not suitable for high-dimensional data with a large domain because when the added
noise is relatively large compared to the count, the utility of the data is signiﬁcantly
destroyed. We also conﬁrm this point in our experimental results (Section 6.4).
Contributions We propose a novel technique for publishing heterogeneous health
data that provides an -diﬀerential privacy [28] guarantee. While protecting privacy
is a critical element in data publishing, it is equally important to preserve the utility
of the published data since this is the primary reason for data release. Taking the
decision tree induction classiﬁer as an example, we show that our anonymization
algorithm can be eﬀectively tailored for preserving information in the data mining
task. The contributions of this chapter are summarized as follows:
1. To our knowledge, a diﬀerentially private data disclosure algorithm that can
simultaneously handle both relational and set-valued data has not been previ-
ously developed. The proposed diﬀerentially private data release algorithm is
based on generalization technique and preserves information for classiﬁcation
analysis (Section 6.3). Previous work [69] suggests that generalization tech-
niques cannot be used to achieve -diﬀerential privacy as they depend heavily
on the underlying data. Yet, we show that diﬀerentially private data can be
released by adding uncertainty in the generalization procedure. The proposed
solution ﬁrst probabilistically generates a generalized contingency table and
1For a contingency table, a frequency matrix is computed over all the attributes, whereas a
marginal is derived by projecting some of the attributes.
111
then adds noise to the counts. For example, Table 6.3.c is a generalized con-
tingency table of Table 6.3.a. Thus the count of each partition is typically
much larger than the added noise.
2. The proposed algorithm can also handle numerical attributes. Unlike existing
methods [113], it does not require the numerical attribute to be pre-discretized.
The algorithm adaptively determines the split points for numerical attributes
and partitions the data based on the workload, while guaranteeing -diﬀerential
privacy. This is an essential requirement for getting accurate classiﬁcation, as
we show in Section 6.4. Moreover, the algorithm is computationally eﬃcient.
3. It is well acknowledged that -diﬀerential privacy provides strong privacy guar-
antee. However, the utility aspect of the diﬀerentially-private algorithms has
received much less study. Does the interactive approach oﬀer better data min-
ing results than the non-interactive approach? Does diﬀerentially private data
provide less utility than k-anonymous data? Experimental results suggest that
our algorithm outperforms the recently proposed diﬀerentially-private interac-
tive algorithm for building classiﬁer [35] and the top-down specialization (TDS)
approach [38] that publishes k-anonymous data for classiﬁcation analysis (Sec-
tion 6.4).
6.2 Problem Deﬁnition
In this section, we ﬁrst present an overview of -diﬀerential privacy and the core
mechanisms to achieve -diﬀerential privacy. We then introduce the notion of gener-
alization in the context of microdata publishing, followed by a problem statement.
112
6.2.1 Diﬀerential Privacy
Diﬀerential privacy is a recent privacy deﬁnition that provides a strong privacy guar-
antee. Partition-based privacy models ensure privacy by imposing syntactic con-
straints on the output. For example, the output is required to be indistinguishable
among k records, or the sensitive value to be well represented in every equivalence
group. Instead, diﬀerential privacy guarantees that an adversary learns nothing
more about an individual, regardless of whether her record is present or absent in
the data. Informally, a diﬀerentially private output is insensitive to any particular
record. Therefore, from an individual’s point of view, the output is computed as if
from a data set that does not contain her record.
Deﬁnition 6.1 (-diﬀerential privacy). A randomized algorithm Ag is diﬀerentially
private if for all data sets D and D′ where their symmetric diﬀerence contains at
most one record (i.e., |DD′| ≤ 1), and for all possible anonymized data sets Dˆ,
Pr[Ag(D) = Dˆ] ≤ e × Pr[Ag(D′) = Dˆ], (6.1)
where the probabilities are over the randomness of the Ag.
The parameter  > 0 is public and speciﬁed by a data publisher. Lower values
of  provide a stronger privacy guarantee. Typically, the values of  should be small,
such as 0.01, 0.1, or in some cases ln 2, or ln 3 [29]. When  is very small, we have
e ≈ 1 + .
A standard mechanism to achieve diﬀerential privacy is to add random noise to
the true output of a function. The noise is calibrated according to the sensitivity of
the function. The sensitivity of a function is the maximum diﬀerence of its outputs
from two data sets that diﬀer only in one record.
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for all D,D′ diﬀering in at most one record.
Example 6.2.1. Consider the raw data set of Table 6.1. Let f be a function that
counts the number of records with Age less than 40. Then, the Δf is 1 because
f(D) can diﬀer at most 1 due to the addition or removal of a single record.
Laplace Mechanism. For the analysis whose outputs are real, a standard mecha-
nism to achieve diﬀerential privacy is to add Laplace noise to the true output of a
function. Dwork et al. [30] propose the Laplace mechanism which takes as inputs
a data set D, a function f , and the privacy parameter λ. The privacy parameter
λ determines the magnitude of noise added to the output. The mechanism ﬁrst
computes the true output f(D), and then perturbs the output by adding noise.
The noise is generated according to a Laplace distribution with probability density
function Pr(x|λ) = 1
2λ
exp(−|x|/λ); its variance is 2λ2 and mean is 0. The following
theorem connects the sensitivity to the magnitude of noise and guarantees that the
perturbed output ˆf(D) = f(D)+Lap(λ) satisﬁes -diﬀerential privacy, where Lap(λ)
is a random variable sampled from the Laplace distribution.
Theorem 6.1. [30] For any function f : D → Rd, the algorithm Ag that adds
independently generated noise with distribution Lap(Δf/) to each of the d outputs
satisﬁes -diﬀerential privacy.
Example 6.2.2. Continue from Example 6.2.1. The mechanism that returns ˆf(D) =
f(D) + Lap(1/) gives -diﬀerential privacy.
Exponential Mechanism. For the analysis whose outputs are not real or make
no sense after adding noise, McSherry and Talwar [76] propose the exponential
mechanism. The exponential mechanism chooses an output t ∈ T that is close to
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the optimum with respect to a utility function while preserving diﬀerential privacy.
The exponential mechanism takes as inputs a data set D, output range T , privacy
parameter , and a utility function u : (D×T ) → R that assigns a real valued score
to every output t ∈ T , where a higher score means better utility.
The mechanism induces a probability distribution over the range T and then
samples an output t. Let Δu = max∀t,D,D′ |u(D, t) − u(D′, t)| be the sensitivity of
the utility function. The probability associated with each output is proportional to
exp( u(D,t)
2Δu
); that is, the output with a higher score is exponentially more likely to
be chosen.
Theorem 6.2. [76] For any function u : (D×T ) → R, an algorithm Ag that chooses
an output t with probability proportional to exp( u(D,t)
2Δu
) satisﬁes -diﬀerential pri-
vacy.
6.2.2 Generalization
Let D = {r1, . . . , rn} be a multiset of records, where each record ri represents the
information of an individual with d attributes A = {A1, . . . , Ad}. We assume that
each attribute Ai has a ﬁnite domain, denoted by Ω(Ai). The domain of D is
deﬁned as Ω(D) = Ω(A1)× . . .×Ω(Ad). To anonymize a data set D, generalization
replaces a value of an attribute with a more general value. The exact general value
is determined according to the attribute partition.
Deﬁnition 6.3 (Attribute Partition). The partitions P (Ai) of a numerical attribute
are the intervals 〈I1, I2, . . . , Ik〉 in Ω(Ai) such that
⋃k
j=1 Ij = Ω(Ai). For categorical
and set-valued attribute, partitions are deﬁned by a set of nodes from the taxonomy
tree such that it covers the whole tree, and each leaf node belongs to exactly one
partition.
For example, Artist is the general value of Dancer according to the taxonomy
tree of Job in Figure 6.1. Similarly, age 23 and diagnostic code 11 can be represented
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by the interval [18− 40) and code 1*, respectively. For numerical attributes, these
intervals are determined adaptively from the data set.
Deﬁnition 6.4 (Generalization). Generalization is deﬁned by a function Φ =
{φ1, φ2, . . . , φd}, where φi : v → p maps each value v ∈ Ω(Ai) to a p ∈ P (Ai).
Clearly, given a data set D over a set of attributes A = {A1, . . . , Ad}, many
alternative generalization functions are feasible. Each generalization function par-
titions the attribute domains diﬀerently. To satisfy -diﬀerential privacy, the algo-
rithm must determine a generalization function that is insensitive to the underlying
data. More formally, for any two data sets D and D′, where |DD′| = 1, the
algorithm must ensure that the ratio of Pr[Ag(D) = Φ] and Pr[Ag(D′) = Φ] is
bounded.
One naive solution that satisﬁes -diﬀerential privacy is to have a ﬁxed gen-
eralization function, irrespective of the input data set. However, a proper choice of
generalization function is very crucial since the data mining result varies signiﬁcantly
for diﬀerent choices of partitioning. In Section 6.3 we present an eﬃcient algorithm
for determining an adaptive partitioning technique for classiﬁcation analysis that
guarantees -diﬀerential privacy.
6.2.3 Problem Statement
Suppose a data publisher wants to release an anonymous data table Dˆ(Apr1 , . . . ,
Aprd , A
cls) to the public for classiﬁcation analysis. The attributes in D are classiﬁed
into three categories: (1) An explicit identiﬁer Ai attribute that explicitly identiﬁes
an individual, such as SSN, and Name. These attributes are removed before releasing
the data as per the HIPAA Privacy Rule [71]. (2) A class attribute Acls that
contains the class value, and the goal of the data miner is to build a classiﬁer to
accurately predict the value of this attribute. (3) A set of d predictor attributes
Apr = {Apr1 , . . . , Aprd }, whose values are used to predict the class attribute. We
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require the class attribute to be categorical, and the predictor attribute can be either
categorical, numerical or set-valued. Further, we assume that for each categorical
or set-valued attribute Apri , a taxonomy tree is provided. The taxonomy tree of an
attribute Apri speciﬁes the hierarchy among the values. Next, we give our problem
statement.
Given a data table D and the privacy parameter , our objective is to generate
an anonymized data table Dˆ such that (1) Dˆ satisﬁes -diﬀerential privacy, and (2)
preserves as much information as possible for classiﬁcation analysis.
6.3 Anonymization Algorithm
In this section, we ﬁrst present an overview of our Diﬀ erentially-private anonymiza-
tion algorithm based on Generalization (DiﬀGen). We then elaborate the key steps,
and prove that the algorithm is -diﬀerential private. Finally, we present the imple-
mentation details and analyze the complexity of the algorithm.
6.3.1 Overview
Algorithm 6.1 ﬁrst generalizes the predictor attributes Apr and thus divides the raw
data into several equivalence groups, where all the records within a group have the
same attribute values. Then the algorithm publishes the noisy counts of the groups.
The general idea is to anonymize the raw data by a sequence of specializations,
starting from the topmost general state as shown in Figure 6.2. A specialization,
written v → child(v), where child(v) denotes the set of child values of v, replaces
the parent value v with a child value. The specialization process can be viewed as
pushing the “cut” of each taxonomy tree downwards. A cut of the taxonomy tree for
an attribute Apri , denoted by Cuti, contains exactly one value on each root-to-leaf
path. The value of the set-valued attribute of a record can be generalized to a cut if
every item in the record can be generalized to a node in the cut and every node in
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Algorithm 6.1: DiﬀGen
Input: Raw data set D, privacy budget , and number of specializations h
Output: Generalized data set Dˆ
1: Initialize every value in D to the topmost value;
2: Initialize Cuti to include the topmost value;
3: ′ ← 
2(|Aprn |+2h) ;




5: Compute the score for ∀v ∈ ∪Cuti;
6: for i = 1 to h do
7: Select v ∈ ∪Cuti with probability ∝ exp( ′2Δuu(D, v));
8: Specialize v on D and update ∪Cuti;




10: Update score for v ∈ ∪Cuti;
11: end for
12: return each group with count (C + Lap(2/))
the cut generalizes some items in the record. For example, the value {21, 22} can be
generalized to the hierarchy cuts {2∗} and {∗∗}, but not {1∗, 2∗}. Figure 6.1 shows
a solution cut indicated by the dashed curve representing the anonymous Table 6.2.
Initially, DiﬀGen creates a single partition by generalizing all values in Apr
to the topmost value in their taxonomy trees (Line 1). Cuti contains the topmost
value for each attribute Apri (Line 2). The specialization starts from the topmost
cut and pushes down the cut iteratively by specializing some value in the current
cut. At each iteration DiﬀGen uses exponential mechanism to select a candidate
v ∈ ∪Cuti for specialization (Line 7). Candidates are selected based on their score
values, and diﬀerent heuristics (e.g., information gain) can be used to determine the
score of the candidates. Then, the algorithm specializes v and updates ∪Cuti (Line
8). As taxonomy tree for the numerical attributes are not given, DiﬀGen again
uses the exponential mechanism to determine the split value dynamically for each
numerical candidate vn ∈ ∪Cuti (Lines 4 and 9). DiﬀGen specializes v by recur-
sively distributing the records from the parent partition into disjoint child partitions
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with more speciﬁc value based on the taxonomy tree. For set-valued attribute, the
algorithm computes the noisy count of each child partition to determine whether
it is empty or not. Only “non-empty” partitions are considered for further split in
the next iteration. DiﬀGen also calculates the scores of each new candidates due
to the specialization (Line 10). The algorithm terminates after a given number of
specializations. The proposed algorithm can also be used to publish a contingency
table by allowing the specialization to continue until it reaches the leaf level of the
attribute domains. Finally, for each leaf-partition, the algorithm computes the noisy
count of the equivalence groups to construct the anonymous data table Dˆ.
Example 6.3.1. Consider Table 6.1 with  = 1 and h = 2. Initially the algo-
rithm creates one root partition containing all the records that are generalized to
〈Any_Job, [18-65), ∗∗〉. ∪Cuti includes {Any_Job, [18-65), ∗∗}. To ﬁnd the ﬁrst
specialization among the candidates in ∪Cuti, we compute score of (Any_Job),
[18-65), and ∗∗.
6.3.2 Privacy Analysis
We next elaborate the key steps of the algorithm: (1) selecting a candidate for spe-
cialization, (2) determining the split value, and (3) publishing the noisy counts. We
show that each of these steps preserves privacy, and then we use the composition
properties of diﬀerential privacy to guarantee that DiﬀGen is -diﬀerentially private.
Candidate Selection. We use an exponential mechanism (see Section 6.2) to
select a candidate for specialization in each round. We deﬁne two utility functions
to calculate the score of each candidate v ∈ ∪Cuti. The ﬁrst utility function is
information gain. Let Dv denote the set of records in D generalized to the value v.
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Figure 6.2: Tree for partitioning records
Note that |Dv| =
∑
c |Dc|, where c ∈ child(v). Then, we get
InfoGain(D, v) = Hv(D)−Hv|c(D), (6.3)




|Dv | × log2
|Dclsv |
|Dv| is the entropy of candidate v with respect to




|Dv |Hc(D) is the conditional entropy given
the candidate is specialized. The sensitivity of InfoGain(D, v) is log2 |Ω(Acls)|,
where |Ω(Acls)| is the domain size of the class attribute Acls. It is because the value
of the entropy Hv(D) must be between 0 and log2 |Ω(Acls)|. And, the value of the
conditional entropy Hv|c(D) lies between 0 and Hv(D). Therefore, the maximum
change of InfoGain(D, v) due to the addition or removal of a record is bounded by
log2 |Ω(Acls)|.







Max(D, v) is the summation of the highest class frequencies over all child values and
the sensitivity of this function is 1 because the value of Max(D, v) can vary at most
1 due to the change of a record.
120
Given the scores of all the candidates, exponential mechanism selects a candi-








where u(D, v) is either InfoGain(D, v) or Max(D, v) and the sensitivity of the func-
tion Δu is log2 |Ω(Acls)| and 1, respectively. Thus, from Theorem 6.2, Line 7 of
Algorithm 6.1 satisﬁes ′-diﬀerential privacy. The beauty of the exponential mech-
anism is that while it ensures privacy, it also exponentially favors a candidate with
a high score.
Split Value. Once a candidate is determined, DiﬀGen splits the records into child
partitions. The split value of a categorical attribute is determined according to the
taxonomy tree of the attribute. Since the taxonomy tree is ﬁxed, the sensitivity of
the split value is 0. Therefore, splitting the records according to the taxonomy tree
does not violate diﬀerential privacy.
For numerical attributes, a split value cannot be directly chosen from the
attribute values that appear in the data set D, because the probability of selecting
the same split value from a diﬀerent data set D′ not containing this value is 0. We
again use an exponential mechanism to determine the split value. We ﬁrst partition
the domain into intervals I1, . . . , Ik such that all values within an interval have the









where vi ∈ Ω(Ii), and |Ω(Ii)| is the length of the interval. After selecting the interval,
the split value is determined by sampling a value uniformly from the interval. Thus,
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This satisﬁes ′-diﬀerential privacy because the probability of choosing any




For set-valued attributes, specialization results a total of 2|child(v)| child parti-
tions, where |child(v)| is the number of v’s children. Hence, we want to prune empty
child partitions as early as possible. Due to noise required by diﬀerential privacy,
a child partition cannot be deterministically identiﬁed as non-empty. We issue a
counting query for the noisy size of each child partition by Laplace mechanism. We
use the noisy size to make our decision. We consider a sub-partition “non-empty”
if its noisy size ≥ √2/′. We design the threshold as the standard deviation of the
noise. While this heuristic is arbitrary, it performs well experimentally.
Noisy Counts. Each leaf partition contains |Ω(Acls)| equivalence groups. Publish-
ing the exact counts of these groups does not satisfy diﬀerential privacy since for a
diﬀerent data set D′, the counts may change. This change can be easily oﬀset by
adding noise to the count of each group according to the Laplace mechanism (See
Theorem 6.1). As discussed earlier, the sensitivity of count query is 1; therefore,
to satisfy 
2
-diﬀerential privacy, DiﬀGen adds Lap(2/) noise to each true count of
the groups (Line 12). We post-process the noisy counts by rounding each count
to the nearest non-negative integer. Note that post-processing does not violate the
diﬀerential privacy [59].
Example 6.3.2. Continue from Example 6.3.1. Let the ﬁrst specialization be
∗∗ → {1∗, 2∗}. The algorithm then creates three child partitions with the child
values {1∗}, {2∗}, and {1∗, 2∗} respectively by replacing the node {∗∗} by diﬀerent
combinations of its children, leading r3, r4, r5, and r6 to the child partition {1∗} and
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r1, r2, r7 and r8 to the child partition {1∗, 2∗}. Suppose that the noisy count indicate
that these two child partitions are “non-empty”. Therefore, further splits are needed
on these partitions. However, there is no need to explore the child partition {2∗} any
more as it is considered “empty”. ∪Cuti is updated to {Any_Job, [18-65), 1∗, 2∗}.
Suppose that the next specialization is Any_Job → {Professional, Artist}, which
creates further specialized partitions. Finally, the algorithm outputs the equivalence
groups of each leaf partition along with their noisy counts as shown in Figure 6.2
under the dotted line.
Next, we use composition properties of diﬀerential privacy to guarantee that
the proposed algorithm satisﬁes -diﬀerential privacy as a whole.
Lemma 6.1 (Sequential composition [74]). Let each Agi provide i-diﬀerential pri-




Lemma 6.2 (Parallel composition [74]). Let each Agi provide -diﬀerential privacy.
A sequence of Agi(Di) over a set of disjoint data sets Di provides -diﬀerential
privacy.
Any sequence of computations that each provides diﬀerential privacy in iso-
lation also provides diﬀerential privacy in sequence, which is known as sequential
composition. However, if the sequence of computations is conducted on disjoint
data sets, the privacy cost does not accumulate but depends only on the worst
guarantee of all computations. This is known as parallel composition.
Theorem 6.3. DiﬀGen is -diﬀerentially private.
Proof. The algorithm ﬁrst determines the split value for each numerical attribute
using the exponential mechanism (Line 4). Since the cost of each exponential mech-
anism is ′, Line 4 of the algorithm preserves ′|Aprn |-diﬀerential privacy, where |Aprn |
is the number of numerical attributes.
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In Line 7, the algorithm selects a candidate for specialization. This step
uses the exponential mechanism and thus, candidate selection step guarantees ′-
diﬀerential privacy for each iteration. In Line 8, the algorithm splits the records
into child partitions. For set-valued candidate, ′ privacy budget is used to deter-
mine the non-empty partitions. In Line 9, the algorithm determines the split value
for each new numerical candidate vn ∈ ∪Cuti. All records in the same partition
have the same generalized values on Apr; therefore, each partition can only con-
tain at most one candidate value vn. Thus, determining the split value for the new
candidates requires at most ′ privacy budget for each iteration due to the parallel
composition property. Thus, for each iteration (Lines 6-11), the required privacy
budget is ′, 2′, or 2′, if the candidate is categorical, set-valued, or numerical, re-
spectively. We reserve 2′h privacy budget in total for all iterations. Any privacy
budget left from the partitioning process (Lines 6-11) is added to the remaining
budget to generate noisy count (Line 12).
Finally, the algorithm outputs the noisy count of each group (Line 12) us-
ing the Laplace mechanism and guarantees 
2
-diﬀerential privacy. Therefore, for
′ = 
2(|Aprn |+2h) , DiﬀGen is -diﬀerentially private due to the sequential composition
property.
6.3.3 Implementation
A simple implementation of DiﬀGen is to scan all data records to compute scores
for all candidates in ∪Cuti. Then scan all the records again to perform the spe-
cialization. A key contribution of this work is an eﬃcient implementation of the
proposed algorithm that computes scores based on some information maintained
for candidates in ∪Cuti and provides direct access to the records to be specialized,
instead of scanning all data records. We brieﬂy explain the eﬃcient implementation
of the algorithm as follows.
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Initial Steps (Lines 1-5). Initially, we determine split points for all numerical
candidates (Line 4). First, the data is sorted with respect to the split attribute,
which requires O(|D| log |D|). Then the data is scanned once to determine the score
for all attribute values that appear in the data set D. An interval is represented
by two successive diﬀerent attribute values. Finally, the exponential mechanism is
used to determine the split point. We also compute the scores for all candidates
v ∈ ∪Cuti (Line 5). This can be done by scanning the data set once. However, for
each subsequent iteration, information needed to calculate scores comes from the
update of the previous iteration (Line 10). Thus the worst-case runtime of this step
is O(|Apr| × |D| log |D|).
Perform Specialization (Line 8). To perform a specialization v → child(v),
we need to retrieve Dv, the set of data records generalized to v. To facilitate this
operation we organize the records in a tree structure, with each root-to-leaf path
representing a generalized record over Apr, as shown in Figure 6.2. Each leaf parti-
tion (node) stores the set of data records having the same generalized record for Apr
attributes. For each v in ∪Cuti, Pv denotes a leaf partition whose generalized record
contains v, and Linkv provides direct access to all Pv partitions generalized to v.
For example, LinkProfessional provides a direct access to all partitions containing the
value Professional as shown in Figure 6.2.
Initially, the tree has only one leaf partition containing all data records, gener-
alized to the topmost value on every attribute in Apr. In each iteration we perform a
specialization v by reﬁning the leaf partitions on Linkv. For each value c ∈ child(v)
for the categorical and numerical attribute, a new child partition Pc is created from
Pv, and data records in Pv are split among the new partitions. For set-valued at-
tribute, the child partitions can be exhaustively generated by replacing v by the
combinations of its children c ∈ child(v). For example, the partition {∗∗} generates
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three child partitions: {1∗}, {2∗} and {1∗, 2∗}. This technique, however, is inef-
ﬁcient. We propose an eﬃcient implementation by separately handling non-empty
and empty child partitions of a partition Pv. Non-empty child partitions, usually
of a small number, need to be explicitly generated. For empty child partitions, we
do not explicitly generate all possible ones, but employ a test-and-generate method:
generate a uniformly random empty child partition without replacement only if the
noisy count of an empty child partition is greater than or equal to a threshold. To




This is the only operation in the whole algorithm that requires scanning data
records. In the same scan, we also collect the following information for each c: |Dc|,
|Dg|, |Dclsc | and |Dclsg |, where g ∈ child(c) and cls is a class label. These pieces of
information are used in Line 10 to update scores. The main computational cost
comes from the distribution of records from a partition to its child partitions. Thus,
the total runtime of this step is O(|D|) because the partitioning process for special-
ization can aﬀect at most |D| records in each iteration.
Determine the Split Value (Line 9). If a numerical candidate vn is selected in
Line 7, then we need to determine the split points for two new numerical candidates
cn ∈ child(vn). This step takes time O(|D| log |D|).
Update Score (Line 10). Both InfoGain and Max scores of the other candidates
x ∈ ∪Cuti are not aﬀected by v → child(v), except that we need to compute the
scores of each newly added value c ∈ child(v). The scores of the new candidates are
computed using the information collected in Line 8. Thus, this step can be done in
constant O(1) time.
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Exponential Mechanism (Lines 4, 7 and 9). The cost of the exponential mech-
anism is proportional to the number of discrete alternatives from which it chooses
a candidate. For Line 7, the cost is O(| ∪ Cuti|), and for Lines 4 and 9 the cost is
O(|I|), where |I| is the number of intervals. Usually both | ∪Cuti| and |I| are much
smaller than |D|.
In summary, the cost of the initial steps and Lines 7-10 are O(|Apr|×|D| log |D|)
and O(h×|D| log |D|), respectively. Hence, for a ﬁxed number of attributes the total
runtime of DiﬀGen is O(h× |D| log |D|).
6.4 Experimental Evaluation
In this section our objectives are to study the impact of enforcing diﬀerential privacy
on the data quality in terms of classiﬁcation accuracy, and to evaluate the scalability
of the proposed algorithm for handling large data sets. We also compare DiﬀGen
with DiﬀP-C4.5 [35], a diﬀerentially-private interactive algorithm for building a
classiﬁer, and with the top-down specialization (TDS) approach [38] that publishes
k-anonymous data for classiﬁcation analysis. All experiments were conducted on an
Intel Core i7 2.7GHz PC with 12GB RAM.
We employ two real-life data sets: MIMIC and Adult. MIMIC is a Mulitipa-
rameter Intelligent Monitoring in Intensive Care data set owned by an anonymous
health institute. MIMIC contains over 36,000 intensive care unit (ICU) episodes.
The data set has eight predictor attributes (i.e., marital status, gender, ethnic, pay-
ment description, religion description, admission type, admission source, and ICD9
code) and a class attribute (i.e., mortality). Among all eight attributes, the ﬁrst
seven are categorical attributes and the last one is a set-valued attribute. The pub-



































Number of specializations, h = 5
Figure 6.3: Classiﬁcation accuracy for MIMIC data set
testing many anonymization algorithms. Adult has 45, 222 census records with 6 nu-
merical attributes, 8 categorical attributes, and a binary class column representing
two income levels, ≤50K or >50K.
To evaluate the impact on classiﬁcation quality we divide the data into training
and testing sets. First, we apply our algorithm to anonymize the training set and to
determine the ∪Cuti. Then, the same ∪Cuti is applied to the testing set to produce
a generalized testing set. Next, we build a classiﬁer on the anonymized training
set and measure the classiﬁcation accuracy (CA) on the generalized records of the
testing set. For classiﬁcation models we use the well-known C4.5 classiﬁer [91].For
each experiment we executed 10 runs and averaged the results over the runs.
MIMIC Data Set. We applied DiﬀGen to MIMIC data set for both the utility
functions Max and InfoGain. Figure 6.3 shows the classiﬁcation accuracy CA, where
the privacy budget  = 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 1, and the number of specializations, h = 5.
We use 2/3 of the records to build the classiﬁer and measure the accuracy on the
remaining 1/3 of the records. Both the utility functions have similar performance,
where CA spans from 86% to 89% for diﬀerent privacy budgets. The experimental
result suggests that the proposed algorithm can achieve good classiﬁcation accuracy


















































































(a) Max (b) Information gain
Figure 6.4: Classiﬁcation accuracy for Adult data set
others for the MIMIC data set because no method exists that can anonymize het-
erogeneous data while ensuring -diﬀerential privacy.
Adult Data Set. To better visualize the cost and beneﬁt of our approach we
provide additional measures: Baseline Accuracy (BA) is the classiﬁcation accuracy
measured on the raw data without anonymization. BA − CA represents the cost
in terms of classiﬁcation quality for achieving a given -diﬀerential privacy require-
ment. On the other extreme, we measure Lower bound Accuracy (LA), which is
the accuracy on the raw data with all attributes (except for the class attribute) re-
moved. CA−LA represents the beneﬁt of our method over the naive non-disclosure
approach.
Figure 6.4.a depicts the classiﬁcation accuracy CA for the utility function Max,
where the privacy budget  = 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 1, and the number of specializations
4 ≤ h ≤ 16. The BA and LA are 85.3% and 75.5%, respectively, as shown in the
ﬁgure by the dotted lines. We use 2/3 of the records to build the classiﬁer and
measure the accuracy on the remaining 1/3 of the records. For  = 1 and h = 10,
BA− CA is around 3% and CA− LA is 6.74%. For  = 0.5, BA− CA spans from
3.57% to 4.8%, and CA−LA spans from 5% to 6.23%. However, as  decreases to 0.1,
CA quickly decreases to about 78% (highest point), the cost increases to about 7%,
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and the beneﬁt decreases to about 3%. These results suggest that for an acceptable
privacy budget such as 1, the cost for achieving -diﬀerential privacy is small, while
the beneﬁt of our method over the naive method is large. Figure 6.4.b depicts the
classiﬁcation accuracy CA for the utility function InfoGain. The performance of the
InfoGain is not as good as Max because the diﬀerence between the scores of a good
and a bad attribute is much smaller for InfoGain as compared to Max. Therefore,
exponential mechanism does not work eﬀectively in the case of InfoGain as it does
for Max.
We observe two general trends from the experiments. First, the privacy bud-
get has a direct impact on the classiﬁcation accuracy. A higher budget results in
better accuracy since it ensures better attribute partitioning and lowers the mag-
nitude of noise that is added to the count of each equivalence group. Second, the
classiﬁcation accuracy initially increases with the increase of the number of special-
izations. However, after a certain threshold the accuracy decreases with the increase
of the number of specializations. This is an interesting observation. The number of
equivalence groups increases quite rapidly with an increase in the number of spe-
cializations, resulting in a smaller count per group. Up to a certain threshold it has
a positive impact due to more precise values; however, the inﬂuence of the Laplace
noise gets stronger as the number of specializations grows. Note that if the noise
is as big as the count, then the data is useless. This conﬁrms that listing all the
possible combination of values (i.e., contingency table) and then adding noise to
their counts is not a good approach for high-dimensional data since the noise will
be as big as the count.
Figure 6.5 shows the classiﬁcation accuracy CA of DiﬀGen, DiﬀP-C4.5, and
TDS. For DiﬀGen, we use utility function Max and ﬁx the number of specializations
h = 15. DiﬀP-C4.5 also uses Adult data set and all the results of the DiﬀP-C4.5 are
taken from their paper [35]. For TDS we ﬁxed the anonymity threshold k = 5 and





























































10 runs of 10-fold cross-validation to measure the CA. 10-fold cross-validation yields
higher CA since more training records are available.
The accuracy of DiﬀGen is clearly better than DiﬀP-C4.5 for privacy budget
 ≤ 2. Note that the privacy budget should be typically smaller than 1 [28, 29, 35].
Even for a higher budget, the accuracy of DiﬀGen is comparable to DiﬀP-C4.5. The
major advantage of our algorithm is that we publish data and the data miner has
much better ﬂexibility to perform the required data analysis. On the other hand, in
DiﬀP-C4.5 the classiﬁer is built through interactive queries; therefore, the database
has to be permanently shut down to satisfy the privacy requirement after generating
only one classiﬁer.
The experimental result also shows that DiﬀGen performs better than TDS.
For a higher anonymity threshold k, the accuracy of TDS will be lower. One advan-
tage of DiﬀGen is that, unlike TDS, it does not need to ensure that every equivalence
group contains k records; therefore, DiﬀGen is able to provide more detailed informa-
tion than TDS. This result demonstrates for the ﬁrst time that, if designed properly,
a diﬀerentially private algorithm can provide better utility than a partition-based
approach.





























































within 30 seconds. We further study the scalability of our algorithm over large data
sets. We generate diﬀerent data sets of diﬀerent sizes by randomly adding records
to the Adult data set. For each original record r, we create α − 1 variations of the
record by replacing some of the attribute values randomly from the same domain.
Here α is the blowup scale and thus the total number of records is α× 45, 222 after
adding random records. Figure 6.6 depicts the runtime from 200,000 to 1 million
records for h = 15 and  = 1. The total runtime for anonymizing 1 million records
is 154s, where 50s are spent on reading raw data, 33s are spent on anonymizing, and
24s are spent on writing the anonymous data.
6.5 Discussion
Is diﬀerential privacy good enough? How to determine the number of specializa-
tions? In this section, we provide answers to these questions.
Diﬀerential Privacy. Diﬀerential privacy is a strong privacy deﬁnition. However,
Kifer and Machanavajjhala [60] have shown that if the records are not independent
or an adversary has access to aggregate level background knowledge about the data,
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then privacy attack is possible. In our application scenario, each record is indepen-
dent of each other and we assume that no deterministic statistics of the raw database
have ever been released. Hence, diﬀerential privacy is appropriate for our problem.
Number of Specializations. Since this is a non-interactive approach, the data
publisher can try diﬀerent values for the number of specializations h to ﬁnd the
threshold and then release the anonymized data. Determining a good value of h





In this chapter, we revisit the problem of distributed anonymization described in
Chapter 5 for achieving diﬀerential privacy. We take the single-party algorithm
DiﬀGen (see Chapter 6) as a basis and extend it to the two-party setting. The main
contribution of this chapter can be summarized as follows:
• We present two-party protocols for the exponential mechanism for both ver-
tically and horizontally partitioned data. These protocols can be considered
as primitives and are used by the proposed anonymization algorithms. They
can also be used by other algorithms that require exponential mechanism in a
distributed setting.
• We present the two-party data anonymization algorithm for vertically-partitioned
data that achieves diﬀerential privacy and satisﬁes the security deﬁnition of
semi-honest adversary model (Section 7.4).
• We present the two-party data anonymization algorithm for horizontally-partitioned
data that achieves diﬀerential privacy and satisﬁes the security deﬁnition of
semi-honest adversary model (Section 7.5).
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7.2 Security Model
In this section, we brieﬂy present the privacy deﬁnition in the semi-honest adversary
model and provide an overview of the required cryptographic primitives that are
instrumented inside the proposed algorithms.
7.2.1 Semi-Honest Adversary Model
In the semi-honest model, adversaries follow the protocol but may try to deduce
additional information from the received messages. A protocol is private according
to the semi-honest environment if the view of each party during the execution of the
protocol can be eﬀectively simulated by a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
knowing only the input and the output of that party [42].
Many of the protocols, as it is the case with the proposed algorithms in this
paper, involve the composition of privacy-preserving subprotocols in which all in-
termediate outputs from one subprotocol are inputs to the next subprotocol. These
intermediate outputs are either simulated given the ﬁnal output and the local input
for each party or computed as random shares. Using the composition theorem [42],
it can be shown that if each subprotocol is privacy-preserving, then the resulting
composition is also privacy-preserving.
7.2.2 Cryptographic Primitives
Following we provide an overview of all the cryptographic primitives that are utilized
by the proposed algorithms in this chapter.
• Yao’s Protocol [119]. It is a constant-round protocol for secure computa-
tion of any probabilistic polynomial-time function in the semi-honest adversary
model. To give a general view about this protocol, assume that we have two
parties, P1 and P2, with their inputs respectively x and y. Let assume that
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both parties wish to compute the same value f(x, y). Let P1 generate an en-
crypted circuit computing f(x, .) and send it to P2. The received circuit is
encrypted and accordingly P2 learns nothing from this step. Afterwards, P2
computes the output f(x, y) by decrypting the circuit. This can be achieved
by having P2 obtaining a series of keys corresponding to its input y from P1
such that the function f(x, y) can be computed given these keys and the en-
crypted circuit. However, P2 must obtain these keys from P1 without revealing
any thing about y. This is done by using oblivious transfer protocol [42].
• Random Value Protocol (RVP) [17]. It describes how two parties can
share a value R ∈ ZQ where R has been chosen uniformly at random and Q ∈
ZN is not known by either party, but is shared between them. More speciﬁcally,
P1 has R1 ∈ ZN and P2 has R2 ∈ ZN such that R = R1+R2 mod N ∈ [0, Q−1]
where N is the public key for the additive homomorphic scheme utilized in
this protocol, namely Paillier’s scheme [86].
• Secure Scalar Product Protocol (SSPP) [109]. It privately com-
putes the scalar product of two binary vectors Z1 = (a1, . . . , an) and Z2 =
(b1, . . . , bn) owned by the parties P1 and P2, respectively. At the end of this
protocol, P1 and P2 have random shares of the result.
• Oblivious Polynomial Evaluation (OPE) [84]. It is a protocol involving
two parties, a sender whose input is a polynomial P , and a receiver whose input
is a value α. At the end of the protocol, the receiver learns P (α) and the sender
learns nothing.
7.3 Problem Deﬁnition
The privacy and the utility requirements are similar to the single-party anonymiza-
tion algorithm as presented in Chapter 6. In particular, we adopt the diﬀerential
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privacy model and preserve information for classiﬁcation analysis. Following, we
present the problems of two-party anonymization for vertically and horizontally
partitioned data.
7.3.1 Anonymization for Vertically-Partitioned Data
We assume that there are two data publishers such that Party 1 (P1) and Party
2 (P2) own data tables D1(ID,Apr1 , . . . , A
pr
j , A




over the same set of records, respectively. This can be achieved by executing a secure
set intersection protocol on the explicit identiﬁers (ID) (See Section 5.6 for details).
We also assume that parties hold mutually exclusive set of attributes. ID and the
class attribute Acls are shared between the parties.
Deﬁnition 7.1 (Two-Party Anonymization for Vertically-Partitioned Data). Given
two vertically-partitioned data tables D1 and D2, where Di is owned by Pi, and a pri-
vacy parameter , the problem of two-party anonymization for vertically-partitioned
data is to eﬃciently produce an anonymous integrated table Dˆ such that (1) Dˆ sat-
isﬁes the -diﬀerential privacy requirement, (2) Dˆ contains as much information as
possible for classiﬁcation, and (3) the algorithm to generate Dˆ satisﬁes the security
deﬁnition of the semi-honest adversary model.
7.3.2 Anonymization for Horizontally-Partitioned Data
We assume that there are two data publishers such that Party 1 (P1) and Party 2
(P2) own data tables D1(ID,Apr1 , . . . , A
pr
d , A




the same set of attributes, respectively. Each data publisher owns a disjoint set of
records, where record1 ∩ record2 = ∅.
Deﬁnition 7.2 (Two-Party Anonymization for Horizontally-Partitioned Data). Given
two horizontally-partitioned data tables D1 and D2, where Di is owned by Pi, and
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a privacy parameter , the problem of two-party anonymization for horizontally-
partitioned data is to eﬃciently produce an anonymous integrated table Dˆ such that
(1) Dˆ satisﬁes the -diﬀerential privacy requirement, (2) Dˆ contains as much infor-
mation as possible for classiﬁcation, and (3) the algorithm to generate Dˆ satisﬁes
the security deﬁnition of the semi-honest adversary model.
For both the problem scenarios, we require the class attribute to be categor-
ical. However, the values of the predictor attribute can be either numerical vn or
categorical vc. Further, we require that for each categorical-predictor attribute Apri ,
a taxonomy tree is provided. We assume that there is no trusted third party who
computes the output table Dˆ and the parties are semi-honest.
7.4 Algorithm for Vertically-Partitioned Data
In this section, we ﬁrst describe the two-party anonymization algorithm for vertically-
partitioned data. We then present the distributed exponential mechanism for vertically-
partitioned data along with detailed analysis.
7.4.1 Anonymization Algorithm
Algorithm 7.1 presents the anonymization algorithm for vertically-partitioned data.
Each party keeps a copy of the current ∪Cuti and a generalized table Dg as shown in
Fig. 7.1, in addition to the private table D1 or D2. We assume that both the explicit
identiﬁer and the class attribute are shared among the two parties. For some utility
functions such as information gain and maximum function [77], the class attribute
is needed to calculate the scores of the candidates locally by the parties. However, if
the class attribute is not shard among the parties, we can use other utility functions
that do not depend on the class attribute (e.g., the widest (normalized) range of
candidates [62]) to calculate the scores. In all cases, the parties are able to calculate
the scores of their candidates locally. Algorithm 7.1 is executed by the party P1
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Algorithm 7.1: Algorithm for vertically-partitioned data
Input: Raw data set D1, privacy budget , and number of specializations h
Output: Anonymized data set Dˆ
1: Initialize Dg with one record containing top most values;
2: Initialize Cuti to include the topmost value;
3: ′ ← 
2(|Aprn |+2h) ;





5: Compute the score ∀v ∈ ∪Cuti;
6: for l = 1 to h do
7: Determine winner candidate w by Algorithm 7.2;
8: if w is local then
9: Specialize w on Dg;
10: Replace w with child(w) in the local copy of ∪Cuti;
11: Instruct P2 to specialize and update ∪Cuti;





13: Compute the score for each new v ∈ ∪Cuti;
14: else
15: Wait for the instruction from P2;
16: Specialize w and update ∪Cuti using the instruction;
17: end if
18: end for
19: for each leaf node of Dg do
20: Execute the SSPP Protocol to compute the shares C1 and C2 of the true
count C;
21: Compute X1 = C1 + Lap(2/);
22: Exchange X1 with P2 to compute (C + 2× Lap(2/));
23: end for
24: return Each leaf node with count (C + 2× Lap(2/))
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Table 7.1: Original tables
Shared Party A Party B
ID Class Job ... Sex Salary ...
1 N Writer Male 30K
2 N Dancer Male 25K
3 Y Writer Male 35K
4 N Dancer Female 37K
5 Y Engineer Female 65K
6 Y Engineer Female 35K
7 Y Engineer Male 30K
8 N Dancer Female 44K
9 Y Lawyer Male 44K
10 Y Lawyer Female 44K
(same for the party P2) and can be summarized as follows.
Candidate Selection. We use the distributed exponential mechanism for vertically-
partitioned data (Algorithm 7.2) to select a candidate w, which is owned by P1 or P2,
for specialization in each round (Line 7). Algorithm 7.2 is detailed in Section 7.4.2.
If the winner w is one of P1’s candidates, P1 specializes w on Dg (Line 9), updates its
local copy of ∪Cuti (Line 10) and instructs P2 to specialize and update its local copy
of ∪Cuti accordingly (Line 11). P1 also calculates the scores of the new candidates
due to the specialization (Line 12 and Line 13). If the winner w is not one of P1’s
candidates, P1 waits for instruction from P2 to specialize w and to update its local
copy of ∪Cuti (Line 15 and Line 16). Thus, at each iteration, the two parties cooper-
ate to perform the same specialization as identiﬁed in the single-party algorithm by
communicating certain information that satisﬁes the semi-honest adversary model.
Example 7.4.1. Consider the raw data set of Table 7.1. Party A owns the data set
DA(ID, Job, . . . , Class) whereas PartyB owns the data set DB(ID, Sex, Salary, . . . ,
Class). Initially, Dg contains one root node representing all the records that are gen-
eralized to 〈Any_Job,Any_Sex, [18-99]〉. ∪Cuti is represented as {Any_Job, Any_Sex,
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[18-99]} and includes the initial candidates. To ﬁnd the winner candidate, both par-
ties run Algorithm 7.2. Suppose the winning candidate w is Any_Job→{Professional,
Artist}. The party P1 ﬁrst creates two child nodes under the root node as shown in
Fig. 7.1 and updates ∪Cuti to {Professional, Artist, Any_Sex, [18-99]}. Then, P1
sends instruction to P2. On receiving this instruction, P2 creates the two child nodes
under the root node in its copy of Dg and updates the ∪Cuti. Suppose that the
next winning candidate is Any_Sex → {Male, Female}. Similarly, the two parties
cooperate to create further specialized partitions resulting the generalized table in
Fig. 7.1. We do not show the class attribute in Fig. 7.1.
Computing the Noisy Count. For each leaf node in the resulted Dg from the
previous step, parties need to compute the true count C before adding noise. Us-
ing the Secure Scalar Product Protocol (SSPP) [109] (Line 20), the parties privately
compute the product of the binary vectors Z1 and Z2 provided by P1 and P2, respec-
tively, to produce the shares C1 and C2 of the true count C such that C = C1 +C2.
For each leaf node, the ﬁrst party P1 (similarly P2) computes the binary vector Z1
such that |Z1|=|D1|=|D2| and Z1[i] = 1 if D1[i] matches the generalized value of the
leaf node; otherwise, Z1[i] = 0.
Example 7.4.2. Consider the bottom most left leaf in Fig. 7.1 where the count of
all male professionals whose salaries in the range [18-99] is needed. P1 generates the
binary vector Z1 = [0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1] whereas P2 generates the binary vector
Z2 = [1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0] as detailed in Table 7.2. In the secure scalar product
protocol, the goal is to privately compute the scalar product Z1 ∗ Z2 such that:
Z1 ∗ Z2 =
∑10
i=1(Z1[i]× Z2[i])
= 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 1 + 0 + 1 + 0
= 2
At the end of the protocol, the two parties have random shares of the result
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Figure 7.1: Generalized data table
Table 7.2: Binary vectors
Shared Party A Party B
ID Job Z1[i] Sex Salary Z2[i]
1 Artist 0 Male [18-99]K 1
2 Artist 0 Male [18-99]K 1
3 Artist 0 Male [18-99]K 1
4 Artist 0 Female [18-99]K 0
5 Professional 1 Female [18-99]K 0
6 Professional 1 Female [18-99]K 0
7 Professional 1 Male [18-99]K 1
8 Artist 0 Female [18-99]K 0
9 Professional 1 Male [18-99]K 1
10 Professional 1 Female [18-99]K 0
Finally, each party adds a Laplace noise to its count (Line 21) and sends the
result to the other party (Line 22). The protocol ends up with two Laplace noises
added to the count of each leaf (Line 23). We experimentally measure the impact
of adding two Laplace noise in Section 7.6.
7.4.2 Exponential Mechanism for Vertically-Partitioned Data
Exponential mechanism (See Section 6.2.1) chooses a candidate that is close to
optimum with respect to a utility function while preserving diﬀerential privacy. In
the distributed setting, the candidates are owned by two parties and, therefore,
requires a private mechanism to compute the same output while ensuring that no
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Algorithm 7.2: Exponential mechanism for vertically-partitioned data
Input: Finite discrete alternatives 〈(v1, u1), . . . , (vn, un)〉 owned by the
parties, and privacy budget 
Output: Winner w










3: P1 and P2 execute RVP to compute random shares R1 and R2, where
(R1 + R2) ∈ Z(S1+S2);
4: for k = 1 to n do
5: if k ≤ j then





7: P2 evaluates L2 ← 0;
8: else











12: P1 and P2 execute COMPARISON(R1, R2, L1, L2);
13: if b = 0 then




extra information is leaked to any party.
The distributed exponential mechanism for vertically-partitioned data presented
in Algorithm 7.2 takes two inputs: (1) Finite discrete alternatives 〈(v1, u1), . . . , (vn, un)〉,
where a pair (vi, ui) is composed of the candidate vi and its score ui. Parties P1
and P2 own (v1, u1), . . . , (vj, uj) and (vj+1, uj+1) . . . (vn, un), respectively. (2) Privacy
budget .
The protocol outputs a winner candidate depending on its score using the ex-
ponential mechanism. The scores of the candidates can be calculated using diﬀerent
utility functions [77]. Given the scores of all the candidates, exponential mechanism
selects the candidate vj with the following probability where Δu is the sensitivity
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Algorithm 7.3: COMPARISON
Input: Random shares R1 and R2, and values L1 and L2
Output: b
1: R = R1 + R2;
2: L = L1 + L2;
3: if (R ≤ L) then
4: b = 0;
5: end if
6: return b;







The distributed exponential mechanism can be summarized as follows.
Computing the Probability. A simple implementation of the exponential mech-
anism is to have the interval [0,1] partitioned into segments according to the prob-
ability mass deﬁned in Equation 7.1 for the candidates. Next, we sample a random
number uniformly in the range [0,1] and the partition in which the random number
falls determines the winner candidate. However, this method involves computing
a secure division (Equation 7.1). Unfortunately, we are not aware of any secure
division scheme that ﬁts our scenario where the nominator value is less than the
denominator value.
Alternatively, we solve this problem without a secure division protocol. We




2Δu)] into n segments where each segment
corresponds to a candidate vi and has a subinterval of length equal to exp( ui2Δu). We





segment in which the random number falls determines the winner candidate.
Picking a Random Number. Each party ﬁrst computes individually exp( ui
2Δu)
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Table 7.3: Cost analysis
l Scaling Floor Value Cost (Extra Bits)
1 2.718281828× 101 27 log2101
2 2.718281828× 102 271 log2102
3 2.718281828× 103 2718 log2103
4 2.718281828× 104 27182 log2104




2Δu) and s2 =∑n
i=j+1 exp(
ui
2Δu), respectively. P1 and P2 need to pick a random number uniformly




2Δu). This can be achieved by
using the random value protocol (RVP) [17]. RVP takes s1 and s2 from the parties
as input and outputs the random value shares R1 and R2 to the respective parties,
where R = R1 + R2. However, RVP works only in an integer setting but s1 and s2
can be decimal numbers because of the exponential function exp.
We address this issue by scaling and take the ﬂoor value of exp( ui
2Δu) × 10l.
Here, l is a predeﬁned number between the parties which indicates the number of
the considered digits after the decimal point. For example, the value 2.718281828 of
exp( ui
2Δu) can be scaled in diﬀerent ways according to the considered digits after the
decimal point as shown in Table 7.3. The parties should agree on a speciﬁc value for
l and only consider the integer portion using the ﬂoor function. The higher accuracy
(in terms of the number of the considered digits after the decimal point) we demand,
the higher cost we pay (in terms of bits) as shown also in Table 7.3. These extra bits
result additional computation and communication cost. Note that restricting the
values of exp( ui
2Δu) to a ﬁnite range is completely natural as calculations performed
on computers are handled in this manner due to memory constraints.
Example 7.4.3. Suppose P1 has two candidates and the values of exp( ui2Δu) for
these candidates are 54.59815003 and 403.4287935, respectively whereas P2 has one
candidate that has a computed value of 7.389056099. After deciding that the value
of l is one and considering the ﬂoor value, P1 ends up with the integer values 545 and
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4034 whereas P2 ends up with the value 73. Both parties then pick a random number
in the range [0, 4652] using the RVP where 4652 = 545+4034+73. Similarly, if the
parties decide that the value of l is two, P1 ends up with the integer values 5459 and
40342 whereas P2 ends up with the value 738. The two parties then pick a random
number in the range [0, 46539] using the RVP where 46539 = 5459 + 40342 + 738.
Picking a Winner. The two parties engage in a simple secure circuit evaluation
process using Yao’s Protocol [119] in Line 12. The circuit COMPARISON compares
their random number R with the sum (L1+L2) provided by P1 and P2, respectively.





2Δu) and L2 = 0, or





Example 7.4.4. (Continued from Example 7.4.3) Suppose the two parties pick
a random number in [0, 4652] using RVP. The circuit ﬁrst checks if the random
number is less than or equal to 545. If so, the ﬁrst candidate of P1 is the winner;
otherwise, the circuit checks again if the random number is less than or equal to
4579 (545 + 4034). If so, the second candidate of P1 is the winner; otherwise, the
candidate of P2 is the winner since the random number must be within the range
[0, 4652] according to the RVP [17].
Remark. The proposed distributed exponential mechanism is independent from
the choice of the utility function. Any function that can be computed locally, such
as information gain, maximum function, or the widest (normalized) range of values,
can be used readily in our algorithm. However, if the data owners (parties) prefer
to use a utility function that cannot be computed locally, then extra measures must
be taken to compute the score privately prior running Algorithm 7.2.
7.4.3 Analysis
We next discuss the correctness, security and eﬃciency of Algorithm 7.1.
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Proposition 7.1. (Correctness) Assuming both parties are semi-honest, Algorithm 7.1
computes a -diﬀerentially private output when both the parties hold diﬀerent at-
tributes for the same set of individuals.
Proof. Algorithm 7.1 performs the same function as the single-party algorithm (Dif-
fGen) but in a distributed setting. DiﬀGen is -diﬀerentially private [77]. Therefore,
we prove the correctness of Algorithm 7.1 by just proving the steps that are diﬀerent
from DiﬀGen:
• Candidate selection. Algorithm 7.1 selects a candidate for specialization (Line7)
using Algorithm 7.2. Algorithm 7.2 selects a candidate vi with probability ∝
exp( ui
2Δu)). Each party computes exp(
ui
2Δu) for its candidates. Then the par-




2Δu)] and partition it among
the candidates where each subinterval has a length equal to exp( ui
2Δu). Since,




2Δu)] and a candidate







. Therefore, Algorithm 7.2 correctly implements exponential
mechanism and step guarantees ′-diﬀerential privacy.
• Updating the tree Dg and ∪Cuti. Each party has its own copy of Dg and
∪Cuti. Each party updates these items exactly like DiﬀGen either using the
local information or using the instruction provided by the other party (Lines
8-17).
• Computing the noisy count. Algorithm 7.1 outputs the noisy count of each leaf




Since Algorithm 7.1 performs exactly the same sequence of operations as in
DiﬀGen in a distributed manner where D1 and D2 are kept locally, it is also -
diﬀerentially private.
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Proposition 7.2. (Security) Algorithm 7.1 is secure under the semi-honest adver-
sary model.
Proof. The security of Algorithm 7.1 depends on the steps where the parties ex-
change information and it is conducted as follows:
• Line 7 (Algorithm 7.2): The only communication between P1 and P2 in Algo-
rithm 7.2 takes place in executing the random value protocol (RVP) and the
circuit COMPARISON. Since RVP [17] and COMPARISON [42, 43] have proven to
be secure, Algorithm 7.2 is secure due to composition theorem [42].
• Line 11 and Line 15: The party that owns the winner candidate instructs the
other party to specialize w and update its local copy of ∪Cuti. The nature of
the top-down approach implies that Dg is more general than the ﬁnal answer
and, therefore, does not leak any additional information.
• Line 20: The secure scalar product protocol is proven to be secure [109].
• Line 22: The two parties exchange the noisy count shares to compute the
noisy count. This does not violate diﬀerential privacy because the noisy count
shares are already private according to Laplace mechanism [30].
Therefore, due to composition theorem [42], Algorithm 7.1 is secure.
Proposition 7.3. (Complexity) The encryption and the communication costs of
Algorithm 7.1 are bounded by O(2h|D|) and O(2hE|D|), respectively.
Proof. Most of the encryptions and the communications occur in Line 7 and Line
20 of Algorithm 7.1. Following we analyse the cost of each of these lines separately.
• Line 7 (Algorithm 7.2): Both parties run RVP where O(ξ) and O(ζ) are the
encryption and the communication costs of RVP, respectively. The add and
the compare operations determine the complexity of the COMPARISON circuit.
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Since these operations can be implemented by the number of gates linear to





2Δu) × 10l. Hence, the number of the encryptions and
the communication complexity of COMPARISON are bounded by O(logF ) and
O(K logF ), respectively, where K is the length of the key for a pseudoran-
dom function. The COMPARISON protocol is called at most n times in Line
12. Therefore, the encryption and the communication costs are bounded by
O(ξ + n logF ) and O(ζ + nK logF ), respectively. Assuming, n logF  ξ
and nK logF  ζ, the total encryption and communication costs of Algo-
rithm 7.2 are bounded by O(n logF ) and O(nK logF ), respectively. However,
Line 7 is executed h times in total. Hence, the number of encryptions and
the communication complexity of Line 7 are O(hn logF ) and O(hnK logF ),
respectively.
• Line 20: Parties run the SSPP to compute the count of each leaf node. The
total number of leaf nodes is 2h. The encryption and the communication costs
of the SSPP are O(|D|) and O(E|D|), where E is the bit length of an encrypted
item [109]. Therefore, the costs of this step are O(2h|D|) and O(2hE|D|) for
encryption and communication, respectively.
Thus, the total costs of the encryption and the communication of Algorithm 7.1
are bounded by O(max{hn logF, 2h|D|}) and O(max{hnK logF, 2hE|D|}), respec-
tively. Since the value of 2h|D| is usually very large, the encryption and communi-
cation costs can be deﬁned as O(2h|D|) and O(2hE|D|), respectively.
7.5 Algorithm for Horizontally-Partitioned Data
In this section, we ﬁrst describe the two-party anonymization algorithm for horizontally-
partitioned data. We then present the distributed exponential mechanism for horizontally-
partitioned data along with detailed analysis.
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Algorithm 7.4: Algorithm for horizontally-partitioned data
Input: Raw data set D1, privacy budget , and number of specializations h
Output: Anonymized data set Dˆ
1: Initialize Dg with one record containing top most values;
2: Initialize Cuti to include the topmost value;
3: ′ ← 
2(|Aprn |+2h) ;
4: for l = 1 to h do
5: Determine winner candidate w by Algorithm 7.5;
6: Specialize w on Dg;
7: Replace w with child(w) in ∪Cuti;
8: end for
9: for each leaf node of Dg do
10: Compute the share C1 of the true count C;
11: Compute X1 = C1 + Lap(2/);
12: Exchange X1 with P2 to compute (C + 2× Lap(2/));
13: end for
14: return Each leaf node with count (C + 2× Lap(2/))
7.5.1 Anonymization Algorithm
Algorithm 7.4 presents the anonymization algorithm for horizontally-partitioned
data, and is executed by the party P1 (same for the party P2). The algorithm follows
the same top-down approach like the single-party algorithm. The general idea is to
anonymize the raw data by a sequence of specializations starting from the topmost
general state. Each party keeps a copy of the current ∪Cuti and a generalized table
Dg, in addition to the private table D1 or D2. Initially, all values in Apr are gener-
alized to the topmost value in their taxonomy trees, and Cuti contains the topmost
value for each attribute Apri . At each iteration, Algorithm 7.4 uses the distributed
exponential mechanism for horizontally-partitioned data to select a candidate for
specialization (Line 5). This can be achieved by calling Algorithm 7.5 detailed in
Section 7.5.2. Once a candidate is determined, both the parties specialize the winner
candidate w on Dg (Line 6) by splitting their records into child partitions according
to the provided taxonomy trees. Then, the parties update their local copy of ∪Cuti
(Line 7). This process is repeated according to the number of specializations h.
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Algorithm 7.5: Exponential mechanism for horizontally-partitioned data
Input: A set of candidates {v1, . . . , vk} and, privacy budget 
Output: Winner w
1: for each candidate vx where x = 1 to k do
2: for (each possible value of aj of vx where j = 1 to m) do
3: for (each class value ci where i = 1 to l) do
4: P1 computes |D1(aj, ci)|;
5: P2 computes |D2(aj, ci)|;
6: end for
7: end for
8: P2 generates a random share α2;
9: (P1 ← α1, P2 ← ⊥) ←
MAX(|D1(aj, ci)|i=1 to l,j=1 to m, |D2(aj, ci)|i=1 to l,j=1 to m, α2);
10: P1 chooses a random share βx and deﬁnes the following polynomial







11: P1 and P2 execute a private polynomial with P1 inputting Q(.) and P2
inputting α2, in which P2 obtains β′x = Q(α2).
12: end for
13: (P1 ← γ1, P2 ← ⊥) ← SUM(βx,x=1 to k, β′x,x=1 to k, γ2);
14: P1 and P2 execute RVP to compute random shares R1 and R2, where
(R1 + R2) ∈ Z(γ1+γ2);
15: P1 and P2 evaluates x← COMPARISON(R1, R2, βx,x=1 to k, β′x,x=1 to k);
16: return vx;
Finally, each party computes the number of its records under each leaf node (Line
10), adds a Laplace noise to its count (Line 11), and sends the result to the other
party (Line 12). Thus, two Laplace noises are added to each leaf count similar to
the algorithm for vertically-partitioned data.
7.5.2 Exponential Mechanism for Horizontally-Partitioned Data
The distributed exponential mechanism for horizontally-partitioned data pre-
sented in Algorithm 7.5 takes the followings as inputs: (1) A set of candidates
{v1, . . . , vk}, and (2) privacy budget . Similarly, the protocol outputs a winner
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Algorithm 7.6: MAX circuit
Input: |D1(aj, ci)|i=1 to l,j=1 to m, |D2(aj, ci)|i=1 to l,j=1 to m and α2
Output: α1 to P1,⊥ to P2
1: sum = 0;
2: for j = 1 to m do
3: max = 0;
4: for i = 1 to l do
5: ss= |D1(aj, ci)|+ |D2(aj, ci)|;
6: if (ss > max) then
7: max = ss;
8: end if
9: end for
10: sum = sum + max;
11: end for
12: α1 = sum - α2;
13: return α1,⊥;







Here, we use the Max utility function as described in Chapter 6. More discussion
about other utility functions are provided in Section 7.7.
Computing Max Utility Function. Unlike vertically-partitioned data, com-
puting score for each candidate requires additional work. To compute the Max
utility function for each candidate vx, the parties P1 and P2 compute |D1(aj, ci)|
and |D2(aj, ci)|, respectively for every possible value aj of vx and for every possible
value ci of the class attribute (Lines 2 to 7). Here, |D(a, c)| denotes the number
of records in D having the generalized value a and the class value c. After that,
the two parties engage in a secure circuit evaluation process using Yao’s Protocol
(Line 9). The values |D1(aj, ci)|i=1 to l,j=1 to m, |D2(aj, ci)|i=1 to l,j=1 to m, and α2 are
passed to the MAX circuit where α2 is randomly generated by P2. The MAX circuit is
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used to compute the shares of Max utility function value for each candidate vx. For
each child value aj of the candidate vx, the circuit MAX, as shown in Algorithm 7.6,
adds the corresponding values |D1(aj, ci)| and |D2(aj, ci)| for every possible value ci
of the class attribute. It then computes the maximum value of the results. Next,
the maximum values associated with each child value aj are summed to get the Max
utility function value for the candidate vx. To produce random shares of the Max
utility function value, the circuit ﬁnally subtracts α2, which is randomly generated
by P2, from the resulted score and outputs the result α1 to P1.
Computing the Probability. The exponential function, exp(x) can be deﬁned







+ · · ·+ x
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To evaluate the nominator of Equation 7.2 for each vx, we need to evaluate
the expression exp( u
2Δu) that is equal to exp(
(α1+α2)













Hence, the next step involves computing shares of the Taylor series approxi-
mation. In fact, parties computes the shares of:








• lcm(2!, . . . , w!) is the lowest common multiple of {2!,. . . ,w!} and we multiply
by it to ensure that there are no fractions.
• ( 
2Δu)s refers to approximating the value of

2Δu up to a predetermined number
s after the decimal point. For example, if we assume s = 4 and  = ln2
then ( ln2
2×1)4 = (0.3465). Note that, this approximation does not eﬀect privacy
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guarantee since we are using less privacy budget. Also, the impact on the
utility is insigniﬁcant. In Section 7.6, we experimentally show the accuracy
for diﬀerent privacy budgets.
• 10sw is multiplied to the series to ensure that the resulting value is an integer.
This equation is accurate up to an approximation error which depends on the
value of w. However, they may be made arbitrarily close to the true value. Since s
and w are known to both parties, the additional multiplicative factors lcm(2!, . . . , w!)
and 10sw are public and can be removed at the end (if desired).
To evaluate the nominator of Equation 7.2 for each candidate vx, P1 chooses
a random share βx and deﬁnes the following polynomial (Line 10):









It is easy to see that









Afterwards, P1 and P2 execute a private polynomial with P1 inputting Q(.)
and P2 inputting α2, in which P2 obtains β′x = Q(α2) (Line 11). To evaluate the
denominator of Equation 7.2, the two parties execute the circuit SUM which takes
as input the random shares βx and β′x for each candidate vx and a random number
γ2 generated by P2 (Line 13). The circuit computes the total sum of the results by
adding the random shares βx and β′x for each candidate vx. It then subtracts γ2,
which is randomly generated by P2, from the value of the total sum and outputs the
share γ1 to P1.
Once we compute the denominator and numerator of Equation 7.2, we can
implement the exponential mechanism like the distributed exponential mechanism
for vertically-partitioned data (See Algorithm 7.2). In particular, we ﬁrst partition
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Algorithm 7.7: COMPARISON circuit
Input: Random shares R1 and R2, βx,x=1 to k, and β′x,x=1 to k
Output: Index x to P1 and P2
1: L = 0;
2: R = R1 + R2;
3: for x = 1 to k do
4: β = βx + β′x;
5: L = L + β;












2Δu) = γ1 + γ2,
and each segment corresponds to a candidate vx with a subinterval of length equal
to βx + β′x. We then sample a random number uniformly in the range [0, γ1 + γ2]
and the segment in which the random number falls determines the winner candidate.
Picking a Random Number. The parties P1 and P2 need to pick a random





can be achieved by using RVP (Line 14). RVP takes γ1 and γ2 from the parties
as input and outputs the random value shares R1 and R2 to the respective parties,
where R = R1 + R2.
Picking a Winner. The two parties engage again in a simple secure circuit evalua-
tion process using Yao’s Protocol [119] (Line 15). The circuit COMPARISON compares
their random number R with the sum L. The winner vx is the ﬁrst candidate such
that R ≤ L where L =∑xr=1(βx + β′x).
7.5.3 Analysis
In this section, we discuss the correctness, security and eﬃciency of Algorithm 7.4.
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Proposition 7.4. (Correctness) Assuming both parties are semi-honest, Algorithm 7.4
computes a -diﬀerentially private output when both the parties hold diﬀerent
records for the same set of attributes.
Proof. The proof is identical to the algorithm for vertically-partitioned data (Sec
Section 7.4.3). Essentially, Algorithm 7.4 performs exactly the same sequence of
operations as the single-party algorithm and thus it also guarantees -diﬀerential
privacy.
Proposition 7.5. (Security) Algorithm 7.4 is secure under the semi-honest adver-
sary model.
Proof. The security of Algorithm 7.4 depends on the following steps where the par-
ties exchange information:
• Line 5 (Algorithm 7.5): The security proof is as follows:
– Circuit MAX: It can be evaluated securely [42]. Parties input their local
counts |D(aj, ci)| and receive the random share of the MAX value.
– Oblivious Polynomial Evaluation: It has been proven to be secure [84].
– Random Value Protocol (RVP): It has proven to be secure [17].
– Circuits SUM and COMPARISON: Similarly, these circuits can be evaluated
securely [42].
Since, all the above protocols produce random shares and proved to be secure,
Algorithm 7.5 is also secure due to the composition theorem [42].
• Line 12: Each party initially adds Laplace noise to its local count and then
exchange the noisy count with the other party. Therefore, the noisy count is
already private according to Laplace mechanism [30].
Hence, Algorithm 7.4 is secure due to Composition Theorem [42].
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Proposition 7.6. (Complexity) The encryption and the communication costs of
Algorithm 7.4 are bounded by O(hk logF ) and O(hk logFK), respectively.
Proof. Distributed exponential mechanism (Algorithm 7.5) dominates the overall
complexity of Algorithm 7.4. The complexity of Algorithm 7.5 is computed as
follows:
• Circuit MAX: This circuit is composed of simple add and compare operations and
thus can be implemented by the number of gates linear to the input size of the
circuit. The input includes m×l local counts |D(aj, ci)| and these values are of
size at most log |D|. Hence, the encryption and the communication complexity
of MAX are bounded by O(ml log |D|) and O(ml log |D|K), respectively, where
K is the length of the key for a pseudorandom function. The MAX protocol
is called at most k times. Therefore, the encryption and the communication
costs are O(kml log |D|) and O(kml log |D|K), respectively.
• Oblivious Polynomial Evaluation: This protocol involves the private evaluation
of a polynomial of degree w. Thus, the encryption and the communication
complexity are bounded by O(w) and O(wE), where E is the length of an
encrypted element [66]. This protocol is also called k times. Therefore, the
encryption and the communication cost are O(kw) and O(kwE), respectively.
• Random Value Protocol (RVP): The costs of RVP are negligible and therefore
they are ignored.
• Circuit SUM and COMPARISON: The analysis is similar to MAX circuit. The en-
cryption and the communication complexity of both the circuits are bounded
by O(k logF ) and O(k logFK), where F = exp( ′ux
2Δu)× 10s.
Both the parties execute Algorithm 7.5 h times to select the winner candidates. Note
that Lines 1-12 of Algorithm 7.5 are not executed in every iteration. Rather, these


















































Figure 7.2: Classiﬁcation accuracy for two-party
communication costs are O(max{kml log |D|, kw, hk logF}) andO(max{kml log |D|K,
kwE, hk logFK}), respectively. Since the value of F is usually very large, the en-
cryption and communication costs can be deﬁned as O(hk logF ) and O(hk logFK),
respectively.
7.6 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the impact of adding two Laplace noises to the leaf counts
on the data quality in terms of classiﬁcation accuracy. We employ the publicly
available data set Adult [34, 38] for the experiment and adopt the same procedure
like the single-party algorithm. In particular, we use 2/3 of the records (i.e., 30,162)
to build the classiﬁer and measure the accuracy on the remaining 1/3 of the records
(i.e., 15060). For each experiment, we execute 10 runs and average the results over
the runs.
Figure 7.2 depicts the classiﬁcation accuracy CA for the utility function Max
where the privacy budget  ∈ {0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 1}. We observe that the impact of
adding two Laplace noises is insigniﬁcant. It is because around half of the time
the noises are canceled out (when the signs are opposite) resulting a more accurate
count compared to the single-party case. And, the other half of the time, the count
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is more noisy (when the signs are same). Overall the impact of adding two Laplace
noises is negligible and the accuracy is comparable to adding only one Laplace noise.
7.7 Discussion
What changes are required if there are more than two parties? How reasonable it is
to assume that the parties are semi-honest and not malicious? Can the algorithms
be easily adapted to accommodate a diﬀerent utility function? In this section, we
provide answers to these questions.
More than Two Parties. The proposed algorithms are only applicable for the
two-party scenario because the distributed exponential algorithms, and the other
primitives (e.g., random value protocol, secure scalar product protocol) are limited
to two-party scenario. The proposed algorithms can be extended for more than
two parties by modifying all the sub-protocols while keeping the general top-down
structure of the algorithms as it is.
Semi-Honest Adversary Model. This is the common security deﬁnition used in
the SMC literature [53] and it is realistic in our problem scenario since diﬀerent or-
ganizations are collaborating to share their data securely for mutual beneﬁts. Hence,
it is reasonable to assume that parties will not deviate from the deﬁned protocol.
However, they may be curious to learn additional information from the messages
they received during the protocol execution. To extend the algorithm for malicious
parties, all the sub-protocols should be extended and must be secure under the ma-
licious adversary model.
Other Utility Functions. For each new utility function, we only need to devise




We address the problem of data sharing while preserving the privacy of individuals.
Inspired by real-life scenarios, we develop algorithms for anonymizing relational, tra-
jectory, and heterogeneous data for diﬀerent application scenarios. We also address
the problem of distributed anonymization to enable multiple parties to integrate and
share their date privately. The proposed algorithms guarantee two privacy models,
preserve data utility for data mining, and are scalable for handling large data sets.
Following we summarize the contributions of this thesis.
8.1 Summary
In the ﬁrst part of the thesis, we begin by proposing a privacy-aware information
sharing method for healthcare institutes with the objective of supporting data min-
ing. Motivated by the Red Cross Blood Transfusion Service (BTS)’s privacy and in-
formation requirements, we formulate the LKC-privacy model for high-dimensional
relational data and develop an anonymization algorithm according to the BTS’ in-
formation need (Chapter 3). We then study the problem of anonymizing trajectory
data and illustrate that traditional QID-based anonymization methods, such as k-
anonymity and its variants, are not suitable for anonymizing trajectory data, due to
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the curse of high dimensionality. To overcome the problem, we adopt LKC-privacy
model and present an eﬃcient algorithm for preserving maximal frequent sequences,
which serves as the basis of many data mining tasks on sequential data (Chapter 4).
Following this, we deﬁne the problem of distributed anonymization for the purpose
of joint classiﬁcation analysis. We formalize this problem as achieving the LKC -
privacy on the integrated data without revealing more detailed information in the
process. We present two solutions based on two diﬀerent application scenarios and
evaluate the beneﬁts of data integration (Chapter 5).
In the second part of the thesis, we focus on diﬀerential privacy and develop
an anonymization algorithm for heterogeneous data. The proposed solution con-
nects the classical generalization technique with output perturbation to eﬀectively
anonymize raw data. Experimental results suggest that the proposed solution pro-
vides better utility than the interactive approach and the k-anonymous data, and
that it is more eﬀective than publishing a contingency table (Chapter 6). Finally,
we present the two-party algorithms for diﬀerentially-private data release. The algo-
rithms similarly address two scenarios where the data are divided among the parties
either vertically or horizontally. We show that the algorithms are diﬀerentially pri-
vate and secure for semi-honest adversary model. These algorithms provide a prac-
tical solution to secure data integration where there is the dual need for information
sharing and privacy protection (Chapter 7).
Thus, the main contribution of this thesis is to develop anonymization algo-
rithms for diﬀerent application scenarios while satisfying diﬀerent notions of privacy.
8.2 Looking Ahead
At the end of the day, this thesis provides a technical response to the demand of
simultaneous information sharing and privacy protection. However, the problems of
data privacy can not be fully solved only by technology. We believe that there is
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an urgent need to bridge the gap between advanced privacy preservation technology
and current policies. In the future, we expect that social and legal regulations will
complement the best practices of privacy-preserving technology. To this end, it
is also important to standardize some privacy models and algorithms for diﬀerent
applications as it is unlikely that there exists a one-size-ﬁt solution for all application
scenarios. Thus, the future research direction appears to lie in deﬁning suitable
privacy models, and developing trustworthy algorithms and systems that provide
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